

THE RISE OF THE  
AMERICAN NATION

1789 - 1824

*BY FRANCIS FRANKLIN*



INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHERS, NEW YORK

COPYRIGHT, 1943, BY  
INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHERS CO., INC.  
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES



*This International Publishers Wartime  
Book is produced in full compliance with  
the Government's regulation for conserv-  
ing paper and other essential material.*

## CONTENTS

Preface	7
<i>Part One: THE FORMATION OF THE NATION, 1763-1789</i>	
I. The War for Independence	11
II. The Establishment of the Federal Government	21
III. The United States in 1789	33
<i>Part Two: DEMOCRATIC VICTORY OVER FEDERALIST REACTION, 1789-1801</i>	
IV. The Hamiltonian Offensive of the Merchant Capitalists	57
V. The Rise of the Jeffersonian Party	74
VI. Conflict Over Foreign Policy	85
VII. The Victory of Jeffersonian Democracy	98
<i>Part Three: VICTORY OF THE AMERICAN NATION OVER FOREIGN AGGRESSION, 1801-1815</i>	
VIII. Jeffersonian Democracy in Power	121
IX. Western Expansion and Federalist Treason	144
X. Jeffersonian Plans for Future Internal Devel- opment	162
XI. The Democratic Peace Policy of the United States, 1807-1811	168
XII. Preparations for an Offensive War of National Liberation	185
XIII. The War of 1812	195
<i>Part Four: NATIONAL AND SECTIONAL GROWTH, 1815-1824</i>	
XIV. The Rise of Industrial Capitalism and Other Nationalistic Trends	223
XV. The First Major Conflict Over Slavery	239
XVI. Hemispheric Defense Against Old World Ag- gression	256
XVII. Political Realignment in 1824	261
Reference and Explanatory Notes	271
Bibliography	281
Index	285

TO MY MOTHER  
WHO TAUGHT ME LOVE OF PEOPLE  
AND PRIDE IN MY HERITAGE

**PREFACE**

WHEN our country first achieved its independence and then established a democratic federal government, the worldwide aspirations of men for freedom were given a new hope. There was something unprecedented in the character of our nation as it grew across a virgin continent during the years following the adoption of our Constitution. While monarchies and other reactionary governments prevailed in Europe, the American people established on a national scale the first truly democratic republic and in the years to come succeeded in preserving—and extending—their democracy.

It is not accidental that our country is now allied with the United Nations for the purpose of securing the liberation of all the countries conquered or threatened by fascist tyranny. Our nation was founded in a people's war against foreign rule. Throughout the years of its youth, it preserved its freedom by championing the rights of other nations which were threatened by our foes.

There is a continuous line of development running from the Declaration of Independence of 1776 through the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 to the Pact of the United Nations of 1942. The Declaration of Independence proclaimed the freedom of one nation, though it paved the way for the unshackling of other peoples. The Monroe Doctrine in 1823 proclaimed the freedom of a whole hemisphere, though it championed the cause of the nations of Europe whose constitutional governments were then being crushed by the armies of the "Holy Alliance." The Pact of the United Nations now proclaims the freedom of peoples throughout the world. It is the logical fulfillment of the democratic foreign policy of our nation during the period of its youth.

The aim of this book is to trace in general outline the growth of our nation during its formative years from 1789 to 1824. During those years, our nation succeeded in preserving its democratic character against both internal and foreign foes. No pretense is made in these pages to present new facts not to be found

in other historical works. Our nation's past was such that every history of America without exception has had to present at least certain major portions of the story of the battle for American democracy. The present volume attempts to interpret the well-known facts of American national growth from 1789 to 1824 in the light of Marxian theory. It is my hope that this book may be of some small service in leading to a greater appreciation of that national heritage which we are now defending.

To my native state, Virginia, I owe my early love for Thomas Jefferson, the real hero of this book. That love was deepened by my years of study at "Mr. Jefferson's University," as the University of Virginia is often called by its faculty and students. However, it was my study of the writings of Marx and Engels which first opened my eyes to the grandeur of Thomas Jefferson as a world figure. For the first time, I began to see the great role which our country played in world history during its formative years. In seeking to deepen my understanding of American history, I have been constantly stimulated and guided by the writings of Earl Browder, which have thrown such brilliant light upon the great pages of our country's past.


I wish to express my gratitude to Mr. J. Mindel, to whom I owe more than to any other individual for the personal guidance he gave me while I was preparing to write this book. I also owe many thanks to Miss Elizabeth Lawson, my colleague in the History Department of the Workers School. To many others who rendered assistance thanks are due, but space forbids further enumeration.

F. F.

## PART ONE

### The Formation of the Nation

1763-1789



WESTERN LAND CLAIMS OF THE STATES IN 1781  
(see pages 22-23).

## CHAPTER I

### THE WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE

AMERICA was born through revolution—the first nation of the New World. Unlike the nations of Europe, it did not grow within the ancient domains of feudal barons but on a virgin continent which had never known typical medieval forms of oppression. The United States in 1776 opened the truly modern period of world history by proclaiming on its banners a democratic program which was openly economic and political rather than religious. The American struggle on the edges of a vast and unsettled wilderness beyond the seas fired the imagination of the world.

The British colonies in America were formed at various intervals between 1607 and 1733 by trading companies or individual proprietors possessed of grants from the Crown. Capitalist exchange during this period was undermining feudalism in Europe, and Great Britain was challenging the mercantilist powers of Spain, France, and Holland for world supremacy. The absolutist Tudors, Henry VIII and Queen Elizabeth, who fostered capitalist development, took the first steps toward establishing a colonial empire. However, it was under the reactionary Stuarts, who fought, on behalf of the aristocracy, to hold in check the rising bourgeois order that the first permanent English settlements on the North American continent were made.

The Stuart monarchs, engaged in their long struggle against the British nation itself, paid little attention to the colonies. The short-lived bourgeois commonwealth, established by the Puritan Revolution after the Civil War of 1642-49, found its hands too full at home—and in Ireland—to give much heed to distant America. Only after the English revolution ended in compromise, with the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, did the British Crown begin energetically to elaborate a colonial policy.

However, after the final removal of the Stuarts in 1689, foreign wars and Whig opposition to the Tory merchants prevented any consistent enforcement of that policy. Not until 1763, following Britain's victory over France in the Seven Years' War, was a determined effort made toward vigorous exploitation of the colonies. By that time, it was too late.

There was a conflict of interests between the colonial peoples and the British rulers of America from the time of the first settlement at Jamestown in 1607. The British Crown sought on behalf of the merchants of England to drain colonial wealth into the mother country.<sup>1</sup> Those who migrated to America came in search of freedom, security, and wealth for themselves. A clash between the two interests was inevitable.

The most diverse economic relations sprang up in the colonies, ranging from forced labor and slavery, alongside small-scale agriculture, in the Southern settlements to widespread small commodity production and overseas commerce, with some manufacturing, in New England. Although there was much self-sufficiency on the frontier and on plantations, farmers, artisans, and the big landlords engaged extensively in producing articles of trade. Thus, the fundamental content of economic life in America was always bourgeois, even though feudal remnants in the forms of land tenure were introduced and maintained in practically all of the colonies until the Revolution.<sup>2</sup> Before the French and Indian War of 1754-63, the colonies had virtually no contact with one another. As long as each colony had economic and political ties almost exclusively with England, an inter-colonial home market as the framework for national development<sup>3</sup> could not arise. The forms of British rule made this impossible.

While still under British rule, a large section of the inhabitants of the thirteen English colonies obtained more democratic rights than were enjoyed by any other people on earth. Civil rights for the property-holding classes existed side by side with slavery and indentured bondage. Legal rights were hedged round with royal and proprietary restrictions. Yet these civil rights were very real and the history of American democracy must date from the establishment of the Virginia House of Burgesses in 1619.

The winning of civil rights in America was made possible by the democratic upsurge occurring in England itself. Prospective settlers among the property holders demanded as the price of settlement certain rights, explicitly guaranteed by written charters. Proprietors, such as the Penns, often offered extensive civil liberties as inducements to the oppressed classes of England, Ireland, Germany, and other lands to migrate to the New World as tenants on their estates. The Crown availed itself of the opportunity afforded by the colonies to remove from England large numbers of the discontented, who had been uprooted by the decay of feudalism. The settlers belonged to various religious sects, frequently democratic in character. All of them were influenced after 1642 by the stirring events of the Puritan Revolution in England. Under such leaders as Roger Williams and Anne Hutchinson in New England, Nathaniel Bacon in Virginia, and Jacob Leisler in New York, they took advantage of the freedom existing in a virgin continent to wrest from their own exploiting classes one democratic reform after another. Long before the American Revolution, the people in each colony had representative bodies through which to voice their grievances, although they could pass no laws without royal consent. They possessed sufficient civil rights to form legal organizations and to engage in open mass movements.<sup>4</sup>

The distance of the colonies from Britain, the concern of the Crown with its own internal problems, the settlement of the colonial people in a wilderness impossible to police, and their possession of arms made necessary by frontier conditions enabled the people both to defend and to extend their civil rights. No other people owned guns as did the colonial Americans, and they were the best marksmen on earth. This popular mastery of firearms made possible that first modern people's war which finally secured American independence.

But in spite of their broad rights within the colonies, Americans were subject to legislation by the government of Britain, in which they had no representation. The colonial legislatures were subject to royal veto or to dissolution by the governors appointed by the Crown. Civil freedom thus amounted to no more than the right to pass local laws unopposed by the Crown

and to voice grievances. It was inevitable that in their effort to break British restrictions on their economic development the colonial people should use their liberties to fight for the right to pass laws without interference by the British Government.

British restrictions on trade, manufacturing, and the issuance of colonial paper currency aroused the opposition of all those interested in capitalist development in America, primarily the merchants and artisans of New England. The British capitalists were determined to have no rival merchants or manufacturers in the colonies and to use America as a market and source of agricultural produce, lumber, furs, and fish. The continuance and enforcement of these restrictions would have prevented the development of an American capitalism of any importance. However, the British laws were widely defied, and American merchants accumulated capital by smuggling.

Britain aroused the undying hatred of the agrarian classes—small farmers and slaveholder speculators in land—by efforts to prevent settlement of the West. Thus, she sought to preserve her fur trade in the wilderness, to keep the settlers in tightly knit communities near the coast where they formed a convenient market and could be ruled more easily, and to make possible alliances with the Indians against France. Unable to police the wilderness, Britain incited Indian massacres against her subjects who settled on the frontier. One of the major grievances listed against George III in the Declaration of Independence was that "he has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers the merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions." England recruited American volunteers for the French and Indian War to drive the French from North America by promising land in Ohio to each soldier. Yet no sooner was victory won than George III issued the Royal Proclamation of 1763 forbidding settlement west of the Allegheny watershed, thus perfidiously nullifying the pledges to those who fought in the West. British agents urged the Indian tribes to enforce the Proclamation by frontier wars.

Simultaneously with this act of treachery, Britain made use of peace to commence rigorous enforcement of the old restraints on

trade and to destroy the illegal traffic of the merchants. The colonies were already powder kegs when Britain, with the Stamp Act of 1765, started the explosion that finally ended her rule. The tax imposed was mild, but the people knew that Britain sought a precedent for shifting the financial burdens of empire to the colonies. This attempt to impose a new form of exploitation brought forth the resounding cry: "No taxation without representation." The political struggle to win full autonomy within the British Empire nevertheless proved hopeless, for events finally showed that self-government was possible only through independence.

National aspirations arose in America long before the economic bonds necessary for the formation of a real nation could be forged. As the struggle over taxation raged, interrupted by Britain's temporary retreats, but always revived by her renewed offensive and intensified by her use of armed force against the colonies, the flames of nationalism burned ever more fiercely. Leaders like Samuel Adams and Patrick Henry imparted clear insight to the classes stirred into movement. Old organizations took up the battle cry for freedom, and new ones such as the Sons of Liberty arose.<sup>5</sup> In the heat of conflict, a national coalition of the advanced representatives of major sections of all classes in all the colonies was formed—first, through the Stamp Act Congress, afterwards through the Committees of Correspondence, the Continental Congress, and the Committees of Safety.

No single class opposed the national coalition of Whigs or Patriots. The Tories consisted of the British bureaucracy in America; merchants and landlords who enjoyed royal privilege and were thus, for the most part, the wealthiest and most powerful of all; those professional men who were dependent upon the former; and certain confused sections of the people who were either misled by Tory leaders or unable to see the tyranny of England because of their class hatred for their own exploiters within the rising national movement. Even the slaves and free Negroes had occasion for bitter hostility toward English rule. Efforts by the Virginia House of Burgesses to abolish the African slave traffic, necessarily the first step toward the abolition of slavery, had been stifled by royal veto.

The popular, democratic character of the American struggle was determined by the degree to which the agrarian masses and the artisans of the towns were set in motion.<sup>6</sup> As these masses pushed their way toward the forefront of the movement, the big capitalists and landlords often took fright. They were faced with the alternatives of capitulating to England or of subscribing to the democratic doctrines of the people.

The people did not adopt hastily the revolutionary program of independence. It took a year of war to demonstrate the necessity for complete secession from Great Britain. Civil strife between Patriots and Tories commenced during the efforts to boycott British goods. In the late months of 1774, the people of New England began to form a militia—the Minute-Men—for self-defense against Redcoat violence. Armed conflict broke out on April 19, 1775, over the struggle for control of arms and ammunition. Like all revolutions, the American War for Independence commenced as a struggle to defend rights already won against the violent attempt of the ruling power to destroy them. During the first year of the war, all classes learned rapidly. Their experiences were brilliantly clarified by the passionate English democrat, Thomas Paine.

George Washington, appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army by the Second Continental Congress, became the outstanding leader who held together the Right and Left wings of the revolutionary movement. As a slaveholder, land speculator, and merchant, he clearly represented the interests of the property-holding classes, although he never even approached being the richest man in America, as often alleged by a myth of obscure origin. His interests in the land to the west made him the most ardent nationalist, representing the interests of the agrarian masses. He had won the undying love of his soldiers by championing their cause in the French and Indian War and by risking his life to survey their grants of land after they were nullified by the Proclamation of 1763. Washington's heroism and devotion to the national interests of all classes, his brilliance and patience in creating an army under difficulties unprecedented for any victorious army in the past, his steadfast strategy of offensive warfare, his undeviating advocacy of per-

manent union, his devotion to the ideal of a republic made him the beloved hero and symbol of the revolutionary movement.

The Declaration of Independence asserted the right of self-determination for the American nation, and transformed the war of rebellion into revolution. That immortal document—the program of the American Revolution—was issued to the peoples of the world for the purpose of winning international support. That its author was Thomas Jefferson, the outstanding hero of American democracy, reveals the democratic character of the American war for national liberation. The Declaration of Independence proclaimed not only the rights of the United States but voiced the most democratic version of the contract theory of the state, with its accompanying doctrines of the rights of nations in general, of the unqualified equality of all men, and of their possession of natural and inalienable rights. This philosophy was held in common at the time by the most advanced spokesmen for the peoples of all the countries of Europe.<sup>7</sup> Jefferson and others definitely regarded these doctrines as applying to Negroes as well as white. The longest paragraph in the original draft of the Declaration was a burning attack on George III for maintaining the horrors of slavery, but the slave traders succeeded in removing this passage.

The announcement to the world of the effort to build on the shores of a vast and unpopulated continent a democratic republic, such as then existed nowhere on earth, aroused the enthusiasm of the republicans of all Europe. Americans were practicing what was then mere theory in Europe. American victory was recognized as the means of convincing the world that republicanism on a national scale would work.

The revolutionary colonies seemed to be fighting against overwhelming odds. A population of less than three million—widely scattered over a large territory, without wealth, industry, a trained regular army, or well trained military leaders, with bitter class antagonisms and powerful internal enemies—was making war against the wealthiest and most powerful empire on earth. England depended not only on her military force, which had recently vanquished her greatest rival, France, but on her Tory allies in America, on disunity among the colonies



and among classes, and on the incitement of Indian warfare on the frontier. However, the people knew that their cause was just. They possessed an unconquerable military base in the Western wilderness and Southern swamps. They had guns and knew how to shoot with deadly aim. They had long grown accustomed to personal independence and defiance of authority. They possessed a group of leaders whose brilliant realism, guided by revolutionary theory, was equaled nowhere else on earth. The fervor and self-sacrifice of the people, their unity in spite of inner conflicts, their ruthless suppression of the internal foe, their mobilization of international support, and the use of offensive strategy by the Continental Army, backed by guerrilla warfare, enabled the people to win.

Victory depended upon national unity as the first prerequisite. To overcome conflicts among the states, Washington and such leaders as Franklin constantly stressed the prospect of the permanent unity of the United States. The various classes for the most part subordinated their class interests to the national good in spite of many flagrant examples of selfishness, class prejudice, and local jealousies. Merchants and landlords yielded from necessity to democratic demands. On the other hand, the democratic forces did not press for their full program of equalitarianism. A policy of compromise held the revolutionary classes together. Over the Tory allies of Great Britain, there was established a revolutionary, democratic dictatorship. Large numbers of Tories, who put armies in the field and who engaged in every variety of espionage, disruption, and sabotage, were rounded up, driven from the country, and their property confiscated.<sup>8</sup>

Support from abroad came to America in the form of volunteers from many lands. There were popular subscriptions of funds and supplies in Ireland. Making the most of the contradictions among the European powers, as well as within England itself, the United States sent emissaries to all the governments hostile to Great Britain, and took advantage of the Whig opposition to George III. Through such brilliant diplomacy as that of the great democrat, Benjamin Franklin, aid from foreign states was obtained in the form of loans, supplies, and military alliance. Without the alliance between revolutionary America

and monarchist France, mutually advantageous to each, American independence most probably would never have been achieved. The republicans of France hailed the pact of their monarch with America, realizing that it did not retard but strengthened the growth of their cause in France.

Members of all classes in America, especially the small producers, made voluntary contributions to the cause of liberty. Others extended credit, although there were speculators who shamefully profited from their country's birth pangs. The public certificates issued in return for loans were promissory notes whose redemption depended on victory.

The volunteer army of George Washington, composed largely of farmers and artisans recruited for short terms, was without formal training and poorly supplied. It was unable to meet the highly trained and well-equipped British mercenaries in the open formations customary to those professional troops. The expert marksmen of the American woods employed frontier methods of fighting and were supported by guerrilla warfare, to which the British troops and German mercenaries alike were utterly unaccustomed. The British won battles, but lost by far more men. They found it impossible to hold territory in the interior of the country, where frequently the whole adult male population—and even the women—rose against them. Such guerrilla bands as those of Francis Marion, the "Swamp Fox," fought a war of utter annihilation in the South during the latter part of the struggle. In conjunction with the regular army, they drove the proud Cornwallis back to the coast for supplies, and led him on the long, wild chase ending at Yorktown. The Americans in a song of the day hilariously called it "Cornwallis' Country Dance." On the sea, privateers, under such leaders as John Paul Jones, played havoc with British commerce. It was a new kind of warfare—a *people's war*—which vanquished Britain.

The farming masses kept their eyes on the West. The expedition of George Rogers Clark, sent forth by Virginia while Patrick Henry was governor, helped to secure American possession of the land stretching to the Mississippi and the Great Lakes.

While the war was raging, profound internal changes occurred in the economic and political life of America. Popularly elected conventions framed new state constitutions of a democratic character. Though some property qualifications for voting remained in every state, they were greatly lowered and the franchise widely extended. Disfranchisement of Jews and Catholics was abolished. Most of the powers of government were concentrated in the legislatures, both houses of which were popularly elected. In some states, single chamber legislatures were established. The governors, now elected, were stripped of the power of veto, and, in most instances, forbidden to serve more than one term. Short-term appointments of judges, upon condition of good behavior, were made. Advanced bills of rights, frequently guaranteeing the right of revolution, were adopted.<sup>9</sup>

The revolutionary legislatures began to pass new laws. Separation of church and state was secured everywhere except in those New England states where the Congregationalist Church, which supported the Revolution, was established. In every state north of Maryland and Delaware, measures providing at least for the gradual emancipation of the slaves were passed either during or immediately after the war. The laws which brought the biggest changes related to the land.<sup>10</sup> In every state, except two, primogeniture and entail were abolished by the end of the Revolution. The first of these laws provided for inheritance of land by the eldest son only. The second prohibited the breaking up of big estates by sales, gifts, or confiscations for debts or failure to pay taxes. Abolition of entails helped the states to finance the war. The continued existence of a closed, hereditary aristocracy was made impossible by repeal of these feudal laws.

Through the confiscation of Tory property and the abolition of feudal forms of land tenure, a considerable section of the old ruling classes within the colonies was overthrown or stripped of former powers. In the course of the Revolution, many new capitalists arose as a result of speculating in war supplies, privateering against Britain, or buying land from bankrupt landlords no longer protected by entails.<sup>11</sup>

The defeat of the British troops at Yorktown sealed the doom of English rule in America. The right of self-determination for

the United States was confirmed by the Treaty of Peace signed in Paris in 1783. The American people were then free to establish whatever form of state they desired. A truly national state was not formed, however, until the adoption of the Constitution in 1789. It was this act which brought the American Revolution to an end.<sup>12</sup>

## CHAPTER II

### THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

THE United States of America, when first proclaimed by the Declaration of Independence, formed merely a temporary combination of states, established for the one aim of securing independence. The Continental Congress until 1781 was merely a body of delegates assembled from the thirteen separate states for the sole purpose of organizing their joint struggles against Britain. Whether or not America would develop as one nation depended on whether the states saw fit to surrender their sovereignty to a durable national power.<sup>1</sup>

Bitter conflicts among the states and the classes within them made difficult the establishment of a genuine and strong government of the United States. The outstanding and earliest advocate of a national government was the democrat, Benjamin Franklin. However, the staunchest supporters of this demand were the big speculators and merchants, who coupled it with a bitter attack upon democracy. They became known as the Strong Government Party. They wanted a central government which would establish a uniform and stable currency, pay the debts contracted during the war, conclude trade treaties with foreign powers, break down barriers to interstate commerce and, in general, foster capitalist development. Moreover, through the establishment of a central and oligarchical government, they hoped to

abolish the thirteen states and their democratic constitutions. Many within their ranks sought an American monarchy<sup>2</sup> and even supported a scheme during the war for making Washington king. This plot was frustrated by Washington's own bitter denunciation of its advocates.

The democratic forces, frequently known after 1781 as Particularists, clung tenaciously to the sovereignty of the separate states, because it was the state constitutions which embraced their democratic gains and because they feared that the big capitalists and landlords would use a national state as a means of abrogating those achievements. They were prevented for a long time by the anti-democratic stand of the big merchants from seeing their way clear to join their democratic program with the nationalist program for a strong government over the union of states.

Throughout the Revolutionary War, the issue of a permanent national state was debated. Local rivalries and jealousies among the capitalists, especially conflicts between Northern merchants and Southern slaveholders, stood in the way of any unanimity even among the exploiting classes. The only program on which any agreement was reached was for a loose confederation, through which the sovereignty of the thirteen states remained virtually complete.

Obstacles stood in the way even of a confederation. The main difficulty was the Western land. Some states possessed vast areas beyond the mountains. Virginia claimed an imperial domain extending to the Mississippi and the Great Lakes, a territory equal in size to all the other colonies combined. Some states had conflicting claims in the West. Others possessed nothing beyond the mountains, and feared that a confederation would be dominated by the large states, especially by Virginia. Maryland led the small states in refusing to ratify the Articles of Confederation until the land to the west would be put at the disposal of all the states. The democratic forces joined in this fight by supporting Maryland, because they knew that rule over the West by the existing state governments would mean the continued subjugation of the back-country settlers to the Tidewater planters of the South and the coastal merchants of the North.

A stalemate set in and continued until 1781 when it became clear that some sort of confederation would be necessary to negotiate a peace treaty. The deadlock finally ended when New York abandoned her vague and shadowy claims in the West. Following this action, which set a precedent for other states, Maryland abandoned her opposition, and the Articles of Confederation were ratified. In 1784, Virginia, under the influence of her own agrarian democratic forces, ceded to the Union all her lands north of the Ohio River. The cession of the other Western holdings and the creation of new states (Kentucky and Tennessee) from the Western counties of Virginia and North Carolina began to seem likely.

The Articles of Confederation did not form a real national government. They granted "sovereignty, freedom, and independence" to each of the thirteen states. The executive officers elected by the single-chambered Congress of the United States possessed no power to enforce Congressional decisions, which were freely nullified by individual states. The requirement that treaties be ratified by the delegates of two-thirds of the states made the handling of foreign relations extremely difficult. Since each state possessed one vote, there was no representation in Congress according to population. Each state continued to have its own tariff laws and currency, which obstructed interstate commerce. Taxes could not be collected by the United States. The revolutionary debts could not be paid, and the public certificates issued by the Continental Congress became practically worthless. Genuine national development under the Articles of Confederation was impossible.<sup>3</sup>

The only area over which the confederation had a semblance of real sovereignty was the Western territory just ceded to the Union—and that region was uninhabited except by Indians who were not citizens. Although there was no one to be ruled in the Northwest, nevertheless important ordinances, which shaped the whole future public land policy of the United States, were adopted for that area. This was the only important legislation achieved under that government.

The nationalization of the Western land at the very outset of the history of the United States profoundly influenced the sub-

sequent growth of the American nation. No other great capitalist country developed on the basis of nationalized land. The absence of feudal forms of land tenure and the presence of public land enormously facilitated capitalist development. The ownership of land by the people, as represented in Congress, meant that the people had the right, through their elected representatives, to pass laws to dispose of this land and to govern it as they saw fit. Those desiring to settle it or to develop its natural resources had to deal only with the government of the United States and not with innumerable private owners.

The creation of the Public Domain gave the small producers, anxious to settle that area, a national interest which they would not have possessed had that land remained under the control of the separate states. It paved the way for sentiment favoring the formation of a Federal Government with real powers. After the adoption of the Constitution in 1789, it was their interest in the public land which converted the agrarian masses into the truest guardians of nationalism throughout all the storms in which, first, the Northern merchants and, later, the Southern slaveholders threatened the disruption of the nation. It was primarily the farmers who were represented by Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson and Abraham Lincoln.<sup>4</sup>

As the nation expanded in territory, all the new acquisitions, with the exception of Texas, became part of the Public Domain. All the present territory of the United States beyond the Western borders of the original thirteen states in 1802 was, at one time, public land, with the exception of Kentucky, Tennessee, Vermont, and Texas. All of these entered the Union directly as states.

Three ordinances adopted by Congress under the Confederation determined the future policy of the United States toward its huge Public Domain.<sup>5</sup> They provided for the political administration of the West, the method for the distribution of the land, and the status of slavery in that area.

The big merchants proposed that the public land be held as a colony in perpetual subordination to the union of thirteen states. Had that proposal been adopted and enforced the United States would have remained a tiny nation on the Atlantic coast and

would have started its history as an empire. Under the leadership of Thomas Jefferson, this proposal was defeated. The Ordinance of 1784, written by Jefferson, provided that the West be divided into territories, each one of which, as soon as its population reached a certain number, was to be admitted to the Union as a *state* on a basis of equality with the original thirteen, its constitution to be formed by a convention elected by the settlers. This ordinance doomed at the outset the imperial aspirations of the big merchants, and determined that the American nation would expand on a democratic basis. Since the first settlers of the West were almost invariably small producers, this ordinance necessarily determined that the Western expansion of the nation would result in the extension of democracy. These provisions evoked undying fear of the West on the part of the merchantile capitalists of the Northeast.

The Ordinance of 1785 determined the method whereby the Western land should be surveyed and distributed among settlers. The big speculators favored the sale of huge areas at low prices per acre, so that settlers could obtain land only from profiteering middlemen. The masses wanted to buy small farms at cheap prices directly from the government. An organized movement for free land had not yet arisen. Both democrats and spokesmen for the big property holders agreed on the sale of land as a means of revenue to the government. The provisions adopted worked to the advantage of the speculators. The ordinance provided that the land be surveyed in rectilinear ranges of townships, each township consisting of thirty-six square miles. Alternate townships were to be sold intact. Such large areas of course could be purchased only by big speculators. The remaining townships, however, contrary to the desire of the land companies, were to be surveyed and sold at auction in square-mile sections. These 640-acre sections were the smallest divisions sold by the Federal Government until the passage of the land law of 1800. The minimum price was set for \$1 an acre or \$640 a section, payable in full within one month of purchase. Thus, settlers with less than \$640 cash could, under no circumstances, buy a farm from the government. Since public land was to be sold at auction, no limit was placed on the actual prices to be

determined by bidding. Under these provisions it was possible for even the smallest purchasers to engage in speculation.

The Virginia method of permitting those buying land to settle on tracts of their own choice was voted down in favor of the New England method of opening for sale only those lands adjacent to sections already sold. The settling of contiguous areas was considered desirable as a means of defense against Indian raids. It was also most favorable for the growth of a home market. A democratic provision by Congress required that one section of each township be held as a means of support for a public school. This responded to popular demands and was supported by speculators as an inducement to settlement.

The Ordinance of 1785 definitely provided for the disposition of the land on a capitalist basis, that is, through purchase and sale, and the establishment of small-scale farming, from which capitalist agriculture would inevitably emerge. Since state governments still sold land at a cheaper price than that set for Federal land, no small sales were made by the United States prior to the passage of another land law in 1796. Repeated legislation, by degrees, reduced the size of lots available for purchase and lowered the price per acre until, by 1840, a settler could buy a forty-acre farm for the minimum price of \$50. Not until the passage of the Homestead Act of 1862 was free land made available.

While the ordinances of 1784 and 1785 were being discussed, the question of slavery in the West was being debated. A bill, sponsored by Jefferson in 1784, provided for the exclusion of slavery from the whole Public Domain. Only three states voted against it. It failed by one vote to receive the endorsement of the delegates of the necessary seven states. The passage and enforcement of that act, by restricting slavery to the South Atlantic seaboard, would have made the continuance of slavery unprofitable and thus have made easy complete abolition of the system.<sup>6</sup> By such a narrow margin did the first American Revolution fail to complete its full democratic task. Failure to extend freedom to the slaves of the South made the second American Revolution of 1863-77 inevitable.

The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 was a compromise measure.

While it prohibited slavery for all time from the territory north of the Ohio River, the system was allowed to flourish in the Southwest. Thus, slavery was permitted to expand until, like a cancerous growth, it afterwards threatened to destroy the nation.

While these measures were being elaborated under the Articles of Confederation, the big merchant capitalists were agitating for a new constitution to establish a strong central government. Their program for the destruction of the democratic state government, however, was blocked on every hand.

Meanwhile, the hostile powers of Great Britain and Spain, by whose colonial holdings the American states were surrounded, threatened by numerous actions the independence of each of the thirteen states. In defiance of the Treaty of Peace, Britain's troops remained in the Northwest Territory. There, they continued to incite Indian raids so as to prevent the settlement of Ohio. Agents of both Britain and Spain sought to play state against state, in order to conquer them one by one.

A compromise between the anti-democratic nationalists and the democratic advocates of states' rights had to be effected if the interests of either large or small property-holders in any of the states were to be preserved against foreign attack. That compromise was finally achieved through the Constitution, written in secret session in 1787 and ratified during 1788 and 1789 by popularly elected state conventions.

The conflict known as Shays' Rebellion, which occurred in Massachusetts in 1786, moved the big property-holders to intensify their efforts to secure a strong national government. This "rebellion" resulted from the efforts of merchants to force the payment in gold of debts contracted in highly inflated paper currency. When the courts of Worcester sent out constables to arrest farmers unable to pay their debts, an armed force of fifteen hundred men gathered under Captain Daniel Shays to prevent this action. Although the so-called "rebellion" was crushed, similar movements arose in the Western counties of all the states, and the merchants and landlords now sought a national government as a means of crushing by force the democratic movements of the debtor farmers.

Under the pretext of proposing amendments to the Articles of

Confederation, ostensibly to deal with certain problems of interstate commerce, the advocates of a strong central government succeeded in having delegates elected by state legislatures to what was really a Constitutional Convention, which assembled in Philadelphia in 1787. The delegates met in absolute secrecy. While almost all of them were wealthy merchants and landlords, they were far from unanimous in their outlook. In spite of their conspiratorial methods, the former Strong Government men were unable to carry the day even in their secret sessions. Not only were there conflicts between Northern merchants and Southern planters, but certain delegates, such as Benjamin Franklin and James Madison, represented in varying degrees the interests of the middle classes. All the delegates recognized that the democratic sentiments of the people could not be completely overridden. The proposal of Alexander Hamilton for an oligarchical government, as closely modeled after a monarchy as possible, was not even discussed. James Madison,<sup>7</sup> the future founder along with Jefferson of the Democratic-Republican Party, was the real "Father of the Constitution." It was he who led the fight for the recognition within the national government of the rights of the thirteen states. Madison thus played a leading role in determining the federal character of the United States Government and in preserving the democratic rights already established in the states. The forces of extreme reaction were defeated inside the Constitutional Convention.

The national state formed by the Constitution was more than a loose confederation, but it did not abolish the thirteen states or their democratic constitutions. The Constitution provided the nation with a strong *federal* government. The latter possessed specified powers surrendered by the states, yet left intact the powers of the states not specifically prohibited. Thus, the Constitution was definitely a compromise. Because of the preservation of definite states' rights, the nation was not fully unified under laws universally applicable. State differences continued to obstruct full national unification to such an extent that, in 1860, state governments became the vehicles for armed insurrection against the Federal Government. However, in 1787, the preser-

vation of states' rights within a Federal state was definitely regarded as the only means for the preservation of democracy, and so no other compromise was conceived as an alternative.

Each state was guaranteed by the Constitution a republican form of government. The states were forbidden to make treaties or alliances, to wage war, to issue paper money not backed by specie, to abrogate contracts, to issue bills of attainder, to pass ex-post facto laws, or to grant titles of nobility. Most other powers were left in their possession. The Federal Government was given authority to collect taxes, to regulate tariffs and interstate commerce, to build post or military roads, to issue currency, to raise an army and navy, to wage war, and to make treaties. Each state was to be represented equally in the Senate, while representation according to population was guaranteed in the House.

The Federal Government established by the Constitution was definitely republican in form. The extent of its democracy was determined in many respects by the different degrees of democracy in the various states. The character of the whole Federal Government was affected by the structure of any one state. The new government represented a fusion of the principle of democracy with the principle of nationalism. As a compromise, it was not nearly so democratic as the farmers and artisans desired, but it was far too democratic to please the big merchants and landlords.

The Federal Government, with authority dispersed among three branches—legislative, executive, and judiciary—each supposedly equal, separate, and independent of the others, provided a system of checks and balances whereby either rapid legislation or rapid execution of the law, especially when desired by the people, became extremely difficult. The one popularly elected body in the new government was the House of Representatives. The House, however, was checked by the Senate, whose members were chosen by state legislatures in such a manner that only one-third of its members could be chosen at any one election. Congress as a whole was checked by the chief executive's power of veto, although a two-thirds vote in Congress could over-ride it. Only one member of the executive branch of gov-



ernment—the President—was to be elected, and he was to be chosen by a College of Electors, as determined by the states, which then meant by state legislatures. All other members of the executive, which was to carry out the actual administration of government, were to be appointed. The judiciary was to be appointed for life by the President with the consent of the Senate. Fully aware of the popular hatred for courts, engendered by oppression under British rule, the framers of the Constitution did not dare grant to the judiciary the written authority to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional. But Chief Justice Marshall later knew how to usurp that right by slyly establishing a precedent in the *Marbury vs. Madison* decision of 1803 which, on the surface, seemed in the popular interest.<sup>8</sup>

Qualifications for voting were left to be determined by states with the result that each state had its own electoral laws. In 1789, property qualifications for voting existed in every state. In the North, they worked to the advantage of the big merchants; in the South, of the slaveholders.<sup>9</sup> A special provision enabled the slaveholders to count three-fifths of their slaves in determining Congressional districts. This gave them far greater representation than their numerical strength would have warranted. To compensate for this privilege, the slaveholders had to agree that, in apportioning taxes among the states on the basis of population, three-fifths of the slaves should also be counted.

The big property-holders relied upon the system of checks and balances as a means of curbing democracy. The leaders of the democratic small producers, on the other hand, relied upon it as a means of checking the big property-holders through their numerical superiority. Since the majority of the free population then owned some property, property qualifications were not nearly so restrictive in 1789 as they would have become later had they been perpetuated in their original form. Inequalities in property made inevitable the final and predominant use of checks and balances against the interests of the small proprietors, not to speak of the working class, which had not emerged as a definite class in 1789. However, the democratic elements in the Constitution did provide for the possibility of checking the big property-holders through powerful democratic movements.

The Constitution, providing for a bourgeois-democratic form of government, definitely represented a compromise between the oligarchical principles of the big property-holders and the democratic principles of the small producers. It also represented a compromise between the two most powerful exploiting classes—the merchants of the North and the slaveholders of the South. It was through the federal character of the new national government that the main compromise between the old Strong Government men and the democratic states' rights advocates was achieved.

Under the banner of the Federal Party, which was republican and thus utterly unlike the old monarchical Strong Government Party, many staunch democrats were rallied. Among the Federalists of 1788-89, not to be confused with the subsequent Federalist Party of Alexander Hamilton, which was really anti-republican and also anti-federalist, were to be found such democratic leaders as Benjamin Franklin, James Madison, and Thomas Jefferson.

However, a powerful anti-Federalist movement arose among both the democratic masses and certain big property-holders. Farmers and artisans were suspicious at the absence from the Constitution of a specific Bill of Rights, even though they possessed bills of rights in their state constitutions. Such democratic leaders as Sam Adams, Patrick Henry, and James Monroe condemned the new Constitution in toto. Many big property-holders, on the other hand, joined the anti-Federalists from fear of the democratic concessions already contained in the Constitution. Thus, opposites temporarily united to oppose the new Federal Government.

Thomas Jefferson, from his post as ambassador in Paris, played a vanguard role in leading the democratic forces to see the necessity of compromise. Pointing to the possibility of a *democratic* national state, he urged the rapid mobilization of a movement for the addition to the Constitution of a Bill of Rights through the exercise of the right of amendment, which he considered one of the most praiseworthy features in the Constitution. He insisted that the Constitution be ratified rapidly and without fail as an instrument of national defense against foreign

aggression. Rejection of the Constitution would have openly announced the weakness of the United States to the whole world. He warned furthermore that delay might lead to the growth of apathy among the people, which might enable the Strong Government group to foist upon the country a constitution less democratic than the one offered in 1788. Yet, with keen insight, he urged that no more than the required nine states should approve the Constitution, for he considered that the remaining four states would then be in a position to bargain for a Bill of Rights. Meetings of artisans, among them members of the old Sons of Liberty, arrived at similar conclusions over the head of their leader, Sam Adams, who failed to see the importance of national power.

As the popularly elected Constitutional Conventions assembled in the states, the new *democratic* Federalists in one state after another refused to ratify the Constitution except upon the condition that a Bill of Rights in the form of amendments be introduced in the first Congress. As a result of the democratic provisions enacted in the state conventions, the Constitution was ratified during 1788-89 by all but two states. The North Carolina Convention followed Jefferson's advice by not ratifying the Constitution after ascertaining that enough states had endorsed it to secure the establishment of the new government. Rhode Island did not call a convention.

The reactionaries not only suffered a defeat in their own secret convention; in the state conventions, the masses forced upon them the Bill of Rights, afterwards incorporated in the first ten amendments. The Constitution, therefore, was not the product of capitalists and landlords alone. Its democratic features were written into it by farmers and artisans.

The Constitution provided the machinery whereby national defense and national development were possible and under which all property-holding classes—big and small—could compete for power. The Bill of Rights, as finally ratified in 1791, together with the right of amendment, assured the conditions whereby the government could be further democratized by legal, constitutional means. The democratic rights in the states and the provision for the admission of new states in the West made

possible, through mass pressure, the peaceable extension of the franchise to the propertyless working class as it arose. Thus, the American working class, unlike the proletariat of any other great nation, found democratic rights at hand from the moment of its emergence as a class. Even with its many restrictions on complete democracy, no great nation had ever possessed a constitution so democratic as that of the United States.

The adoption of the Constitution brought the American Revolution to an end, and opened the history of the American Republic. Whereas the Declaration of Independence proclaimed the program of the American Revolution, the Constitution summarized its actual achievements. That program, as in every bourgeois revolution, exceeded the rights which the people obtained. Hence, the struggle for freedom and equality did not end in 1789. The Constitution, determined by the struggles among the classes, corresponded to the actual relationships among classes in 1789. Broad democratic rights, though somewhat restricted, actually existed, and they were recognized. Slavery existed, and it was recognized.

After 1789, democratic struggles occurred within the legal framework of Constitutional rights until the slaveholder rebellion of 1860 precipitated the Civil War. Freedom and civil rights were thereafter extended to the Negro people through new Constitutional amendments *after* a second American revolution had already achieved those rights by force of arms.

### CHAPTER III

#### THE UNITED STATES IN 1789

THERE were less than four million Americans in 1789, but their domain was vast. A national economy—production for a common home market—had developed only slightly among the settled communities of the seaboard states. Less than one-fifth of the territory of the young republic, only that between



the Alleghenies and the Atlantic coast, was settled. The United States was bounded on the north by Britain's Canadian possessions; on the west, beyond the Mississippi River, by Spanish Louisiana; and on the south by Spanish Florida, which extended along the entire Gulf of Mexico to the boundaries of Louisiana. Three primary tasks confronted America: the development of a common economy among the settled communities; the extension of the American community of people, with its interdependent economy, into the Public Domain beyond the mountains; and national defense against the monarchist powers by which the United States was encircled.

Not only did the poor development of interstate commerce in 1789 make difficult the rise of an economy common to all the states, but there were several distinct modes of production in different regions of the country. On small farms, especially on the frontier, production for use rather than for exchange was widely prevalent. This patriarchal or domestic economy always evolved quite rapidly into small commodity production—small-scale agriculture and petty industry. This was the predominant mode of production in 1789. In the Tidewater areas of the South, slave plantation economy was almost universal. Along the Hudson River Valley, a semi-feudal system of tenancy still operated. The capitalist mode of production—the exploitation of wage-labor—was nowhere developed to more than a slight extent. However, small commodity production steadily, though slowly, evolved into capitalist production both in the towns and in the country.

The working classes were small farmers, artisans, slaves, and an incipient wage-earning class. The exploiting classes who owned means of production were landlords and a very small and undeveloped group of industrial capitalists. The wealthiest and most powerful of all the capitalists were merchants and speculators, who were engaged not in production but in exchange, although many of them were simultaneously landlords and a few were also manufacturers. They operated primarily in New England and the seaport towns. Buying from the producing classes at low prices, they created the conditions for capitalist industry by accumulating money-capital at the expense of

the small producers and by creating in this manner a propertyless working class.<sup>1</sup>

It was the existence in different sections of the country of different economic systems which to a great extent determined the fight for the preservation of states' rights within the framework of the Federal Government. Different forms of economic life produced that sectionalism which became so pronounced a characteristic of American national life. The original basis for regional differences in colonial times was the existence of vast stretches of unsettled land, which enabled different classes to obtain a foothold and to introduce varying production relations on different areas. National growth before the Civil War was always accompanied by the expansion of these regional economies, some of which were contradictory to general national development. It became a peculiarity of the American nation that class conflicts until after the Civil War generally assumed a highly sectional form. Strong remnants of the old sectionalisms still persist.

The fabulous fertility of the Southern Tidewater enabled this area to become the first stronghold of slavery. On the rocky soil of New England, small commodity production grew more extensively than elsewhere. That section and the cities of the upper Middle Atlantic states thus formed the most favorable ground for the growth of commerce and afterwards of manufacturing. The West, as it expanded from both north and south, was always the region where small farmers possessed their greatest freedom and power.

The farmers in the Western countries of the Southern States enjoyed more freedom than did the small producers in any area of New England. The middle classes in New England were the direct victims of their merchants and landlords, who concentrated their energies upon holding them under control. The Southern planters, who exploited their slaves directly, were unable to extend their grip so completely over their back-country farmers until the years preceding the Civil War. The instrument of control in New England was the old policy of settling the land in tightly knit communities, completely dominated for the most part by the established Congregationalist

Church. In the South, Western farmers had settled where they wished, and they belonged to different churches, Baptist and Presbyterian, which bitterly hated the disestablished Anglican or Episcopal Church, to which most of the slaveholders belonged. The greater degree of individual freedom in the Piedmont and Valley regions of the backcountry South converted that area into the first great stronghold of democracy under the American Republic. As new Western states entered the Union from both north and south, they became even more distinct strongholds of the small producers. Thus, the Jeffersonian movement often seemed to be Southern and Western. However, small producers were to be found in all regions, and the democratic movement, after the formation of the Federal Government, always represented national interests.

The attempt to portray sectional conflicts in America as purely sectional not only overlooks class differences within each of the regions but obscures the basis for the growth of nationalism, which steadily, though with frequent setbacks, triumphed over purely localized interests. Small producers were always everywhere, though in the Tidewater South they could scarcely eke out a living and were not very numerous. Their democratic interests throughout all regions coincided, though their freedom was more stifled in some areas than others. The pioneers within the strongholds of Western democracy always underwent class differentiation, and Western capitalists, with interests conflicting with those of the small producers, emerged quite rapidly within every Western state. Regional conflicts were, therefore, expressions of class conflicts, and every region was shot through with its own class struggles. Certain classes within each region—the small producers and industrial capitalists—generally voiced national interests, because they were developing production on the basis of a national home market. Merchants and slaveholders, on the other hand, were often more dependent on foreign trade than on domestic markets. As a result, their policies at different times conflicted with national interests.<sup>2</sup>

The development of the American nation depended upon growing capitalism establishing a common economy within the framework of a home market on a common territory. Capitalist

development required that all sections and all classes in America be drawn into the network of market relations. This required not only settlement of the nation's territory, but the connection of all areas by systems of roads and waterways. It also necessitated the establishment of a uniform and stable currency. Finally, it depended upon the rise of a native American industry.

Almost the entire free population of the United States in 1789 was bourgeois, the big merchants and the small producers forming two wings of a national bourgeoisie. That was why such a compromise as that effected through the Constitution was possible. The fortunes of the wealthy were small in comparison with those of today. Although the gulf between them and the small producers was sharp and distinct, it was not so wide as it became later. The vast majority of the free white people owned land. Of the small minority engaged in trade and industry—less than ten per cent of the population—large numbers possessed petty industries or at least the tools of their trade. The number of propertyless workers—domestic servants, seamen, hired laborers on the farms—was extremely small. Indentured bondage still existed, though by degrees it disappeared. Sharp struggles inevitably arose between the big and little bourgeoisie and among the various groups of capitalists and landlords. These fights could never center around the question of whether capitalism was to develop, but only over how it was to develop.

The overwhelming majority of the population toiled on the land, and the land was the source of the biggest fortunes, except those derived from overseas commerce. The breadth of the Public Domain and the slight development of industry caused this to continue until after the Civil War.

Semi-feudal forms of land tenure, transferred from Europe to the colonies, were virtually abolished by the Revolution. The abolition of primogeniture and entail in all but two states placed nearly all wealth on the competitive basis of capitalism rather than on the hereditary basis of feudalism. It was possible for landlords to lose their holdings and for small producers, through speculation or other means, to become landlords or capitalists. Acquisitions in the West made the latter course especially easy.

Landlordism, always a feudal remnant, assumes a capitalist

form when land can be bought and sold freely, when it can be used for commodity production and when continued ownership rests upon competition rather than on perpetual hereditary rights guaranteed by law.<sup>3</sup> Landlordism in the United States in 1789 had almost universally assumed this capitalist form. Even the manors of the Hudson River Valley, buttressed by feudal laws and commanding rent in the form of labor, produced commodities for a capitalist market. Estates elsewhere in the upper Middle Atlantic States and in New England were generally worked by tenants paying cash rents. The slave plantations of the South, while frequently producing largely for family consumption, also raised crops for sale. Unprotected by entails, plantations could be kept intact only through the extension of commodity production.

Speculation in Western land was a principal source of a large proportion of the big capitalist fortunes until long after the Civil War, though not to so great a degree in 1789 as later. Three large land companies had been formed by that year. They had influenced Congress, many of whose members were stockholders, to sell whole ranges in million-acre lots at the reduced price of 33 cents an acre. Since inflated public certificates were accepted, the actual price amounted to about 10 cents an acre. The Federal Government, in its efforts to sell land for revenue, thus competed on the market with private speculators, as well as with state governments, which still held public land in their Western domains. Underselling by speculators and states later helped lower the price of Federal land.

The pioneers engaged deeply in speculation. It was common for frontiersmen to clear and improve a farm, sell it at a higher price, purchase cheap land farther to the west, sell it after improvements were made, and then move still farther into the wilderness. The hope of thus acquiring capital was the incentive which lured vast numbers of pioneers ever more deeply into the receding forests and plains. Such pursuits differed radically from those of the big speculators, for a considerable part of the higher prices received by frontiersmen for their land represented the actual value created on the land by their labor. Increasingly, however, those who themselves cleared the land were deprived

of the proceeds of their labor by big speculators and banks. Thus, fierce hatred arose for both bankers and big speculators.

Small commodity production always evolves into capitalism, for which it is the necessary precondition. During periods of an expanding market, some small producers, through speculation and other means, acquire wealth, become employers, and thus rise into the capitalist class. The majority, on the other hand, are driven downwards into the propertyless wage-earning class by exploitation at the hands of merchants and speculators and by competition with capitalist rivals. Middle-class differentiation was far slower in the United States than in other capitalist nations, because of the seemingly endless lands to the west. The torrent of settlers moving into those wide spaces prevented rapid class differentiation, preserved temporarily a high degree of equalitarianism, and afforded an economic basis for the preservation and extension of democracy.

The American home market was poorly developed in 1789. Only 3.3 per cent of the population lived in cities, and only six cities had populations above 8,000.<sup>4</sup> The means of transportation, in the backcountry especially, were in a miserable state as inherited from the colonial past.<sup>5</sup> As a result, the farms and plantations produced a large portion of their own requirements. Many farms had flour and sawmills, distilleries, and even iron forges. Every farmer on the frontier had to be an artisan and "Jack of all trades." The versatility of the American farmers formed a rich soil for subsequent industrial development.

There were itinerant craftsmen in the more populated rural centers. In the villages, blacksmiths, harness-makers, gunsmiths, cabinet-makers, shoemakers, and other craftsmen plied their trades. There were flour and sawmills, which frequently operated under one roof together with iron forges and shops for fulling cloth. Water-power was still used exclusively.

The only major industries under the restrictive rule of Britain had been ship-building, lumbering, fisheries, fur, the manufacture of rum, and in North Carolina the production of tar, pitch, resin, and turpentine. The few small textile industries, iron works, and mines of colonial times had been hampered or prohibited by Great Britain.

While the Revolution broke the legal restrictions on manufacturing, it could not secure immediate or rapid industrial expansion. Although there was a great increase in small industries during the war, England flooded America with goods after the conclusion of peace and thus ended this industrial activity.<sup>6</sup> America remained dependent upon England for most of her manufactured goods throughout the early nineteenth century. As a means of holding the United States in a semi-colonial status, British law forbade the export of machinery or knowledge of their construction to America. Trained workers were prohibited by law from leaving England.

There was no real industrial working class in the United States in 1789. Apprentices and journeymen worked side by side with master craftsmen in little shops. Journeymen, owning their own tools and selling their products rather than their labor-power, could look forward with considerable confidence to acquiring little shops of their own. Master craftsmen almost universally sold their wares directly to consumers, and had not fallen under the control of merchants, who were preoccupied with the overseas carrying trade. Even in the larger manufacturing establishments, workers in the main still owned their tools and did not work for wages. Some craft or guild organizations of printers, carpenters, and shoemakers, embracing both master employers and journeymen employees, had arisen before the Revolution. They regulated prices and the quality of production. Manufacturing had thus not arisen to any considerable degree beyond petty-bourgeois conditions of labor. The factory system had scarcely commenced to develop. Only among seamen and the most unskilled workers—isolated farm hands, domestic servants, workers employed temporarily for various odd jobs—was there to be found the faint beginning of a proletariat.<sup>7</sup>

In 1787, cotton factories, using the jenny, were erected in Philadelphia, in Beverly, Massachusetts, and in New York. In 1789, Samuel Slater, a former apprentice in one of Arkwright's factories in England came to America illegally. With the support of a Quaker merchant, Moses Brown of Providence, Rhode Island, he established in Pawtucket the first Arkwright factory. Samuel Slater has been called the father of the American factory

system, launched simultaneously with the new Constitution. Yet it was many years before industrial capitalism could overcome British competition, poor roads, and the absence of a big propertyless working class.<sup>8</sup>

The growth of a national home market in 1789 was further retarded by the chaotic condition of the currency. The paper money issued during the Revolution was practically worthless. Specie was scarce and was still being drawn to Europe or driven out of circulation. Barter and the use of Spanish and Portuguese coins and of bills of exchange continued as in colonial times. Rates of exchange for foreign coins differed from state to state. There were only three banks in the entire country—the Bank of North America in Philadelphia, the Bank of New York, and the Bank of Massachusetts in Boston.

While Great Britain was the main external threat to American national development, there were two big obstacles within the nation—slavery and the overseas carrying trade of the merchants.

Throughout the revolutionary years, the slaveholders kept alive the most reactionary mode of production in American life. After the invention of the cotton gin in 1793, they sought its expansion. The ancient system of slavery, discarded by feudal Europe over a thousand years before it was revived by merchant capitalists in America, always stifled the enterprise of both small producers and industrial capitalists. Chattel slavery was the blight that was introduced in the New World at the very moment when the hopes of mankind for freedom on its shores began to burn so brightly. Its ancient horrors stood forth more sharply by contrast with the new principles of democracy which were realized by the white people on so broad a scale. It became the tragedy of the South that the birthplace of democracy in the New World—Virginia in 1619<sup>9</sup> and during the formative years of the Jeffersonian Party—was also the stronghold of an ancient curse and the region which was finally led into rebellion against all the principles for which the modern world has fought.

Slave production in 1789 was no slight system. Close to 700,000 out of a population of less than four million, about

two-fifths of the population of the South, were held in chains. Negroes formed nearly half of the population in Virginia and much more than half in South Carolina. Slaves were found almost exclusively in the Tidewater counties.

While slavery was extensive on the coastal river valleys from Delaware to Spanish Florida in 1789, it was not on the offensive, and its future was unclear. Although profits from tobacco and other slave crops had been high in early colonial times, England had steadily used her state power to reduce prices and had involved the planters in heavy, hereditary debts. While profits declined and the cost of maintaining an ever-growing number of slaves increased, many planters had employed their slaves largely to produce goods for plantation use and to maintain the style of an aristocracy. Many ran their plantations at a loss while they obtained profits from other enterprises such as land speculation, commerce in the crops of backcountry farmers and the sale of supplies on credit to those same farmers. Thus, slaveholders in 1789 were widely involved in capitalist ventures beyond the bounds of their plantations. The patriarchal slavery that prevailed did not manifest the savage form it assumed later when cotton was raised as a commodity for a ravenous market.

The soil of Tidewater Virginia and Maryland was already wearing out. The center of slave production had shifted to South Carolina, and only there and in Georgia was the system profitable. The planters of Virginia and Maryland were already selling slaves to the lower South.

After the abolition of primogeniture and entail, the need for cash to prevent foreclosures of plantations caused the abandonment of patriarchal slavery as an aristocratic luxury. Either slavery had to be abolished or it had to produce crops for sale. The slaveholders were in a wavering and indecisive position. Their only defense of slavery was apologetic. Since their minds were not clouded by profits from the system, the planters of Maryland and Virginia spoke openly of its evils, discussed means of emancipation, and even joined emancipationist societies. Many slaveholders freed their slaves voluntarily. Usually this was by will providing for emancipation upon the death of the master.

Occasionally a planter provided his freed slaves with land. What generally stood in the way of emancipation in the upper South was the absence of means whereby masters could recover the money invested in slaves. It was widely believed in 1789 that slavery was dying out.

Throughout colonial times, slaves had struggled valiantly for freedom—in efforts at insurrection and by frequent escapes. There are records as early as 1760 of organized efforts by free Negroes in the North to abolish slavery through petitions, resolutions, court actions, and propaganda. While some slaves were misled by British agents and looked to England for help during the Revolution, the majority indicated by their actions that they hoped for freedom through American victory. Many Negroes gave devoted service to the revolutionary cause. The pioneer abolitionist activities of the Negro people found allies among the white people in 1775, with the formation, under Benjamin Franklin as president, of a Pennsylvania anti-slavery society, which later became part of a national federated movement.<sup>10</sup>

The slave system was by nature incapable of unification with the nation. It prevented its hundreds of thousands of victims from becoming a part of the nation and from contributing their energies freely to its development. To the extent that the slave economy engaged in exchange, it was largely with England. Thus, slavery prevented the full incorporation of the areas it dominated into the national home market. Nevertheless, during the early years of the republic, before the expansion of slavery had developed on a large scale, the slaveholders' interests in the West placed them temporarily in the camp of the progressive forces seeking to defend and settle the national domain.

As merchants, speculators, and creditors, many slaveholders had interests in common with the Northeastern capitalists. As an exploiting, propertied class, the slaveholders were always hostile to democracy on principle. At times of radical democratic threats, they were frequently ready to unite with the Northeastern capitalists against the masses. As landlords, however, their desire for expansion to the Southwest, as well as other interests, sharply conflicted with those of the mercantile, financial capitalists and led them into alliance with the democratic farmers, even though

within that coalition there were bitter clashes. Because of their fear of the merchant capitalists, whose leaders sought an American monarchy, the slaveholders, during the early history of America, were genuinely republican, though not democratic. Not in a position to seize the reins of power themselves, they sought to keep the door open for competition among the property-holding classes.

Not until the introduction of cotton culture after the invention of the cotton gin in 1793, when the South obtained a monopoly of the world's production of cotton, did slavery become so fabulously profitable that it definitely fastened itself on the country as an excrescence foredoomed to destroy the nation unless forcibly removed. Not until the struggle over Missouri in 1818 did the new character of slavery manifest itself in a startling form. Prior to that time, major sections of the slaveholders supported in the main—though not completely—all general movements for national defense and national expansion, although they did not contribute to the internal development of a common economy. Not until the time of the Mexican War did their efforts to incorporate new territory into the Union become definitely contrary to the national interests of the American people.

The main obstacle to genuine national development after 1789 and prior to the War of 1812 was that the merchants and speculators of New England and seaboard cities were primarily concerned with the overseas carrying trade. Major sections of the merchant capitalists played leading roles in the Revolutionary War, and it was they who pressed most vigorously for the establishment of a national state. However, their main interest from the beginning was commerce in foreign goods and among foreign powers, rather than in the produce of domestic industry and agriculture. Their policies after the establishment of the Federal Government indicated that their interests in foreign commerce were for the most part in conflict with the development of American production and domestic commerce. Their desire for a strong government, as closely modeled after a monarchy as possible, expressed their effort to use the undeveloped nation as an instrument for furthering foreign trade in such a manner as to make real national development impossible.

The British restrictions on American commerce were broken by the Revolution. The war with England opened American ports to trade with Spain, Holland, and France. Although British markets in the West Indies were closed to American vessels, fish and lumber were exported to the Dutch, French, and Spanish islands, and, through them, trade with the British West Indies was indirectly reopened. However, the slave traffic and the old triangular routes of colonial times were largely lost. After the war, only Prussia and Sweden made trade treaties with America on the basis of reciprocity. Credit from foreign powers was made difficult by the failure of the United States to pay the revolutionary debts, owed primarily to France and Holland.

To offset the loss of the African trade, certain shipping interests found new markets in the Baltic countries and the Far East. Eighteen of forty-six foreign ships entering Canton in 1789 were American. At the same time, Captain William Gray opened trade in New England goods with the Indians of Oregon, from which furs were carried to China and exchanged for silks, tea, and other goods brought back to New England.

At the conclusion of the Revolutionary War, certain merchants became agents, as in colonial times, for the distribution of British goods in America. Britain cleverly extended credit to these merchants, and thus brought them under her financial control. Also she dangled before them the prospect of much more extensive credit on condition that the slaveholders pay their pre-revolutionary debts. Thus, England sought to provoke disunity by causing strife between New England merchants and Southern planters. Some Tories, who had not been driven from the country, began to resume their old businesses. Economic dependence upon England increasingly led the vast majority of the big merchants to follow a pro-British policy resembling that of the former Tories. They became the instruments for holding America in semi-colonial economic dependence upon Britain.

As Europe became involved in a long series of wars, the ease of acquiring profits from the carrying trade abroad caused the merchants to scorn any program for developing their American market. Capital did not move readily into industry. The mer-



chants not only ignored the development of the West, but stood in deadly fear of that region as a material base for the growth of democracy. They recognized that westward migration by preventing the growth of a propertyless class kept wages high in the East. As the condition for investments in industry they strove to make Western land inaccessible and thus to hasten the formation of a large proletariat who would work for wages as low as those in England.<sup>11</sup>

Two methods of capitalist development were possible in the United States. One was by centralizing capital in the hands of the big merchants and speculators through the rapid conversion of the middle classes into a propertyless working class. This type of capitalist development could have occurred only by preventing the small producers from moving into the West. Although internal national development along the Atlantic could have occurred, the nation would have expanded very slowly, if at all, into the West. Capitalism in the United States would have developed on a narrow foundation and only through the destruction of the democratic rights of the small producers. Under such circumstances, America would most probably have lost its independence. Development along these lines was the program of the old Strong Government Party of the merchants and speculators, who later, under the leadership of Alexander Hamilton, usurped the name of Federalist Party. The champions of this program may be described as *bourgeois nationalists*. Inability to realize their program in the face of democratic opposition subsequently led large numbers of them to adopt an anti-national position and finally to commit acts of overt treason. That was the significance of the triumph of Burr over Hamilton within the Federalist Party.

The other possible pathway for national development—the one which was actually followed—was through the growth of small commodity production to be secured by the movement of small producers into the West as pioneers who cleared the wilderness, extended the market, and laid the foundations for the development of capitalism on a broad foundation. Such a program depended upon the accessibility of land, possible only through the preservation and extension of democratic rights.

Migration into the West necessarily counteracted the process of middle-class ruination and slowed up the emergence of a proletariat. Nevertheless, far from preventing the development of capitalism, it assured the extension of capitalism into the West, internal development over a huge area, and the preservation of democracy. It resulted in the growth of capitalism on a firmer, more solid, and more democratic basis than would have been the case had the program of the big merchants been followed. Those small producers who advocated and achieved the program of development in the West on a democratic basis may be described as *bourgeois-democratic nationalists*. It was they who secured the incorporation of democratic principles into the Constitution and who later united under the leadership of Thomas Jefferson in the Democratic-Republican Party. It was they who made America a great nation.

Those who follow the bourgeois theory of economic determinism have generally portrayed the merchants in America, after the adoption of the Constitution, as a progressive, even if a ruthless, force. This theory stems from the mechanistic materialism of the Royalist philosopher of seventeenth-century England, Thomas Hobbes. It was widely popular among such leaders as Alexander Hamilton in eighteenth-century America, and is enunciated today by historians such as Charles A. Beard. That school of historical interpretation differs radically from Marxist historical materialism. Marxists regard *production relations* as the basic and determining factor in historical development. Economic determinists, on the contrary, have always tended to regard a so-called "acquisitive instinct," supposedly possessed by every child of nature, as the primary economic factor. Marxists regard individual acquisitiveness as in itself the product of definite production relations—specifically those of small commodity production and capitalism. In other words, it is not a fundamental characteristic of human nature, but of the bourgeois and the small producer, bred by their own particular relationship to their particular modes of production. Economic determinists have, in accordance with their theory of individual acquisitiveness, focused their attention on acquisition and exchange rather than on production. That is why they have over-

estimated the importance of the merchants in developing the American nation and underestimated the role of the small producers.

Historical progress has always been brought about, first of all, by the development of the forces of production; secondly, by conscious insight into the social tasks required for further development; thirdly, by organized struggle to achieve those tasks. In the United States, from the time of its inception until after the Civil War, it was always, first of all, the small producers and, secondly, the industrial capitalists who developed the forces of production and the nation. The significance of the frontier was that it was the ever-moving area into which the nation was expanding and where its productive forces were being developed. The pioneer small producers paved the way for the higher capitalist mode of production as no other class at the time was able to do. They also accomplished another task for which the industrial capitalists were incapable. They preserved and extended democracy.

The effort to perpetuate small commodity production for all time is impossible and reactionary, but its development has always been progressive. The industrialists continued the development of the forces of production to a higher stage than that to which small producers were capable, though they accompanied industrial activity after the Civil War by ruthlessly undermining democracy. After the final triumph of industrial capitalism, the closing of the frontier, and the rise of monopoly capitalism, the small producers and the industrial capitalists ceased to be the main progressive classes. The industrial working class, as it arose, became the only class capable of developing the forces of production to a stage higher than that of monopoly capitalism, to the stage of socialism. However, it can achieve this task only through firm alliance with the small producers, whose outlook remains thoroughly democratic.

Economic determinists have frequently described the democratic movements of the small producers as anti-capitalist. This never was and never could be the case. The small producers were anti-merchant, anti-speculator, but never anti-capitalist. They themselves were developing the mode of production which

always and everywhere has been and must be the absolutely necessary precondition for capitalism and which always, when left to its own devices, develops automatically into capitalism. By describing these movements mistakenly as anti-capitalist and by pointing to the obvious fact that capitalism was not abolished, the economic determinists have created the utterly false impression that the democratic movements of small producers never accomplished anything.

As mechanistic materialists, economic determinists have always underestimated politics in general. While correctly regarding politics as determined by economic factors, they have conceived of economic systems as machines whose movements are purely automatic. Hence, they tend to regard political consciousness as "sound and fury signifying nothing." Marxists, on the contrary, as *dialectical* materialists, recognize interaction between economic factors and political consciousness. While political consciousness is the product of production relations, conscious insight into those relationships in turn becomes a force, reacting upon and changing society when possessed by classes who unite for struggle to effect their aims. Thus, unlike economic determinists, Marxists do not ignore or underestimate political movements, but regard them as the highest expressions of economic forces.

The political movements of the small-producer democrats did not abolish capitalism and did not establish or perpetuate economic equality. The first aim was inconceivable to them. The second was utopian. However, they did prevent that "hot-house development of capitalism" advocated by the Hamiltonians, which would have prevented the expansion of the American nation across the continent, and they did preserve and extend bourgeois-democracy. These were no mean accomplishments. They established the conditions under which the working class is able to undertake the execution of its more advanced historical tasks.

The American nation during its early years was encircled by aggressive foreign powers. To the north lay Britain's Canadian colonies. To the west and south lay the Spanish holdings of Louisiana and of West and East Florida. Spanish possession of the port of New Orleans was of decisive importance. Upon this



outlet to the sea depended the whole economic life of the Trans-Allegheny region, barred from access to the Atlantic by the lack of roads or waterways through the Appalachians.

Great Britain was far from reconciled to the loss of her colonies. Having lost them during war with France, Spain, and Holland, she planned, when the war was ended, to reassert her rule over America. For this reason, England did not surrender the forts in the Northwest Territory as required by the peace treaty of 1783, maintaining that her legal justification was the failure of the Southern slaveholders to pay their debts. British troops in the Northwest continued to incite Indian massacres and prevented the first surveys in Ohio. England hoped to establish a puppet Indian state in that territory and to use the Northwest as a military base from which to strike again at the independent states. Her plans began to be executed in the years preceding the War of 1812. Meanwhile, Britain used her economic power to hold America in dependence on her industry. Through credit and by taking advantage of their fear of democracy, she converted many of the big merchants of the United States into instruments of British aggression. British agents at the same time sought to intensify the anti-Federalist sentiments of the masses in order to foment dissension and disunion.

At the same time, Spain was attempting to wrest the Western country from the Union. Watching the hosts of settlers pouring across the mountains, Spain stood in deadly fear of an armed assault upon New Orleans. She played upon the ambitions of individuals such as General Wilkinson to foment secessionist plots in Kentucky and Tennessee. General Wilkinson and others were bribed with free outlets through New Orleans and with pensions. They swore allegiance to the Spanish Crown, and did yeoman service for the monarch on whose payroll they were placed. Spain also played upon the anti-Western sentiments of the Northeastern merchants. This was evidenced by a treaty proposed under the Confederation by John Jay, but rejected by Congress, to surrender free navigation of the Mississippi in exchange for trade agreements of advantage to New England merchants. Spain likewise took full advantage of anti-Federalism among the masses and of the anti-democratic policies of mer-

chants and landlords. Her spies circulated widely, and she sought recruits among all disgruntled, adventurous elements. Florida, as well as New Orleans, became a breeding ground for aggressive intrigues.

Agents of monarchist France also fished in the troubled waters of America. France was not reconciled to the loss of Canada and Louisiana through the Peace Treaty of 1763. She still sought a foothold upon the American continent. France had violated her alliance with America by a secret plot during the Revolutionary War to establish an Indian puppet state between the Alleghenies and the Mississippi. She was incensed that America had acquired that land at the end of the War. However, the outbreak of the French Revolution, during the year when the new Federal Government was being formed, rapidly altered the relation of France both to the United States and other powers.

American foreign relations in 1789 were deeply connected with the status of the Indians. The original inhabitants of the territory of the United States were not a part of the American nation. They were not incorporated into its economic life or culture. They were never granted citizenship until the Dawes Act of 1887 offered citizenship to those who renounced their tribes. The tribes were never permitted either to become a part of the nation or to form, through social evolution, a nation of their own.

There is nothing more tragic in American history than the bitter conflicts between frontiersmen and Indians. From the beginning to the end of that long and bloody contest both sides were fighting for freedom, land, home, and country. Yet the opportunity for coming to an understanding and for peaceful co-operation did not arise. The cause for the slaughter on all the "dark and bloody grounds" extending from Jamestown in 1607 to the final fight with Custer in the Far West must be found in the imperial policy of Great Britain and, to a less degree, of France and Spain. From the time of the earliest colonial settlements, the great powers sought to utilize and intensify all possible antagonisms for their imperial aims. Each power tried to use the Indian tribes as pawns for imperial expansion. With ruthless cynicism, Britain had converted the Indians, entirely

innocent of the deeply laid plots of the distant monarchy, into a police force against her own subjects.

From the point of view of the Indians, massacres of American settlers were neither wanton acts of cruelty nor part of a monarchist policy. They were the struggles of a primitive people, who lived by hunting, to protect what they regarded as their inalienable rights to their hunting grounds. The nature of the conflict between England and the American people was beyond the bounds of their existence, for primitive communal relations of various kinds still comprised their fundamental form of social organization. The great principle of democracy, for which the frontiersmen fought, was a principle which to them was meaningless, for they had never known state forms of oppression.

In their defensive fight against a social organization more advanced than their own their simple virtues were inevitably corrupted. Englishmen, Frenchmen, Spaniards, American traders and agents, all alike, introduced commodity exchange with them. At the same time, they deliberately introduced their vices among the Indians. They used whiskey as a means of robbing them. They did not hesitate to engage in any perfidious act of deception. Indian women were the victims of their lust. Social diseases unknown to the primitive tribes became common. In their effort to prevent corruption, tribal leaders blamed the pioneers who penetrated their lands, and there were always false friends sent by Britain and later by American speculators to help intensify this reaction. Even when the hypocrisy of these "friends" was recognized, there arose a fierce and bitter hatred for white men in general.

Just as the Indians had no conception of class conflicts, so the institution of private property in its advanced forms seemed incomprehensible to them. In their eyes, land was like the air and sunshine, a free gift of nature for the common use of all, to be distributed at times by lotteries or treaties, but never to become permanent private property.

The signing of treaties was often preceded by drunken orgies. Chiefs, who understood little of contracts while sober, were induced to make their marks ceding lands or selling furs while in a high state of intoxication. Such treaties were of course not

recognized by the Indians. Moreover, Americans never comprehended the position of the chief. Regarding him as a petty monarch, they considered that he had sole right to alienate lands. This was not the case, since the chief, as spokesman for the tribe, was generally bound by the council of warriors. When tribes refused to be bound by the decision of the chief, the frontiersmen regarded this as flagrant violation of a contract. On the other hand, frontiersmen themselves constantly violated the very treaties they obtained by fraud. Thereupon, they would proceed by deceit or force to obtain new treaties recognizing the accomplished fact of their new settlements.

There was a clash of two radically different social systems, each one having its own conceptions and outlooks, each being equally incomprehensible to the other. To the settlers, the Indians' disregard for private property appeared wicked. To the Indians, bourgeois private property seemed sacrilege.

Throughout the whole period of the settlement of the West, it was the most democratic forces which came in immediate and violent conflict with the Indians. Among the democratic leaders, there were individuals, from the time of Roger Williams, who saw the tragedy of the conflict, recognized the human rights of Indians, and vainly sought to find some means of peaceful co-operation. This was true of Jefferson. Had the democratic forces and the Indians been free to work out their own relations, some peaceful solution might undoubtedly have been found. However, the incitement of the Indians by the great powers and by American merchants and speculators made it inevitable that the democratic classes, in defense of their democracy and the independence of their nation, should fight the Indians. Britain incited the Indians from the Northwestern forts and from Canada; Spain and British agents did the same in Florida. Thus, the fiercest hatred was engendered, and slaughters in which no quarter was given on either side resulted.

In the midst of such bitter internal conflicts and external threats, the American republic was established. Many problems confronted it. The merchant capitalists demanded the establishment of national credit; uniform, though not protective, tariff regulations; a uniform and stable currency; uniform and heavy

taxes; steps to increase the amount of available capital; favorable trade treaties with foreign powers; the creation of an armed force—in a word, the fostering of trade and the establishment of military power. The small producers demanded easy access to Western lands, outlets for their crops, the ousting of the British from the Northwestern forts, the protection of the frontier from British-inspired Indian raids, the opening of New Orleans, the extension of civil rights, low taxes, and a democratic people's militia. A small and not very powerful group of industrialists wanted protective tariffs and the development of roads and waterways. The slaveholders, with the future of their system uncertain, had no clearcut program. Those with commercial interests supported certain aspects of the merchants' program. Others were in agreement with many aims of the middle classes. They were united in their desire to utilize the Federal Government to prevent slave insurrections and escapes. The national interests of all classes demanded the defense of the borders of the United States from foreign aggression.

The bitter conflicts among classes over domestic policies made preservation of the union of states under the new constitution extremely difficult. All classes regarded the new government as an experiment. Because foreign powers were utilizing class conflicts for their own aggressive aims, the tasks of preserving the Union and defending independence were inevitably one and the same.

## PART TWO

### Democratic Victory Over Federalist Reaction

1789-1801



THE UNITED STATES AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IN 1802  
(see pages 23-27).

## CHAPTER IV

### THE HAMILTONIAN OFFENSIVE OF THE MERCHANT CAPITALISTS

THE first party conflict under the new government occurred during the first elections to Congress. Both the old Federalists and anti-Federalists ran candidates. The basic issue over which these loose party formations had emerged had been settled, and the new problem was how and in the interest of what classes the Federal Government was to be administered. Conflict over that question necessarily caused political realignment shortly after the new government began to function.

The anti-democratic forces among the Federalists succeeded largely in branding the anti-Federalist candidates as enemies of the Union, whose sole object in running for office was to subvert the government. This was by no means the case, since most of the anti-Federalists indicated by their actions that they subscribed to the majority decision in establishing the Federal Government, that they contended for office in order to protect their interests under the new government and to guarantee its democratic administration. A large majority of Federalists were elected, although quite a number of democratic anti-Federalists were sent to Congress from certain agrarian districts of the South and West.

During the struggle over the ratification of the Constitution, support for the new government had been won from large sections of the suspicious farmers by the rumor that "the General," as Washington was familiarly called, had consented to become its head. As the outstanding leader, hero, and symbol of the Revolution, George Washington was more widely beloved than any other leader. No one else could have rallied such wide support for the new "experiment." His rich experience as Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary Army had given him a

unique knowledge of the country and the needs of all classes. When the ballots of the Electoral College were opened by the first Congress, George Washington was found to have been elected by unanimous consent. John Adams, who represented the big merchant and landlord interests of New England, received by a narrow margin the second highest vote, and thus became Vice-President.

George Washington as President was by no means the mere figurehead depicted by some historians. Simultaneously slaveholding planter, merchant, and speculator in land, Washington possessed in his own person the contradictory aims of different groups of capitalists. Washington's many interests made him in 1789 the best representative of all the big property-holding groups who were looking toward general national development. No man in all America had more continuously championed the need for permanent union all during the war. He freed his own slaves, advocated general emancipation, and sought the development of scientific agriculture based on wage-labor. Although he supported in the main the financial policies of the merchant-speculators, his landlord interests kept him from going all the way with Alexander Hamilton. As a landlord and land speculator, concerned with Western expansion, his aims coincided with those of the Western farmers. He was interested in various projects for developing inland transportation. Thus, Washington never fell into that narrow anti-nationalist, anti-expansionist position of the Northeastern merchants.

The representatives of the mercantile-financial interests always followed the policy of presenting their measures with Washington's approval, thus surrounding them with the halo of his name and making support of them the test of patriotism. They were deterred from going as far as they would have had they possessed Washington's complete support. Fundamentally he was always on the side of big property, but as the representative of all the property-holders he was afraid of the disruption of national unity. Thus, he exercised a steadying hand on every special capitalist interest. He stood staunchly for moderate republicanism, expressing the strongest opposition to all

monarchist sentiments, yet at the same time opposing the thoroughgoing democracy of the farmers and artisans.

Congress assembled nearly a month behind schedule on April 2, 1789, in New York, as the temporary capital. Fashionable society in that city, as later in Philadelphia, attempted to create the atmosphere of a European court. The first discussions of Congress were over rules of procedure. There were many arguments, symptomatic of monarchist sentiments among the wealthy, over titles for the new government officials and over various matters of form and ceremony—much to the disgust of the democratic Congressmen.

Immediately after the adoption of rules of procedure, proposals were made for a tariff. After some wrangling over rates, agreement was reached on a mildly protectionist tariff, whose average rate was less than 10 per cent, the main object of which was revenue for the new government. As a stimulus to the shipping interests, a 10 per cent discount on duties was placed on goods imported in American vessels. A symptom of the pro-British sentiments of the majority in Congress who represented the big merchants was the defeat of Madison's proposal to adopt tariff rates which would discriminate against England.

On April 30, Washington took his oath of office. Congress proceeded to create the executive departments of government and to establish the Federal courts, while Washington began to make his appointments. The first Cabinet, consisting of four members, took the form of a coalition government. This revealed the keen judgment of Washington in realizing what was necessary to hold the Union together. Thomas Jefferson became Secretary of State; Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury; General Henry Knox of Massachusetts, Secretary of War; and Edmund Randolph, former Governor of Virginia, Attorney-General. The Cabinet thus consisted of three representatives of big property and one of the forces of democracy. There were two representatives of the merchants and speculators—Hamilton and Knox; one of the slaveholders—Randolph; and one of the farmers and artisans—Jefferson. The scales were tipped on the side of mercantile-financial interests, and the big propertied

classes definitely predominated. Jefferson was reluctant to accept, but was finally convinced by Washington's argument that his presence in the government, as democratic leader, was essential for the success of the new Federal union.

Appointments to the judiciary consisted entirely of representatives of the big property-holding interests. Thus, during subsequent periods when the democratic forces gained control of the legislative and executive branches of government, the judiciary became the major stronghold of big property.

The unity of the first Cabinet was temporary and superficial. There were two deeply conflicting conceptions in the nation over the function of the new government—that of the bourgeois nationalists and that of the bourgeois-democratic nationalists. It was inevitable that the conflicting interests of the two class groupings should break into open strife. The bourgeois nationalists were better organized, more definitely conscious of their aims, and on the offensive. It was their offensive which quickly disrupted the semblance of unity established in Washington's administration.

Alexander Hamilton held the key post in the new government for the most pressing problems immediately confronting the country were financial. West Indian by birth and of humble origin, Hamilton when a boy had been enabled to come to America to study by winning a prize in an essay contest. During the Revolution, while still a mere youth, he served Washington in a clerical capacity as an aide, and performed many acts of bravery. Talented, ambitious, and entirely devoted to the "rich and well-born," he became the most brilliant and forthright leader of the American bourgeoisie.

Keenly aware of the lack of support for the new "experiment" in government from both the people and the men of wealth, Hamilton indicated to friends, upon taking office, that it was necessary by some bold action rapidly to rally all the men of wealth to firm support of the new government. It was his historical role to lead in the consolidation of a real dictatorship of the big bourgeoisie within the democratic framework of the new government. When shortly after his appointment Congress requested a report on the public credit of the United States,

Hamilton saw the possibility of accomplishing far more than the mere payment of debts.

Hamilton's plans did not spring from merely an individualistic stroke of genius. He had consulted closely with all the foremost speculators and financiers of the day. Furthermore, he was a careful student of the development of capitalism in England and other European countries, and thus had a wealth of experience on which to draw. His famous reports bristled with facts drawn from the previous history of capitalism.<sup>1</sup>

Hamilton's *Report on the Public Credit of the United States* was read in Congress during January, 1790. The report recommended that Congress immediately assume obligation for the full amount of all the debts contracted by the revolutionary government plus all accumulated interest. He furthermore proposed that the Federal Government assume the debts, plus all arrears of interest, owed by the individual states. Altogether, the total debts of both the Federal and state governments, as actually paid, reached a total of \$76,096,468.67, a tremendous sum for American capitalism at this early date.

Hamilton's plan was to increase the nation's capital both by establishing its credit abroad and by raising the market price of the public certificates to par. Public certificates had been frequently exchanged for as little as one-twentieth of par value. It was not Hamilton's plan to redeem the certificates in cash immediately, or even in the near future, as funds were not available, and immediate payment, even if that had been possible, would not have accomplished the desired end. Hamilton's object was to maintain a permanent debt. The government had no immediate funds with which to pay. The previous government had been powerless to pay the debts or to maintain the market prices of certificates, because it possessed no power to collect taxes. The new government, however, had full constitutional powers to levy and collect taxes and to use armed force if necessary. Merely by undertaking an obligation to pay the debts, the new government could restore the market prices of certificates. Such an obligation, now that the government possessed power, would transform mere paper into negotiable capital and thus multiply many times over the amount of capital in the

nation—in some instances by twenty times the former amount. Funding the public debt was thus a means of *creating* capital. The new capital would exist in the form of paper. But the paper would circulate as capital prior to the actual payment of the debt. Behind the certificates would be the power of the government to tax. Hamilton indicated the enormous possibilities for capitalist development in America, but emphasized that to wait until enough capital was accumulated through normal methods of trade and industry would require decades or longer. However, the creation of capital through the stroke of a pen in assuming the public debt would assure the immediate and rapid expansion of American capitalism. England and other capitalist powers had learned long ago how to create capital out of a debt.

The large holders of public securities, the merchants, bankers, speculators, manufacturers, were whole-heartedly for Hamilton's plan. But the representatives of the toiling classes, as well as many of the slaveholders, eyed it with suspicion long before they realized all its implications.

The Constitution provided that direct taxes should be apportioned among the states, not on the basis of wealth, but on the basis of population, counting three-fifths of the slaves. This made unconstitutional any kind of income tax until the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, and meant that the brunt of all direct taxes would fall upon the small farmers, who formed the vast bulk of the population. The whole plan was seen by many to be a gigantic scheme for centralizing wealth in the hands of the speculators, bankers, and merchants, the large holders of certificates. As always, primary accumulation took the form of a direct assault upon private property based on labor.

Hamilton always regarded a national debt as a good in itself, regardless of the end for which the debt had arisen. It enabled the government to create capital, apparently out of nothing; in fact, out of a deficit. It converted the holders of securities—bankers, merchants, speculators—into creditors of the state, thus giving them financial control. In a word, it enabled them to buy state power. It established the basis for heavy taxes. As early as 1781, in a letter to Robert Morris, written much more frankly than were his reports to Congress, Hamilton declared: "A na-

tional debt, if it is not excessive, will be to us a national blessing. It will be a powerful cement of our Union. It will also create a necessity for keeping up taxation to a degree which, without being oppressive, will be a spur to industry. . . . It were otherwise to be feared our popular maxims would incline us to too great parsimony and indulgence. We labor less now than any civilized nation of Europe; and a habit of labor in the people, is as essential to the health and vigor of their minds and bodies, as it is conducive to the welfare of the State."<sup>2</sup>

Hamilton's proposal was for payment to all then holding certificates. But small holders had been forced to sell their certificates during the difficult days after the Revolutionary War, frequently for as little as one-twentieth of par. Speculators had taken advantage of popular distress in anticipation of future redemption. Thus, many whose certificates had originally represented payment for services during the arduous days of the war had received almost nothing; whereas among those enriched by Hamilton's plan were speculators who had given no aid to their country in its hour of need, but had afterwards bought certificates for a song. Many of the speculators had been Tories during the Revolution, secure in British-held ports, wining and dining with Redcoat officers, or profiteers taking advantage of their nation's distress to acquire personal fortunes of their own.

To make matters worse, Hamilton took into his confidence, before making his report, all the leading speculators of New York and Philadelphia. While the report was being read, boats and stage coaches were leaving New York at full speed for the West and South, where it took weeks or months for news of Congressional deliberations to spread. These agents circulated rapidly among small holders of securities, buying their certificates at the cheap prices still prevailing. They spread the rumor that Congress was going to *repudiate* the debts and that consequently certificates would soon be worthless. They told the small holders that, prior to repudiation, Congress had offered to permit certain purchases in Western lands with certificates at their present prices. Thus they pretended to offer small holders a final chance to sell. By the time Hamilton's program had become



law and the news had reached the country, practically all the original small holders had been completely swindled of all their holdings.

James Madison launched the fight against Hamilton's program by introducing an amendment proposing that Congress should discriminate between the original holders and the speculators, paying to the latter the highest market price of certificates during the previous period and paying to the original holders the difference. Thus, Madison fought for his agrarian constituency, not opposing payment of the debt or stabilization of the credit of the United States, but fighting for the redemption of the certificates so as to keep wealth more widely distributed, championing the rights of the patriots who had won the Revolution against the maneuvers of the speculators.

The attack on Madison by the Hamiltonians was bitter. They maintained that to fail to pay the face value printed on the certificates to the actual holders would be in defiance of all business principles and that it would destroy trust and confidence in the government. Their indignation, expressed in a high, moral tone, indicated that Madison's amendment struck at the very heart of their scheme.

Several days after Madison's attack, William Maclay of Western Pennsylvania made a substitute proposal for the payment of the debt through sales of Western lands. Maclay saw the danger of the financial interests obtaining control of the government; he wished to avoid taxation on the farmers, and hoped to stimulate settlement of the West as a means of rapid liquidation of the debt. Maclay proposed joint action to Madison, but met with no success. Thus, the opposition entered the struggle divided in its own ranks.

Not only were the agents of the financiers of New York and Philadelphia busily purchasing cheap certificates during the Congressional debates. In anticipation of their own legislation, Congressmen themselves engaged in this unholy traffic. This was not unforeseen by Hamilton, who deliberately relied on the self interest of Congressmen in securing the passage of his bills. Jefferson once quoted him as openly praising corruption in government. In reference to a disparaging comment by John Adams

on the notorious corruption of the British Government, Hamilton had remarked: "Purge it of its corruption, and give to its popular branch equality of representation, and it would become an *impracticable* government; as it stands at present, with all its supposed defects, it is the most perfect government which ever existed."<sup>3</sup> The story that corrupt government began during the period of Jacksonian democracy is one of the myths of American history. It was widespread in the first Congress, and Alexander Hamilton sired it with his open blessing and theoretical justification.

After heated debates, Congress rejected Madison's amendment by a vote of 46 to 40. Of those voting for Hamilton's proposal, 26 were themselves speculators in public securities.

The fight over the assumption of the state debts was more stubborn. Behind this plan was the desire to unify and strengthen the new Federal Government, to obtain control over sources of revenue formerly possessed by the states, and to demonstrate to foreign powers that the United States was now one power. Most of the Southern states had paid their debts through the sale of Western lands. It was the Northern states, especially Massachusetts, which still had debts unpaid. The Southern farmers and slaveholders thus saw that assumption would force them to pay the debts of the Northern states. New forces were mobilized for the opposition, and at first the bill lost by two votes. Ludicrous descriptions were written at the time of the speculators streaming gaily into Congress to watch their triumph, their agents having already gone forth to buy state certificates, and then streaming out of Congress in a rout, making no effort to hide their dismay and crying out that the whole experiment in a Federal Government was a mistake.

Hamilton, however, was not to be discouraged. Rallying his colleagues, he proceeded along the circuitous path of political horse-trading toward victory for his bill. The agrarian representatives were anxious to have the nation's capital removed from the financial centers of the North to the South. Through a bargain over what was to him an inconsequential issue, Hamilton sought to secure the victory of assumption.

It was at this moment that Thomas Jefferson made what he



later regarded as one of his greatest political mistakes. Jefferson had just arrived in New York to assume the office of Secretary of State. Hamilton pretended alarm over a possible secession of the North from the Union unless the Assumption Act was passed, but promised Jefferson that the North would agree to move the capital to the South in return for support to that act. On the basis of his fear of disunion, Jefferson promised to use his influence for assumption in return for Hamilton's support for moving the capital. Through Jefferson's persuasion, enough Congressmen were influenced to secure the passage of the bill. Jefferson later complained bitterly that Hamilton had deceived him.

After Congress had voted to move the capital, for a period of ten years, to Philadelphia prior to its permanent establishment on the banks of the Potomac, Congress adjourned its first session. Hamilton was now approaching his greatest triumphs, for the basis for all his subsequent financial proposals had been laid.

Hamilton has become famous in every history textbook as the man who stabilized the currency of the United States. This was a necessary and progressive achievement. But this important act was accompanied by one of the greatest swindles in American history. This swindle is not mentioned as a rule by the ordinary textbooks. And yet it was just that which endeared him to the hearts of the big capitalists. The stabilization of the currency could have been secured just as easily through the honest and democratic method proposed by Madison. But that was not what the speculators desired.

Such was the first major piece of legislation enacted by the United States Congress. Charles A. Beard has called it one of the greatest acts in the centralization of wealth in the history of capitalism.

As news of how the people had been fleeced by small hordes of avaricious speculators began to trickle into the countryside, a vast surge of wrath began to swell, wrath which subsequently found an articulate and effective outlet in the party of the people to be mobilized by Jefferson. On the other hand, Hamilton's dramatic act of mobilizing the men of wealth to the support of

the new government was as successful as it could ever have been in his wildest dreams. The certificates, bought for a pittance, suddenly became negotiable capital worth often twenty times the prices for which they were bought. One can well understand why the big speculators rallied to the new government. It had made them rich. It owed them money which they had never loaned and for which they had surrendered almost nothing. Thenceforward, until they lost full control in 1801, these newly enriched capitalists of the Northeast were as tenderly concerned over the prosperity of the Federal Government as of their own enterprises. The Federal Government now *was* their enterprise. Their new capital, created by this government, was invested in it.<sup>4</sup>

When the second session of the first Congress convened in Philadelphia, Hamilton proceeded to amplify his program. The financing of the enormous obligations undertaken required a system of taxation. The Hamiltonians maintained that neither the funds from the tariff nor the sale of Western lands could even begin to meet the new obligations.

Hamilton avoided recommending a direct tax by proposing an excise tax on intoxicating liquors. This had the appearance of taxation on a luxury or even a vice and was sponsored as such by the Puritan merchants of New England. However, Hamilton and his colleagues well knew the real significance of the Whiskey Tax. The wretched condition of the back-country roads was such that the only feasible means of transporting corn, the major crop of the hinterland, was in the form of whiskey, which consequently for the poor farmers became a medium of exchange. Practically every farmer on the frontier had his own distillery, and the produce of these little "stills" was to bear the brunt of taxation.

Hamilton was warned that such a tax would arouse all the fury of the frontier farmers, who from the first had eyed with deep suspicion the movement for a strong Federal Government. Knowing well that he was flying in the face of popular rage, Hamilton actually welcomed rebellion in order to have an opportunity to demonstrate the armed strength of the new government, to break the will of the people, and thus make them

feel the iron hand of the new state power. This was demonstrated subsequently in the crushing of the so-called "Whiskey Rebellion" of 1794.

Bitter arguments were launched against the Whiskey Tax in Congress. However, the previous adoption of the Public Debt and the bargain that had been made by leading democrats over assumption made its passage inevitable.

The Whiskey Tax, on top of the swindle perpetrated by the funding program, added insult to injury. Not only had the holders of securities been robbed, but now many of them were heavily taxed to pay the very speculators who had fleeced them. From the first days of the tax, echoes of 1765 filled the air. Seeds of revolt were planted, and it was not without difficulty that the leaders of the Democratic-Republican Party, soon to be born, held in check tendencies toward isolated violent action and channeled the deep-seated rage of the frontier into organized, disciplined action.

The day after the proposal for the Whiskey Tax, Hamilton's *Report on the Bank* was read to Congress. Long before definite steps had been taken for the establishment of the Federal Government, Hamilton had elaborated his plan for a National Bank. The bank proposed was to have the privilege of holding on deposit all funds derived from taxation, customs duties, the sale of Western lands, or other sources. Its capital of \$10,000,000 was to be subscribed by private investors, with the exception of \$2,000,000 to be subscribed by the United States. The bank's capital was thus, in every sense, to be private, though its administration was to be under government control.

Hamilton indicated that a good part of the capital for the new bank could easily be composed of the recently appreciated public certificates. Seventy-five per cent of the capital, as afterwards subscribed, consisted of public securities recently transformed into negotiable capital by legislative action. Thus, the bank rested primarily on the National Debt. In the last analysis, it rested on taxation; on the labor of the tax-paying farmers. The democratic leaders were quick to see that the National Bank was but an extension of the Funding Act.

The bank was to manage government loans, to furnish

financial aid to the United States Treasury, and to be under the supervision of the Treasury Department. It was also to be given the right to issue currency recognized by the government. Hence, it was to become an instrument for establishing a stable, uniform, and deflated currency throughout the United States, an end which the merchants and speculators had been seeking since the Revolutionary War, but one to which the debt-ridden farmers were remorselessly opposed.

Subscriptions to bank stock were to be in no smaller sums than \$400. This guaranteed that the bulk of the investors would be the Northeastern merchants and financiers. Thus, the financial interests were to have another direct investment in the government. Through its ability to grant loans at interest, the bank would, to a still further degree, facilitate the draining of wealth from the agrarian regions and its centralization in the hands of the Northeastern capitalists.

The Bank Bill went through the Senate without a battle, the democratic agrarians considering it hopeless to fight it in the light of previous votes. However, in the House, James Madison led the fight on the ground that there was no provision in the Constitution for such an institution. The Hamiltonians defended the bank with their favorite argument of implied powers. Madison and his followers warned that on the basis of such a doctrine there could be no constitutional restriction on any tyranny. They emphasized that the Constitution would not have been ratified had such a doctrine been made explicit and that the Hamiltonians were defying the popular will.

The Bank Bill passed, assured of victory by Congressional security holders. Nineteen of the twenty voting against it were Southerners. The establishment of the National Bank crowned the financial edifice constructed under Hamilton's guidance in the short period of two years during the sessions of the first Congress, which adjourned in the summer of 1791.

A whole stock of new capital had been created by legislative decree alone, "as if by the wave of an enchanter's wand." Purchasers of cheap and almost worthless paper had had that paper transformed into negotiable capital in the form of public securities, guaranteed by the authority of the government. These

securities were subsequently transformed into stock in the National Bank. But the investors surrendered nothing for they received in return bank notes which were also negotiable and thus easily transformed into commercial or industrial stock. Hence, the capital, created and multiplied by the Funding Act, was multiplied again through the bank. An era of rapid expansion in capitalist enterprises ensued. The whole thing had the mystifying appearance of being based on paper alone and thus partaking of the character of fantasy. But what lay behind the paper was the government's power to tax. The agrarian leaders saw readily that the newly created paper represented a claim on the produce of the laboring population.

A frenzy of gambling in the new certificates commenced immediately upon the issuance of bank stock in the summer of 1791. Adventurers and charlatans of every sort engaged in buying, stealing, and forging government paper. The government had become a business venture in itself. Had there not been sudden, urgent warnings, there would have been a panic in the late summer of 1791, even before the bank had begun to function.

Hamilton utilized the funds available to the Treasury Department, which he kept in one common "sinking fund," to stabilize the market prices of public certificates. Whenever prices of securities began to fall he immediately purchased from the market a sufficient quantity to stop the fall. Through government action, disaster for the speculators was averted.

As the people saw that in the mad scramble for government paper it was not beneath the dignity of Congressmen to profit from their legislative offspring, outcries against the "corrupt squadron" in Congress began to rise.

Hamilton's major financial policies were all adopted during the first Congress. Early in the sessions of the second Congress of 1791-92, he attempted to get another basic measure passed, but this time he was unsuccessful. Dissatisfied with the mildly protectionist Tariff of 1789, he proposed in his famous *Report on Manufactures* protection rather than revenue as the fundamental aim of tariff policy. Dwelling on the marvelous opportunities for industrial development in America, he advocated

a heavy protective system aimed at excluding all foreign commodities competing with native industries. As a further stimulus, he urged tax exemptions and government bounties for new manufactures. Foreseeing agrarian opposition, he devoted the major portion of his report to convincing the farmers. New outlets for farmers' goods would be obtained, he argued, and prices of agricultural supplies would be lowered through native production. He held before farmers the idea of immigration resulting from industrial expansion as a preventative of labor shortage. Finally, he maintained that industrialization would enable farmers to increase their incomes by the employment of their wives and children in the mills. "Of the number of persons employed in the cotton manufactories of Great Britain," he declared, "it is computed that four-sevenths, nearly, are women and children; of whom the greatest proportion are children, and many of them of a tender age." 5

This report foreshadowed the subsequent industrial growth of America. Although it was widely publicized it aroused no serious Congressional discussion, resulted in no legislation, and produced no storm of comment. Hamilton was in advance of the merchant capitalists of his day. Concerned primarily with overseas trade and speculative ventures, they were not ready to divert their energies toward industrial development on a big scale. Hamilton's report was laid on the table of history until subsequent events made it the immediate order of business.

Not content with pointing out the pathway to future industrial growth, Hamilton sought actively to lead the capitalists of his day along that trail. He corresponded with leading industrialists, taking a special interest in Samuel Slater's venture. He obtained full reports on industrial enterprises, and with his knowledge and influence rendered manufacturers much aid. He personally helped select the site at Passaic Falls, New Jersey, for the great textile mills which later arose there. He used his influence to get a charter from the New Jersey legislature exempting the manufactory at the place later known as "Patterson" from taxation for ten years. Hamilton was among the first to grasp the possibility for that division of labor between North and South whereby Southern plantations became producers of cotton for

Northern mills. It was he who influenced Carolina planters to commence raising cotton which prior to the invention of the cotton gin in 1793 was virtually unknown in the South. Thus, Hamilton helped found the cotton kingdom as well as Northern industry.

No heavy protective tariffs were adopted during any of the three Federalist administrations. In fact, it was through the Jeffersonian party that the industrial capitalists, in opposition to the merchants, later began to press their demands; and, after the War of 1812, it was the Jeffersonians during Madison's administration who finally doubled the tariff of 1789 and thus first attempted to establish a system of protection.

Throughout the two administrations of Washington, there were constant debates in Congress over the land policy of the Federal Government; yet it is significant of lack of interest in the West by the Hamiltonian party that no land law was passed till 1796.

Under the Ordinance of 1785, very little land was sold directly to settlers. Most of the land sold by the government was in million-acre plots at reduced rates to three large land companies. One of these, a fraudulent venture which collapsed, never purchased its holdings, while the others never actually bought all of the huge areas originally assigned them. The only other large sale was to the state of Pennsylvania for the purpose of giving that state a frontage on Lake Erie. The receipts from sales, far from bringing a revenue to the government, did not defray the expense of surveying the Seven Ranges set aside by Congress for the first settlements in Ohio. Most of the actual settlers purchased from states or speculators, from whom credit could be obtained, or squatted illegally upon the land. As a deliberate means of preventing settlement of the West, the New England states were selling land within their own boundaries on relatively easy terms.

Shortly after the convening of the first Congress, Thomas Scott of Pittsburgh proposed that land should be sold by the government in small plots and that a land office should be established. He pointed out that 7,000 squatters had already settled on unsurveyed land and emphasized that they were willing to

buy if given an opportunity and a guarantee that others would not be allowed to purchase at auctions the land they had improved. Unless this were done, he warned that foreign powers, by a promise of free land, might easily win the squatters' allegiance. Spain had already made such offers.

There were bitter debates in Congress, in which the Hamiltonians opposed stubbornly any policy that would drain the population from the seaboard states. Hamilton was requested to make a *Report on the Disposal of the Public Domain*. This was done in July, 1790, and in this report Hamilton stressed the primary importance of land as a source of revenue, and proposed measures clearly in the interest of the speculators. No action was taken on his report, although it afforded the basis for debates during six years. Congress was too busy with legislation of more direct concern to the mercantile, speculating interests. Opportunities already existed for land speculators. For the farmers, able to obtain land from the states and confronted with the direct onslaughts of Hamilton's general financial policy, other issues were at the time more pressing.

Prior to the second Congress, there was no organized opposition to the Hamilton faction outside of Congress, but in the summer of 1791 and during the ensuing session of Congress, the tide began to turn. Before the adjournment of the first Congress in 1791, it had become bitterly clear to Jefferson, Madison, and their colleagues that the "unity" of the coalition government had been disrupted. For the protection of democracy and the well-being of the small producers of America, for the fundamental interests of the nation as a whole, they saw the necessity of forming a party, national in scope, to undertake the task of wresting control of the government from the hands of the speculators who had slipped into power behind the bold and cynical leadership of the Secretary of the Treasury.

## CHAPTER V

## THE RISE OF THE JEFFERSONIAN PARTY

THE first steps toward the formation of new political parties occurred in Congress during the fights over Hamilton's financial measures. The Hamiltonians took the first step by working as a bloc on all issues. Their leader in the Senate was the great financier of the Revolution, Robert Morris of Philadelphia. Outstanding leader in the House was Fisher Ames of Massachusetts. Other shining lights among them—all speculators—were Senator Philip Schuyler of New York, father-in-law of Hamilton, and, in the House, Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts, and George Clymer and Thomas Fitzsimmons of Pennsylvania. From the beginning, this faction assumed the name of Federalist and consistently posed as the sole defender of the Federal union and the Constitution. It sought always to becloud the real issues by branding its opponents as "Anti-Federalist," even though the leader of the Congressional opposition was James Madison, the outstanding Federalist of the day. The Hamiltonians denounced factions or parties in words, but they were opposed to them only in the sense that they wished no opposition to their own party.

As a means of defense against the Federalist "monocrats," as Jefferson called them, the opponents of Hamilton's policies commenced holding caucuses. The anti-Hamiltonians were heterogeneous in class origin and difficult to unite, thus contrasting sharply with the tightly knit, homogeneous group of speculators and merchants, with the clearly formulated aim of a single class, who gathered around Hamilton. Among the anti-Hamiltonians were representatives of the small farms in the West and South, of the great slave plantations of the South, of the vast estates of the Hudson River Valley, and of poverty stricken artisans. It was no easy task to solidify these elements, with their

conflicting aims, into a single party with a single program. Only the danger threatening *all* agrarian interests and *all* the small producers eventually led them into a coalition, which was always unstable. Many landlords and slaveholders, who also had mercantile interests, or who suffered from a fanatical fear of democracy, supported Hamilton. However, their agrarian interests as such were threatened, and this led many into alliance with the democratic small producers.

The leader of the anti-Hamiltonian group in the House was the scholarly James Madison of Virginia. In the Senate, William Maclay of Western Pennsylvania was the rough and outspoken representative of the backcountry, while James Monroe of Virginia was spokesman for small farmers as well as for certain slaveholders. Prominent leaders in the House, in addition to Madison, were James Jackson, who spoke for the small farmers of Georgia; Timothy Bloodworth, poor artisan of North Carolina; and William Giles, Piedmont slaveholder of Virginia.

From the beginning, the Hamiltonians had highly organized support outside of Congress. In the coastal cities were powerful organizations of merchants. The Society of the Cincinnati, consisting of former army officers, was solidly Hamiltonian. Most of the newspapers of the time were owned and edited by those usurping the name of Federalist. In the *Gazette of the United States*, edited by John Fenno, the Federalists possessed what amounted to an official party organ, which sought to pose as a "court journal" or "government" paper. This paper enjoyed special privileges as Hamilton gave it all government printing and secured loans for it from the National Bank.

In New England, the Federalists possessed a real, though unstable, mass base. Here was the stronghold of the mercantile, financial interests. Small commodity production among farmers and artisans was most highly developed, and huge landed estates were not so common as elsewhere. In this environment petty-bourgeois opportunities were widespread and the Federalists were able to rally the bulk of the voting population more readily around their program of capitalist development.

The strong grip of Calvinism in New England afforded the most fertile soil for mass support to Hamiltonian Federalism.

Reared on a gospel of work and thrift, which offered material rewards to those who labored according to God's will, New Englanders were deeply ingrained with the most thoroughly bourgeois of all religious ideologies. The Calvinists advocated and practiced rule by those who prospered through capitalist enterprise, and condemned the poor, as slothful, both to eternal damnation after death and subjugation on earth to "God's elect." The Congregational Church, successor to the old Puritan church of Massachusetts, was the center of all community life. Most terrible of all calamities was to feel the disfavor of the congregation. The Puritan faith demanded that each man search both his own soul and the conduct of his neighbors for signs of failure to follow the Calvinist code of sober toil and material advancement. Failure to follow that code evoked within the sinner's consciousness the fear of hell-fire, so vividly described by generations of Puritan divines, and brought down the devastating denunciations of a powerful and inquisitorial clergy and severe condemnation, if not ostracism, at the hands of Puritanical neighbors. The clergy, in alliance with the merchants, wielded all-powerful political control. Without support from the clergy, the hopes of candidates for office were blasted. Elections were accompanied by religious services and long sermons which were political speeches. The opening of ballots was presided over by the clergy with appropriate prayers. Disfranchisement could be the penalty for straying from the narrow Calvinist path. Nowhere else in America did a single church so dominate all community life. The achievement of democratic reforms in New England depended upon breaking the grip of this bulwark of the Federalist Party.

Although the opponents of the Hamiltonians in Congress voiced the will of the overwhelming majority of the people, they had no organized support outside of Congress and only a few, isolated, local newspapers. Not only were the people unorganized, but they were widely scattered and, due to poor methods of transportation and communication, not easily reached. The vast majority of the poorest—unskilled laborers, journeymen, tenants, many small farmers—were still disfranchised through property qualifications. Moreover, many quali-

fied voters among the farmers and artisans, unaccustomed to voting in the past, did not avail themselves of their newly won electoral rights.

The potential forces of democratic opposition were growing. Not only was mass resentment accumulating as knowledge of the Federalist policies spread, but in 1791 two new frontier states—Kentucky and Vermont—entered the Union on the basis of full equality with the original thirteen. In their constitutions, both states adopted universal, manhood suffrage, the necessary result of the absence of sharp inequalities of property.

While there was a spontaneous growth of the democratic forces it was necessary to organize them not merely for defense against the Federalists, but for the salvation of the Union. The masses frequently showed trends toward local violence and secession. Without a national democratic party, these tendencies would have played into the hands of foreign agents seeking the dismemberment of the Union.

In forming a party, national in scope, Jefferson saw the importance of two things. First, he proposed the establishment of a national, democratic newspaper to challenge the Federalist press, bring the facts to the people, and introduce unity and organization into the democratic forces. Secondly, he advocated building the party on a solid, mass basis in the localities and states before making premature efforts to form a national party, which might prove to be one of leaders alone.

Philip Freneau, famous poet of the Revolution, was secured as editor of this democratic newspaper. As a means of support, he was given a clerkship under Jefferson in the Department of State, and in the fall of 1791 the *National Gazette* began to appear. Mild at first, it rapidly assumed the offensive with satirical, as well as scholarly, articles and poems. In spite of the support received directly from the government for the Federalist journal, Hamilton's followers charged Freneau with political corruption for editing a party paper while employed by the Department of State.

In order to build the new party upon a solid foundation, leaders were selected in the various states. With some outstanding exceptions, most of the educated leaders with political experience



were in the so-called "Federalist" camp; but, with faith in the people, Jefferson proceeded with the utmost skill and diplomacy to work with the forces available. In constant consultation with Madison, Monroe, Giles, and Bloodworth, he selected assistants in the states. Some of these were old revolutionists such as Sam Adams and John Hancock in Massachusetts; others, younger men such as Matthew Lyon of Vermont, the son of an Irish rebel hanged by the British. In Pennsylvania, a whole galaxy of brilliant leaders were found, among them the famous scholar, Dr. Benjamin Rush, one of the founders of modern psychiatry. Most of the outstanding national leaders were Virginians.

Under the initiative of the men selected, neighborhood clubs of shoemakers, carpenters, and other working men began to spring up in the towns. These were the famous Democratic Societies which became the base for the Democratic-Republican Party.<sup>1</sup> The aim of these clubs was to enlighten and unite all those able to vote and to arouse them to the importance of using their combined strength at the polls to support democratic candidates who were generally nominated by legislative caucuses. Their next task was to swell the forces of democracy through an onslaught upon the still heavy restrictions on the franchise in the states. They circulated the *National Gazette*, and held educational discussions, forums, and lectures.

It was Jefferson's belief, in common with all the philosophers of the eighteenth century enlightenment in Europe, that men, equal by nature with their oppressors, could be held in subjugation to exploiters only when their minds were held in ignorance and superstition. The maintenance of democracy depended, therefore, upon universal education in natural science, which according to the philosophers of the enlightenment included political science. The fight for free public education was thus an integral part of Jeffersonian democracy. As instruments of popular adult education, Jefferson relied upon a democratic press free from control by the wealthy and upon the Democratic clubs. Jefferson and Madison both saw that maintenance of a free press and democratic organizations depended upon the preservation and establishment of economic security, which meant at the time the widespread distribution of small property

holdings. However, they saw that the extension of democracy through organization of the toiling population was the only means through which to secure and extend the property rights of the small producers.

Jefferson's policy was to let Hamilton hang himself by bringing the simple facts to all the people, who were to be shown the constitutional means, through united action, for redressing their grievances by the ballot. The Democratic Societies, the direct outgrowth of the American Revolution, represented a new development in the history of the world. The Jacobin Clubs, which were growing in France at the same time, were similar expressions of the newly liberated peoples.

The statewide organizations of the Democratic clubs were coordinated on a national scale by correspondence between the state leaders and Jefferson and his colleagues in Philadelphia. The principle of the old Committees of Correspondence was being applied to new problems. There was no national convention of the democratic organizations, but the caucus of democratic congressmen, guided by Madison and others who were in constant consultation with Jefferson, assumed the role of national leadership. While the state organizations mobilized the people for state elections, the caucus in Philadelphia prepared to select candidates for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency in 1792. The caucus chose the name of Republican Party, to which was added the more descriptive term "Democratic." The Jeffersonians were thereafter known as Democratic-Republicans or simply as Republicans or Democrats.<sup>2</sup>

The new party formed by Jefferson and Madison, both Federalists in 1789 and both still federalist according to the real meaning of the word, embraced the democratic forces who had been in both the Federalist and anti-Federalist camps in 1789. The Federalist Party of Alexander Hamilton consolidated the anti-democratic forces from both of the former groupings. Thus, the Federalist and Democratic-Republican parties of 1791 and thereafter were not the same as the Federalist and anti-Federalist parties of 1789. The alignment was entirely different and along new issues.

The Federalist Party of Alexander Hamilton marched under

a false banner. The secret aim of its leaders was to abolish the democratic states, thus to abolish the federal character of the United States Government and to establish a centralized monarchy. It was the old Strong Government Party under a new form.<sup>3</sup> It was in reality anti-federalist for it hoped to destroy the Constitution, which it held in great contempt. The Democratic-Republican Party, on the contrary, was not only democratic but was the only genuinely federalist party. Its aim was to preserve the Constitution as it stood, democratizing it further through amendments as constitutionally provided. Inevitably, however, the demagoguery of the new Federalist Party confused large sections of the people who were sincerely federalist and sincerely republican.

The Federalist magnates and divines inveighed against the new societies as conspiracies against the government. They denounced Jefferson as a demagogue, a rabble rouser, an atheist, a traitor to his class, a renegade aristocrat. A Massachusetts newspaper summarized the Federalist attitude with the statement, "There can be but two parties in a country—the friends of order and its foes."<sup>4</sup> To such a degree were organizations of the poor and criticism of the government held criminal in certain areas—especially in the strongholds of Congregationalism—that frequently members of the societies were forced to work secretly.

It was the favorite argument of Federalists that they were the party of order, that the people were their own worst enemy who must be saved from themselves. To this Jefferson frequently replied that if men were not fit to rule themselves, certainly they were not fit to rule others. The Federalists invariably spoke with contempt and hatred of the people. They gloated over Hamilton's famous sneer, "The people!—The people is a great beast." The men of small property were portrayed as passionate, turbulent, subject to distempers. The Federalists pictured the people as straining at the leash to devour the property of the wealthy. Therefore, they asserted, the people must be curbed. However, the actions of the Federalists proved that it was they who were hungering for the property of farmers and artisans and that they wanted to strip the people

of civil rights in order to plunder them the more readily. The thief was crying: "Stop thief!"

In a letter to Judge Johnson, written on June 12, 1823, Jefferson discussed the origin of his party.

"The fact is," he wrote, "that at the formation of our government, many had formed their political opinions on European writings and practices, believing the experience of old countries, and especially of England, abusive as it was, to be a safer guide than mere theory. The doctrines of Europe were, that men in numerous associations cannot be restrained within the limits of order and justice, but by forces physical and moral, wielded over them by authorities independent of their will. Hence, their organization of kings, hereditary nobles, and priests. Still further to constrain the brute force of the people, they deem it necessary to keep them down by hard labor, poverty, and ignorance, and to take from them, as from bees, so much of their earnings, as that unremitting labor shall be necessary to obtain a sufficient surplus barely to sustain a scanty and miserable life. And these earnings they apply to maintain their privileged orders in splendor and idleness, to fascinate the eyes of the people, and excite in them an humble adoration and submission, as to an order of superior beings."

Jefferson then stated the principles of his party: "Our [object], on the contrary, was to maintain the will of the *majority* of the [Constitutional] convention and of the people themselves. We believed, with them, that man was a rational animal, endowed by nature with rights and with an innate sense of justice; and that he could be restrained from wrong and protected in right, by moderate powers, confided to persons of his own choice and held to their duties by dependence on his will. . . . We believed that men, enjoying in ease and security the full fruits of their own industry, enlisted by all their interests on the side of law and order, habituated to think for themselves, and to follow their reason as their guide, would be more easily and safely governed, than with minds nourished in error, and vitiated and debased, as in Europe, by ignorance, indigence, and oppression. The cherishment of the people then was our principle, the fear and distrust of them, that of the other party."<sup>5</sup>



The Democratic Societies mobilized the most advanced forces of bourgeois democracy against the reactionary forces of counter-revolution. They became bodies of popular education. Jefferson and his colleagues undertook to smash the illusion that the issue was order as opposed to anarchy and to show that there were two orders—the one oligarchical, the other democratic. To prove that democracy had its own discipline, lectures and discussions were held in the societies on the subject of organized, united action as opposed to fruitless individual or local struggles. Within the societies, disciplinary measures were self-imposed upon members—to the shocked amazement of the “monocrats.”

While the new party was rising, events in the West deepened the hostility of the farmers to the Hamiltonian regime. In 1790, General Harmar had led a force against the British-inspired Indians, who had prevented the first surveys in Ohio, and his troops had been routed. In the spring of 1791 Washington ordered Governor St. Clair, the appointed governor of the Northwest, who was a Federalist, upon another expedition. The campaign failed solely from lack of supplies and reserves, which were withheld by the Federalist-controlled War Department in the East. The cry of Federalist betrayal then arose on every hand. While Congress was working at full speed to enrich speculators on the coast and within its own halls, it flagrantly disregarded the lives of the pioneers who heroically guarded the nation's frontiers. The *National Gazette* took up the issue.

In sharp opposition to the Federalists, Washington commissioned the staunch fighter, “Mad Anthony” Wayne, to prepare for a new campaign. The Federalists furiously opposed Wayne's appointment. Washington's action convinced the people that their beloved hero was not a Federalist, and that he was still their leader. Their faith that Washington sought to open the West was confirmed by the successful campaign of Wayne in 1794.

Signs of party conflict over foreign affairs appeared during the sessions of the Second Congress in 1791-92. Fenno's *Gazette* had been publishing John Adams's *Discourses of Davilla*, which praised monarchy as the highest form of government and denounced democracy as the worst. Such doctrines, coming from

the pen of the Vice President of the United States, considerably alarmed the democratic forces. When Tom Paine's *The Rights of Man*, a brilliant and passionate reply to Edmund Burke's denunciation of the French Revolution, appeared in America, with a foreword by Thomas Jefferson, a bitter fight was launched within official circles and in the press. The Federalists found no word of denunciation for the Vice President's attack upon the democratic government of which he was a head. But they professed indignation that the foreword to Paine's book by the Secretary of State seemed to allude to John Adams in condemning the “political heresies which have sprung up among us.” The newspaper storm which followed helped arouse the people to the need for vigilance in preserving their democratic gains and to bring more clearly to light the common interests between the democrats of America and of France.

Meanwhile, the Democratic-Republican Party prepared for the election of 1792. The Congressional caucuses of both parties stood for the re-election of Washington. However, the Democrats opposed the return of the monarchical John Adams to office, and planned a campaign to secure a majority in the House of Representatives and the state legislatures.

In the spring of 1792, overspeculation led to the failure of firms in the Northeast, and a short panic ensued. The Democrats pointed stubbornly to the lesson that not even business as a whole had profited from Hamilton's policies. This argument had great weight with many small producers who had been disappointed in their hopes of prosperity through Hamilton's policies.

While Washington was re-elected unanimously, John Adams was returned to office by only a narrow margin. Five states went over to the Democratic camp. New York, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia cast all their electoral votes for George Clinton; Kentucky gave hers to Jefferson. Many new Democrats were sent to the House. In New York, the Federalist, John Jay, was defeated for Governor by the Democrat, George Clinton.

During the first session of the third Congress, the Democratic-Republicans began to take the offensive. Hamilton had been assuming the role of Prime Minister toward his fellow cabinet

members and toward Congress. He made no pretense of submitting to Congress detailed, itemized accounts of the finances of the government. Suspicion grew that the affairs of the Treasury could not stand the light of day. The Democratic leaders decided to press for an investigation, hoping thus to find Hamilton guilty of fraud or embezzlement and to drive him from public life. A resolution was passed, demanding that Hamilton submit to Congress a full and detailed report on all the affairs of the Treasury.

The reports revealed no misuse of public funds for personal ends. There has never been evidence that Hamilton profited personally from any of his policies. However, definite irregularities were discovered which revealed contempt for Congress and violation of the law. Funds appropriated for the debt owed to France had not been paid, but had been placed in the National Bank. This revealed a flagrant flaunting of the popular sympathy with the French Revolution. An unauthorized loan from the bank had been contracted when sufficient public funds were already on deposit.

The Democrats introduced a resolution censuring these irregularities, but it was defeated. Shortly afterwards, there appeared a pamphlet by John Taylor of Virginia entitled *An Examination of the Late Proceedings of Congress Respecting the Official Conduct of the Secretary of the Treasury*. Analyzing in detail the vote on the resolution of censure, Taylor proved that the resolution had been defeated by those personally profiting from Hamilton's policies. Twenty-one of the thirty-five voting against the resolution were stockholders or dealers in public certificates, three were National Bank directors. Democrats circulated Taylor's pamphlet throughout the Union.

## CHAPTER VI

### CONFLICT OVER FOREIGN POLICY

WHILE the Jeffersonian party was seeking to save the nation from the ruthless financial policies of the new Federalist Party, events in Europe caused sharp conflict over foreign policy.

The national interests of the United States were deeply interlocked with the outcome of the great French Revolution. During the first years of that revolution, constitutional monarchists were in power. They imposed severe limitations upon the autocracy and abolished the nobility, but sought to preserve the monarchist form of government. The noblemen fled to Austria and to various courts, and tried through foreign bayonets to regain their lost privileges. Louis XVI, though still in power, joined with them in conspiring for the defeat of his own nation, in order to save the autocracy and the remnants of an outworn feudal age. The people then moved steadily into the republican camp. In 1792, they deposed the king and queen, subjected them to public trial, convicted them of treason, and in 1793 sent them to the guillotine.

From the beginning of the struggle of the French nation, the American people hailed the great endeavor. Only among a few Federalist leaders were there snarls. But the downfall of the monarchy more fully clarified the issues. This act evoked boundless enthusiasm from the peoples of the world, while the reactionaries of all lands entered a determined opposition. Playing upon human sympathies through vivid portrayals of the execution of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, the reactionary leaders said nothing of the oceans of blood and tears caused by the tyranny which was overthrown. For a time, their tears, publicized through newspapers inaccessible to republicans, caused wavering among backward sections of the people. However, as

the crowned heads of Europe, joined by the émigré French aristocracy, prepared to march on France, the true issues broke through the fog of propaganda. When George III joined the coalition of kings, and revolutionary France declared war against the monarchist alliance, the issues for America could no longer be obscured. The struggle of France against George III was in the national interests of America. The fall of France would be the signal for an onslaught against the United States. The Frenchmen, defending their borders against the monarchist aggressors in Europe, were defending the independence of America.

After the downfall of the French monarchy, the Federalists became violently and boisterously pro-British. From 1793, party lines were formed not only over domestic issues, but also over foreign policy. Those who supported the domestic program of Alexander Hamilton supported also the monarchist armies of intervention in France, while those who opposed the Federalist financial policies advocated full aid to the young French Republic.

Many small producers had not been directly affected by Hamilton's financial measures in 1793. Only the most clear-sighted saw fully whither the Federalist offensive was leading. Matters of finance were not easily understood by the mass of the people, and it was difficult for them to formulate their own financial program in opposition to Hamilton. But when Federalists sought to mobilize Americans for aid to George III against democratic France, who was fighting for her life against America's bitterest foe, then even the most backward could understand.

The people demanded not only aid to France, but also stern measures against England. Great Britain had inflicted systematic trade war upon the United States since the end of the Revolution. Heavy duties were being levied upon American products; American merchants and their agents were not permitted to reside in certain parts of the British Empire; only American goods were received in England from American ships; American vessels were prohibited from entering the British West Indies. There was evidence that Britain had unleashed the pirates of the Barbary Coast of Africa upon American vessels.

These pirates, fearing Britain's navy, never harmed English ships and had in fact entered into the service of the British. While under the British Empire, the merchants of colonial America had received protection from piracy, but following the Revolution, American vessels were plundered, and the United States had been forced by the Bey of Tripoli to pay tribute as a means of safety.

Upon the outbreak of the war against France, the British issued Orders in Council for the seizure of all ships bearing goods to revolutionary France, and Britain began seizing American vessels. In addition to capturing goods bound for France, England commenced, on a big scale, the impressment of American seamen into the British navy. So wretched were conditions on British ships that English seamen deserted in every American port. Some took out citizenship papers, and then shipped in American boats. To capture escaped seamen, England searched American vessels, thus failing to recognize the sovereign power of the United States to naturalize foreigners.

In the face of such outrages, the American people wanted not merely aid to France, in accordance with the Treaty of 1778, but economic retaliation against Britain. While the merchants were irked by British policy, their dependence on British credit and trade, as well as their hatred for French democracy, led them into cowardly submission to British aggression.

Everywhere in 1793 the cry resounded that the kings were on the march again and that it was time for all free peoples to unite for the preservation of liberty. Although Congregational church bells tolled and Federalists lowered flags to half-mast after the execution of Louis XVI and his Austrian queen, French victories were greeted by the joyous ringing of other church bells. There were parades and demonstrations hailing the new spring-time of freedom in France. The tricolor flag was often displayed with the star-spangled banner. On all sides, the people proudly and jauntily wore the cockade hats of the French Revolution. Liberty poles appeared in many places. Crowds danced in the streets of Philadelphia to the *Carmagnole*. Orchestras in the theaters were forced to play *La Marseillaise*, and children sang and whistled the *Ça Ira*. Throughout the country, students pored

over the writings and speeches of the French leaders. Revolutionary dramas were shown in all but the most conservative theaters. The terms "Citizen" and "Citizeness" were heard on every hand. Artisans and mechanics started booing and jostling the wealthy on the streets, and crowds tore down from public buildings all symbols remaining from the days of royalty in America. Nothing so inspired the growth of the Jeffersonian party as the French slogan of "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity."

As the French democrats established the Reign of Terror—a revolutionary dictatorship to crush the enemies of democracy—the Federalists sought to discredit democracy by spreading endlessly stories of the violence accompanying the overthrow of tyranny. The French Revolution was by far more violent than the American, because it was the first successful popular onslaught against the accumulation of centuries of oppression. The suppressed wrath of the people erupted with volcanic fury. Oppressed as they had been under British absolutism, the people of colonial America had possessed democratic rights such as the people of France had never known at any moment of their long history. The democratic forces of England had wrested concessions from the British Crown in the course of carrying out the first colonization efforts in America. The ability to escape into the Western wilderness had further strengthened American democracy. In France, where there had been no liberty and no "West," the full force of previously suppressed fury struck more directly at the aristocracy.

The effort of the Jacobin Terror to hold the revolution permanently to a consistent policy failed because the class in power was the middle class, wavering between the desire to become capitalistic and the desire to abolish all exploitation. Robespierre's effort to crush all enemies of the program of absolute equality could not succeed because the small producers in his own party were constantly undergoing class differentiation and breeding from their own ranks newly rich capitalists who sought to establish a capitalist dictatorship over the masses. There was no strong proletariat able to realize the dream of Robespierre. However, the short-lived effort to crush all enemies of freedom

and equality enabled the revolution for the time being to sweep France clean of feudal remnants. It inspired the peoples of the world as had no previous struggle.

While Jefferson and other democratic leaders deplored the "excesses" of the French Revolution, never once did they fail to see the real issue of democracy as opposed to autocracy, of national independence as opposed to foreign domination and treason. The lines were so drawn that there was no middle ground. One was either for or against the French republic, and the Democratic-Republican Party stood firmly by its sister democracy. Concerning the execution of the king, Jefferson expressed hope that the French had set an example to the whole world of "rendering monarchs amenable to punishment like other criminals,"<sup>1</sup> and Madison wrote with approval that he found the opinion of most men about the king to be: "If he was a traitor, he ought to be punished as well as another man."<sup>2</sup> In reference to violence, Jefferson declared, "Rather than it [the French Revolution] should have failed I would have seen half the earth desolated; were there but an Adam and Eve left in every country, and left free, it would be better than it now is."<sup>3</sup>

The Federalists tried to smear the Democratic-Republican Party as the agent of revolutionary France. They recklessly charged that the Democrats were financed by French gold, that Jefferson was a French spy, that the Democratic Societies were Jacobin Clubs. With this tactic the Federalists exposed their own position. If they spoke so venomously of the French republic, it was because they hated the American republic and wished to strike at the democratic movement of their own people.

The Democrats made it clear that it was in the interest of *America* that they supported France. The louder the Federalists inveighed against the agents of a foreign power, the more they exposed themselves. Could Americans be convinced that it was in their interest to support George III, whose redcoats now sought to crush France as once they had devastated American soil? If there were agents of foreign powers in America, who could they possibly be except Federalists, seeking through an alliance with England to crush American democracy? When

Federalists spoke sneeringly of the Democratic Societies as Jacobin, many accepted the term as a badge of honor. When Federalists pretended to fear that Democrats would erect guillotines in America, it sounded like the old Tory attacks upon the "self-constituted" bodies which had carried through the American Revolution.

The power of monarchists, such as those who made the guillotine necessary in France, had been defeated in America during the War for Independence. The conditions existed for a legal, constitutional democracy without violence, as Jefferson's administrations subsequently proved. Those conditions were just being established in France. It became clear that the Federalists were seeking to destroy the legal, constitutional basis for democracy and to restore a rule of violence against which only violence could be effective should they be allowed to succeed.

In the spring of 1793, Citizen Genêt arrived in Charleston as Ambassador from the young French Republic. His mission was to secure supplies for sorely pressed France by implementing the Treaty of 1778. In that treaty, America had promised to maintain favorable trade agreements with France and to assist her, when necessary, in the defense of the West Indies. Now that the French Revolution had converted these treaty obligations into the means for assisting French democracy and curbing Britain's war of intervention, the American people clamored for their fulfillment.

In August of 1791, the slaves of Haiti had carried out their great insurrection, and the National Convention of France in September, 1793, proclaimed their emancipation. Defense of the West Indies under these conditions meant a powerful blow in behalf of the Negro people of all lands. Thus, the anti-slavery forces stood fully for support to the Treaty of 1778, while slaveholders increasingly feared it.

At this period of international crisis, the capitalist interests closed ranks as never before. Washington hurriedly assembled his Cabinet to discuss Genêt's mission. Jefferson alone in the Cabinet championed the unqualified reception of Genêt and the execution of all treaty obligations. The Cabinet decided to receive Genêt, but, over Jefferson's opposition, to hold the treaty

in abeyance. It rejected Hamilton's openly pro-British policy in words, but accepted it in substance. Washington issued a Proclamation of Neutrality, which virtually nullified the treaty and thus aided Britain and the intervening powers.

Mass indignation over the un-neutral "neutrality" was voiced by the large and passionate demonstrations which greeted Genêt on his journey from Charleston to Philadelphia. The Ambassador from France was received coldly, however, by Washington and the other government leaders, who had already met with the minister sent by the exiled princes of France.

Popular as a symbol of his people, Genêt proceeded to damage his own cause by utter failure to follow diplomatic procedure. Failing to leave mobilization of the American people to the Democratic-Republican Party, Genêt himself urged Washington to call an extra session of Congress to discuss application of the French treaties, and threatened to appeal over his head to the masses. Finally, in defiance of the Federal Government, he sent to sea from American waters the British ship, *The Little Sarah*, captured by the French and rechristened *The Little Democrat*, after a promise that the ship would remain in port. Following this, Washington demanded his recall.

The radical republicans, then in power in France, readily consented to the recall of Genêt, who was not of their party, but at the same time demanded the recall from France of the Federalist Ambassador, Gouverneur Morris, who had intervened in French politics far more flagrantly than had Genêt in American affairs. Morris had secretly corresponded with the imprisoned king, and had accepted funds from Louis XVI for the purpose of bribing French officials to secure his escape from prison. Washington yielded to the French demand, and sent to France, in place of Morris, the ardent Republican and friend of the French Revolution, James Monroe.

In the summer of 1793, Jefferson resigned from the Cabinet, thus sharply rebuking the administration. Before leaving office, he submitted to Congress a *Report on Commerce*, urging economic resistance to England. Hamilton and his colleagues had maintained that affairs with England were friendly. Jefferson's report stressed the economic warfare which England had

never ceased conducting against America. Shortly after Jefferson's resignation, Madison introduced resolutions in Congress calling for economic retaliation on England.

The demand for the ousting of the British from the Northwest was renewed as "Mad Anthony" Wayne prepared for new campaigns against the Indians in that region. Meanwhile, many merchants and shipping interests themselves began to show alarm at British interference with their commerce. The Federalist politicians began to fear that war against England might be forced upon them. A non-importation act against Britain was actually passed in the House, and was defeated in the Senate by only one vote. Mass pressure, the fear of war with England, and the desire of the merchants to stop interference with their overseas trade led to the appointment of a special envoy to Great Britain to negotiate a treaty. However, the appointment was given to the arch-Federalist, John Jay.

While Jay was in England and Wayne was defeating the Indians in Ohio, the Congressional elections of 1794 approached. Frightened at the prospects of a Democratic landslide, the Federalists sought to outlaw the Jeffersonian party.

From the first day of the Whiskey Tax, farmers of Western Pennsylvania had resisted the tax collectors, who were frequently threatened with violence, or stoned, their houses fired upon at night, or their barns burned down. Inspired by the heroic struggles of the French revolutionists, opposition to the tax increased in the summer of 1794. Defiance was advocated at mass meetings, arrests were resisted, and farmers collected arms. There was talk of a march on Philadelphia. Although such resistance had been going on for a long time, Hamilton chose the moment preceding the elections for a display of force against what was pronounced a "rebellion." A militia of fifteen thousand was assembled from neighboring states, and Hamilton himself mounted horse and led this huge force against some two hundred men. Most of the men scattered before the troops arrived. A small number were captured and brought to Philadelphia. There, branded as "Insurgents," these poorly dressed backcountry farmers, some of whom had fought in Washington's army, were paraded through the streets and subjected to public

ridicule. Hamilton demanded that they be hanged, but Washington, with greater understanding of the relation of forces in democratic America, pardoned them.

The real aim of the Federalists in their use of force against the so-called "Whiskey Rebellion" was revealed by their efforts to blame the Democratic-Republican Party, to brand it as a party of violence and sedition, and thus to remove it from the ballot. The Jeffersonian party stood aloof from such outbreaks as that of the "Whiskey Boys," although it supported the aims for which they fought. The Democratic policy was to avoid adventurous outbreaks, in order by a national movement, through constitutional means, to change the character of the government at the polls. Although the Federalists were utterly unable to substantiate their charges that the Democratic-Republican Party was responsible for the violence in Pennsylvania, since all the agitation of that party was against such ineffectual forms of struggle, nevertheless unsuccessful efforts were made to have the area in which the "rebellion" occurred disfranchised. This was the district from which Albert Gallatin was a candidate for Congress. This brilliant democrat of Swiss origin was the outstanding financial genius within the Jeffersonian party and, thus, within the sphere of economics, Hamilton's most dangerous foe.

In spite of the Federalist plots, the Congressional elections of 1794 were hotly contested. Everywhere the Federalists felt the Democratic attack. Many Democrats were elected, although they remained outnumbered. There was evidence that some Federalist victories were won through tampering with the ballots.

Meanwhile, a crushing defeat was administered by the troops of "Mad Anthony" Wayne to the Indians of the Northwest, and indisputable evidence was found that Englishmen in disguise were fighting among the Indians.

In his message to the fourth Congress, Washington delivered a bitter attack upon the "self-constituted" Democratic Societies. It was a great blow to the Democrats, for from no one but Washington would large sections of the people have heeded such an attack. Such was the devotion to him that many could not believe charges from him unjustified, and the local societies be-



gan to dissolve. Yet even the prestige of Washington could not prevent their members from active participation in the following elections.

Early in 1795, John Jay returned from England with his treaty, which amounted to a complete surrender and a virtual alliance with England against France. Britain was granted the trading privileges of the most favored nation. The Mississippi River was opened to the British, and they were given complete freedom in West Indian commerce. Freedom of the seas for American vessels was actually restricted by the extension of the list of contraband goods. The West Indian trade in certain commodities was opened to American ships of only seventy tons or less provided that West Indian commodities were transported only to American ports. Agreement was made for abandonment by Britain of the Northwestern forts, but only on condition that the pre-revolutionary debts of the Southern slaveholders be paid. British claimants against the United States were given rights which were not extended to American claimants against England. No provision was made for ending the impressment of seamen.

So conscious of its betrayal of the nation's will was the Senate that it ratified the Jay treaty in secret session and voted not to make public the terms of the treaty to which the country was bound. Incensed at such a mockery of democracy, Senator Mason of Virginia carried the text of the treaty to the Democratic newspaper, *Aurora*. The next morning, the *Aurora* printed the full text of the treaty, and thus unleashed a furious storm.

Handbills, calling for attacks on British vessels in the style of the Boston Tea Party, appeared on the streets of Philadelphia on July 3. Crowds, composed principally of working men, gathered on the wharves and were prevented from action only by the mobilization of troops. On the Fourth of July, the effigy of John Jay was dragged through the streets by a huge crowd, bent on burning it before Washington's home. Only the presence of troops prevented this plan. A few clashes with the soldiers, in which the crowd hurled stones, occurred. However, the effigy was burned elsewhere, and a "monument" with a contemptuous inscription was erected. A demonstration of friendship was

staged before the French Ministry. The treaty was publicly burned before the British Embassy.

Similar demonstrations occurred throughout the country. There was scarcely a village or hamlet in which John Jay was not burned in effigy. In New York, Alexander Hamilton, who had resigned from the Cabinet in January, 1795, was stoned before Trinity Church when attempting to speak in defense of the treaty. In Charleston, South Carolina, the treaty and Jay's effigy were burned by the public executioner, and Federalists were warned that interference would be punished with tar and feathers. Even among the merchants, there was denunciation of the treaty. In the face of the popular rage, Hamilton launched a drive for a standing army, advocating civil war as the means for suppressing mass indignation. Though now a private citizen, Hamilton, as America's first political boss, remained the dominant figure behind the Administration.

Federalists were alarmed by Washington's delay in signing the treaty and his apparent concern over public opinion. However, when he finally signed it, the slogan of "Stand by Washington" was launched again by the Federalists. On this occasion, certain Democratic papers did not fail to attack him bitterly.

When Congress assembled in 1796, the Democrats demanded that Washington place before the House all papers relating to the Jay treaty, and prepared to kill the treaty through failure to make appropriations. Federalist Congressmen threatened to dissolve the Union unless the appropriations were made, and they finally intimidated Congress into making them.

Meanwhile, Monroe in Paris had averted a declaration of war upon the United States by France. Monroe had informed France that the Jay treaty did not represent public opinion in the United States, and had warned that war would throw America into firmer alliance with England. He held forward the hope of a Democratic-Republican victory in 1796, as the means of setting aside the anti-French treaty. For this, he was bitterly attacked by the Federalists, who desired war, and Washington recalled him.

Popular rage against the Jay treaty was counteracted somewhat by the conclusion in 1795 of the Treaty of Greenville with



the Northwestern Indians and of the Pinckney treaty with Spain. The former opened for settlement a large area in Ohio. The latter granted to Americans, for a period of three years, passage to the mouth of the Mississippi and the right of deposit, that is, the right of farmers to store their crops awaiting shipment, at New Orleans. The Pinckney treaty also surrendered to the United States territory in the region of the Yazoo River which had been claimed by Spain, the United States, the state of Georgia, and the Indians. This treaty followed years of procrastination and incitement of Indian attacks by Spain. Its conclusion was precipitated by Spanish fear of a British-American alliance. While the Pinckney treaty temporarily allayed the conflict with Spain, Spaniards, in defiance of the treaty, continued to occupy the Yazoo area.

There was great indignation among Federalists when Tennessee in 1796 framed a constitution before making its application for admission as a state. Yet the new state was admitted in time to swell the democratic forces in the presidential election of that same year. Its constitution permitted all taxpayers to vote. In the next Congress, Andrew Jackson, as representative from Tennessee, appeared for the first time in the national capitol.

Throughout Washington's administration, there were constant debates in Congress over the land policy of the Federal Government. Yet not until 1796 was a new act passed. The new law provided for the sale of land at local offices. The minimum price was raised to \$2 an acre, some Congressmen vainly maintaining that this price would make speculation impossible. A slight credit system was introduced whereby half the price of a 640-acre section could be paid one year after purchase. The new law pleased no one, and scarcely any land was sold under its provisions.

Terrified by the prospect of the retirement of Washington and unable to persuade him to accept a third term, Hamilton and his closest followers sought desperately for some candidate other than John Adams in the presidential election of 1796. The bulk of the Federalists were staunch supporters of this reliable party man, but not so Hamilton and his most intimate col-

leagues. This vain, colorless Puritan possessed no popular appeal. He was too widely hated for his well-known desire for a government closely modeled after that of the British monarchy. To Hamilton, he seemed to talk too favorably about the representation of all interests in the government, even though he never advocated majority representation for majority interests. As a landlord, he was not so rabidly pro-British as the merchants and speculators who were Hamilton's closest followers.

Unable to win most of the Federalist leaders away from Adams, Hamilton's colleagues plotted secretly to divert enough votes in the College of Electors from Adams to elect Pinckney of South Carolina. This was in violation of the majority will of the Federalist caucus which had chosen Pinckney for the Vice-Presidential candidate. This maneuver was possible prior to 1804, because there were then no official Vice-Presidential candidates. The Presidential candidate who received the second highest vote became the Vice-President, and party caucuses decided on their Vice-Presidential choice by instructing their electors to withhold a few votes from one of their two candidates. Hamilton's violation of his party's decision started a breach in the Federalist Party that rent it asunder before the election of Jefferson in 1801.

Prior to the election, Washington made his famous *Farewell Address*. Couched in the most general terms, the address spoke of the blessings of the Union, the danger of disunion, and the need to avoid permanent entangling alliances with foreign powers. In its general terminology, it expressed doctrines to which every supporter of the Union had always adhered. Yet the Federalists used it as a party platform, maintaining that they alone supported the Union, that the Democratic-Republicans endangered the Union by fomenting party strife, and that the warning against permanent foreign entanglements applied solely to their program of aid to France. The Jeffersonians could maintain with much better logic that it was Federalists who, in the interest of a high-handed minority, threatened the disruption of the Union and had initiated party strife, that the danger of "permanent foreign entanglements" came really from the pro-British program of the Federalists. However, the Federalists

were able, because of Washington's own position, to claim the *Farewell Address* as an endorsement of their party.

By only three votes in the Electoral College did Jefferson fail to obtain the Presidency. As it was, he was elected Vice-President under John Adams, whom the Hamiltonians failed to defeat. Had the Democratic-Republican vote been consolidated, in the face of Federalist disunity, Jefferson would have been elected President in 1796, for the Democratic votes in various states were scattered among different candidates.

With the election of John Adams, the Federalists obtained complete control of the executive branch of government. But, without the restraining hand of Washington and filled with terror by Jefferson's election and by the growth of the West, the Federalists rapidly lost their heads. In the tense atmosphere of 1796, when the battle cries of the French Revolution were ringing on every side, they launched one of the most openly reactionary regimes in American history.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE VICTORY OF JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY

THE administration of John Adams was launched under a cloud. In the face of the rising democratic tide, the Federalists increasingly resorted to methods of conspiracy and double-dealing. While plotting at all times against the people, they engaged in the most unscrupulous intrigues among themselves. Regardless of the particular policies advocated by the two factions of Hamilton and Adams, final reliance was placed by Federalists of both camps in the use of naked force against the popular opposition. This, in the days of continuing revolutionary fervor, when the people possessed small holdings, fire-arms, and legal democratic rights, meant disaster.

The new Federalist administration, in following its pro-British policy, drove toward war with France. When it found an issue with which to create hysteria, it used artificially inspired war fever as a smokescreen for an onslaught against democracy, which, if successful, would have destroyed the Constitution, abolished the legality of the Jeffersonian party, and laid America prostrate before Great Britain.

The occasion for the Federalist campaign for war was found when France refused to receive Pinckney as the new minister sent to succeed Monroc. At this time, the Federalists began to split over fundamental issues. Adams was for negotiation with France, which of course was advocated also by the Democrats, but groups within the Hamiltonian camp immediately clamored for war. Around Hamilton had rallied the big shipping interests who, because of their economic dependence on England, were most rabidly pro-British. They came to be known as the English Party or the Anglo-men. Around Adams rallied those landlords and merchants who, while bitterly hostile to democracy and the French Republic, stood in fear of weakening American trade and American national interests in general before Great Britain. Hamilton, who was for war, warned his followers that failure to negotiate would isolate the Federalist Party and thus defeat their warlike aims. Consequently a special commission was sent to France. However, while the envoys were on their way, the Hamiltonians sought to undermine the success of the mission by warlike speeches in Congress.

Early in 1798, Adams sent a message to Congress announcing the failure of the mission and calling for warlike measures. The Democrats pressed that the papers describing the negotiations in France be produced, believing that their contents would reveal no cause for war and would redound to the discredit of the administration. This was the move for which Federalist leaders had waited gleefully. According to these papers, the envoys to France had not only been disdainfully refused an audience, but had been approached unofficially by individuals, designated in the papers as X, Y, and Z, who, on behalf of the French Minister, Talleyrand, had promised recognition in return for a certain sum of money and a loan for France. The Democrats

were naturally dumbfounded at such behavior on the part of one of the leaders of the French government at such a moment of international crisis.

In actual fact, following the execution of Robespierre in 1794, counter-revolution began in France, and a corrupt Directory, already taking steps to dash to earth the hopes of the democratic forces, had come to power. France was still fighting a just war of national defense against the coalition of kings. That war was still one which it was to the national interest of America to support. However, the significance of the internal changes in France was not known in America, and the democratic forces still regarded France as the advance guard of democracy throughout the world. The publishing of the X Y Z papers produced deep-seated disillusionment in America and aroused bitter resentment. The Federalists played upon the youthful and still revolutionary national pride of the American people to arouse war hysteria, through which they succeeded in launching the most open attacks upon democracy ever to occur in American history.

Jefferson kept his head throughout this crisis and declared that the French people should not be made to suffer for the actions of a few swindlers. He urged that Congress adjourn until passions cooled. But many of his own party, in the midst of the excitement, wavered and went over to the side of the Federalists. Under the slogan, "Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute," an undeclared naval war was waged against France for two and a half years.

A navy was created under a new department. The French treaty of 1778 was abrogated. To finance the war, the national debt was swelled by heavy loans, for which the financiers demanded an unusually high rate of interest. New and burdensome taxes were levied. A standing army was established. Although Washington was appointed honorary commander, Alexander Hamilton became the acting commander. Merchant vessels were armed and instructed to capture French vessels interfering with American trade. Altogether some eighty-five French vessels were subsequently captured by the American navy.

Having at last secured their long-desired standing army, the Federalists proceeded with frantic speed toward their main objective, the crushing of democracy at home. Their every step indicated that the war fever was a blind for a merciless attack upon the Democratic-Republican Party and that the standing army was created for use against the American people rather than against a foreign foe.

From the early days of the Adams administration, the most scurrilous campaign of slander against the Democrats was in operation. Jefferson and the other Democratic leaders were ostracized from fashionable society. They were freely branded in the press as liars, assassins, atheists, advocates of free love. Every Democrat was publicly and privately stigmatized as a moral leper, dishonest, corrupt, an enemy of religion, law, and order. Rude attacks upon the foreign born were launched by the party whose leader was himself a West Indian of humble and obscure origin. In Congress, Gallatin was insulted for his foreign accent and Matthew Lyon for his Irish origin.

After the adoption of war measures, Democrats were portrayed as French agents preparing an armed uprising to aid a French invasion. Rumors were spread that Democrats were planning to burn Philadelphia. Lurid stories were told that, upon seizing power, Democrats would make the wives and daughters of the nation common property, destroy the churches, and introduce anarchy. *Porcupine's Gazette*, edited by the Englishman William Cobbett, reported actual French invasions of the American coast. By all these means, a state of terror was invoked in the minds of the politically unlettered. Federalist mobs attacked the homes of Democrats, many of whom were brutally beaten. The statue of Benjamin Franklin, who had secured the French alliance during the Revolution, was smeared with mud. Spies trailed Jefferson, Vice-President of the United States, and his mail was opened. Jefferson and his colleagues were insulted in public places, and crude jokes against them were freely circulated. It was within this atmosphere that the Alien and Sedition Acts were born.<sup>1</sup>

The Alien Acts were directed not merely against the small number of Frenchmen in America—30,000 according to some

estimates—but to an even greater degree against the Irish. The vast majority of the foreign born supported the Jeffersonian party. The Alien Acts sought to reduce the voting strength of the Democrats and, by curtailing immigration, to prevent the inevitable increase of the democratic forces. At the same time, they served the purpose of buttressing the Federalist effort to smear the party of democracy as an agent of a foreign power.

The law permitting rapid naturalization was repealed in favor of an act requiring a residence of fourteen years. The so-called Alien Act, to be in effect for two years, authorized the President to order the deportation of all aliens whom he, in his own mind, considered dangerous to the peace and security of the nation. Imprisonment was the penalty for failure to comply. The Alien Enemies Act authorized the President, during periods of war, to deport all subjects of the enemy nation or to establish the conditions of restraint under which they were to be held.

No party in the United States in 1798 advocated anything even resembling sedition except groups of Federalists who had on several occasions threatened secession and dismemberment of the Union unless their measures were passed, and who frequently advocated a monarchist form of government. The Jeffersonians worked for the peaceful election of their own candidates, and thus advocated a change in the administration through the methods provided by the Constitution. The Sedition Act was in itself seditious, since it was in open defiance of the first and tenth amendments to the Constitution.

It was not sedition which was declared punishable by the Sedition Act. It was *criticism* of the government or government officials. Not only did the law provide punishment for those conspiring against the execution of Federal laws, but it applied to anyone who wrote, printed, or spoke any "false, scandalous, and malicious" statement "against the government of the United States, or either House of the Congress of the United States, or the President of the United States, with intent to defame—or to bring them—into contempt or disrepute." The Act was to be operative for two years.

Had the machinery existed for actually enforcing the Sedition

Act, the election campaign of 1800 could not have taken place and it would have perpetuated the Federalist Party in power for all time. It would have prevented any party of opposition from criticizing those in office, silenced its press, prevented election campaigns, and thus would have established a dictatorship subject to absolutely no restraint.

The Alien and Sedition Acts were party instruments fashioned to crush by law and force the popular party, against which Federalists had no other weapons. They were acts of desperation. The Jeffersonians saw immediately that the Alien and Sedition Acts were experimental feelers. The whole fate of the achievements won by the Revolution depended upon whether or not the people should permit these acts to remain law. Acceptance would have meant the end of democracy and the establishment of an undisguised oligarchy. Such a result would have enabled the pro-British Federalists to follow policies binding the country to England in such a manner as virtually to abolish its independence. With the passage of these acts, the conflict between Federalists and Republicans reached the crucial stage. The whole future of America was at stake.

No one was actually deported under the Alien Acts, and yet the threat of deportation, combined with the terror that was unleashed, caused a large number of Frenchmen and others to flee the country. Under the Sedition Act, there were numerous arrests and indictments, although, as a result of vast popular resistance, there were only ten convictions.

Among those imprisoned was the Democratic member of Congress from Vermont, Matthew Lyon. His "crime" was the writing of a letter charging Adams with "unbounded thirst for ridiculous pomp, foolish adulation, and selfish avarice," with throwing men out of office as political opponents, and using religion as a "state engine to make mankind hate and persecute one another." He had printed another letter—before the passage of the Sedition Act—referring to "the bullying speech of your President and the stupid answer of your Senate." Among the others arrested were editors, printers, business managers of the Democratic press, ministers of the Gospel, men of high reputation who were universally respected. When no basis for arrests

under the Sedition Act were found, resort was often had to trumped up charges.

Throughout this reign of terror, the Federal Courts proceeded with unparalleled brutality and a disregard for judicial procedure. Party speeches in undisguised form were delivered by judges from the bench. In the text of decisions, often prepared in Federalist Party caucuses, unscrupulous attacks were made against the Democratic-Republican Party. Juries were notoriously packed. Not even in the South, where the population was overwhelmingly Democratic, were Democrats found on juries. The judges arrogantly refused to hear testimony and interrupted lawyers for the defense so often and so insolently that, at the trial of James Thomas Callender in Virginia, conducted by the infamous Judge Chase, the lawyers for the defense demonstratively laid down their papers and refused to continue. At the same trial, Judge Chase unblushingly told a prospective juror, who had asked to be rejected because he considered the defendant guilty, that he must serve, since his opinion was not based on the evidence to be submitted.

The character of the new standing army soon became clear. The soldiers acted as tools of Federalist reaction. Swaggering through the streets, armed with swords and dirks, they bullied citizens, insulted women, protected petty thieves, and assailed civil officials seeking their arrest. They were incited to attack Democratic leaders with brutal violence. The office of the *Aurora* was invaded. Its editor, William Duane, was beaten into insensibility, and saved from murder only by the heroic action of his son and a few other Democrats.

Since the government did not possess the force with which to execute the Sedition Act, it was widely—and, in Southern states, universally—defied. Petitions were circulated. Mass meetings of protest were held. Crowds gathered to protect their leaders from mobs and soldiers, to prevent arrests, to guard homes, and to preserve from destruction those printing presses which dared to tell the truth. As Democrats were marched to prison, crowds poured into the streets. The people raised funds with which to furnish bail and to pay the fines of the victims. Crowds gathered around prison windows. The old Minute-Men of Vermont

planned to tear down the jail in which Congressman Lyon was imprisoned, but they were urged by Lyon himself to resort to legal means, as this would build the movement most effectively. While still in prison, Lyon ran for re-election, and was returned to Congress by an overwhelming vote. When prisoners left their cells, they were met by throngs who hailed them as heroes and escorted them to their homes. The imprisoned Democrats became fiery symbols and from their cells did more to organize the Democratic movement than through all their previous efforts. Full records of court proceedings at the sedition trials were published in the Democratic papers or in pamphlet form, and these factual accounts convinced the people of the class character of the Federalist regime.

The Federalists found it impossible to recruit more than a fraction of the army they planned; and there were large-scale desertions. Open resistance to the new taxes occurred. As the people saw how war hysteria and the standing army were being used to destroy their liberties, the excitement against France died down and the demand for peace increased.

The Democrats made use of the state legislatures as the leading bodies of resistance to the tyranny of the Federalist administration. As defense against the Federalist standing army, states with Democratic-Republican administrations began to enlarge their state militias, thus building up an armed force for resistance to Federalist reaction.

During this time, Jefferson prepared the draft of the famous resolution adopted by the Kentucky Legislature in November, 1798, while Madison wrote the resolution adopted by the Virginia Legislature in December of the same year. These famous resolutions reaffirmed the contract theory of government. Declaring that the Constitution was a compact among the states, they maintained that certain powers had been surrendered to the Federal Government while others had been reserved by the states and the people. Among the powers prohibited to the Federal Government were laws "abridging the freedom of speech or of the press" or restricting "the migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit . . . prior to the year 1808." The Tenth Amend-

ment specifically reserved to the states or the people all "powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the states . . . or to the people." The Alien and Sedition Acts were, therefore, declared in violation of the compact embodied in the Constitution. It was consequently within the power of the states to declare them null and void. The resolutions were sent by the Kentucky and Virginia legislatures to all the other state legislatures with the request that they take similar action. This procedure indicated that the Jeffersonian principle of nullification advocated joint action by the majority of the states. No proposal was made for secession from the Union. The Kentucky and Virginia resolutions became the real platform of the Jeffersonian party in the election campaign of 1800.

To facilitate the movement for peace, a prominent Democrat, Dr. James Logan, went to France at his own expense to investigate the possibility of restoring normal relations and to inform the country of his findings. His investigation revealed a desire for peace and a readiness to lift the embargo on America and to free American seamen who had been captured whenever the United States reopened negotiations.

Facing the election of 1800 amidst unparalleled opposition to the war and the army, Adams, who was unhappy over Hamilton's control of the army, began to move toward negotiations with France for the restoration of peace. But at the same time he relied on the Sedition Act as the means for assuring his reelection. For no liberal reasons, but as a matter of practical politics, Hamilton opposed the rigorous enforcement of the Alien and Sedition Acts, which operated in the interest of President Adams. He sought rather the strengthening of the armed forces under his command, without which the Alien and Sedition Acts were mere paper.

In absolute secrecy both from the country and the President, Hamilton, in conjunction with Britain, entered into a vast scheme for the use of the new army in a war of conquest in Latin America. Considering Spain the inevitable ally of France, Britain had entered into negotiations with the Latin American Francisco de Miranda for rendering aid to the rising revolutionary

movements in the Spanish colonies of America. England hoped thus both to keep France out of Latin America and to obtain a foothold for herself. Hamilton and other Federalist colleagues corresponded with Miranda, and planned to aid England in this vast venture. The reward for the United States was to be the military conquest of Cuba and Florida. This was another expression of the aim to convert the United States into an empire which the democratic forces had defeated through the Ordinance of 1784. It laid the basis for part of the conspiracy more elaborately worked out later—and along treasonable lines—by Aaron Burr.

When this plot was proposed to Adams, he completely rejected it. Without consulting with his Cabinet which was under Hamilton's control, Adams proposed to Congress a renewed effort for peace. As a result, envoys were finally sent to France, and peace was concluded.

The breach in the Federalist camp then became open and irretrievable. Adams forced the resignation of two of his Cabinet members, who had attempted to sabotage the negotiations for peace. From then on, the feud between the Hamilton and Adams factions in the Federalist camp became so bitter that the Democrats were able, by quoting each side, to expose the whole Federalist Party as corrupt to the core.

In preparation for the election of 1800, intrigues developed within intrigues. Foreseeing the almost certain fate of a Democratic triumph, in spite of the Sedition Act, Federalists of both factions secretly planned to steal the election by some coup d'état.

Efforts were made in secret sessions of the Senate to pass laws changing the election procedure as established by the Constitution. When a majority of Democrats were elected to the state legislature in New York, Hamilton, with the backing of a party caucus, tried to get the governor to call an extra session of the outgoing Federalist legislature to deprive the newly elected body of the right to choose electors. He furthermore launched a plan for the usurpation of power by the Federal Government so as to destroy democracy in the states and abolish the federal character of the national government. The vigilance



of the Democratic Party and factionalism among the Federalists thwarted all these schemes.

Meanwhile, numerous threats were made that if Jefferson were elected, the Union would be dissolved by the secession of New England. The politically ignorant were frightened by the charge that the Jeffersonians would erect guillotines and launch a Reign of Terror. The Federalists and their clergy sought to brand Jefferson as "Anti-Christ," seeking to destroy religion. These charges were met by Democrats with biting satire. It was far easier to accuse Hamilton of irreligion, especially of flaunting the ethical principles of Christianity which Jefferson always held in high esteem. The Democrats responded to the unscrupulous attacks of the Congregationalist clergy by themselves going on the offensive against the Congregationalist tyranny in New England.

In the course of the election campaign, it became clearly impossible to elect either of the Federalist candidates, Adams and Pinckney. The majority of the Federalists of both factions then commenced a conspiracy to elect to the Presidency the Democratic-Republican, Aaron Burr, who had been chosen by his own party as candidate for Vice-President. The unprincipled character of Burr was clearly revealed when he did not publicly and clearly repudiate this Federalist plot as the discipline of his own party demanded. Although not held in high regard by Democratic leaders, he had been chosen as Vice-Presidential candidate because he controlled the vote of New York, a decisive state. With Burr elected by Federalist votes, the Federalists expected to split the Jeffersonian party and to continue to rule through a renegade from the Democrats when they could no longer rule openly in the name of the Federalist Party.

Against this scheme, Hamilton was adamant, but the majority of his own faction was no longer under his control. Apart from his personal feud with Burr, Hamilton was clear-sighted enough to see that, much as Jeffersonian democracy conflicted with the political principles of his class, the Jeffersonian movement was naturally not contemplating, as it could not, the overthrow of capitalism. For a party of small commodity producers, such an aim was both impossible and inconceivable. Hamilton saw that,

in the long run, capitalism could develop more readily by acceding to Jefferson's election than by a foolhardy support of Burr, whose election in violation of the popular will might easily lead to the disruption of the Union and the downfall of the Federal Government. Hamilton warned that Burr, an unscrupulous adventurer, could not be trusted by any party and even intimated that he considered him capable of making a deal with a foreign power. Hamilton's more fanatical followers stupidly considered the Jeffersonian movement as anti-capitalist. Loss of full state power by the mercantile interests they regarded as identical with the revolutionary overthrow of the big property-holding classes. They had reached the point where they were ready to destroy the nation rather than concede a Democratic victory. As a genuine bourgeois nationalist, Hamilton refused to follow his party to such a conclusion. Thus, he became isolated within the very party he had founded.

Hamilton's loss of leadership in 1800 proved that the time was rapidly approaching when all bourgeois nationalists, regardless of their hatred for democracy, would have to find their way temporarily into the Democratic-Republican Party, because that party alone represented the national interests of America. The Federalist Party was then rapidly degenerating into a clique of conspirators and traitors. It had ceased to represent the national interests of any class, and it soon ceased to be a political party in the true meaning of the term. Nothing could demonstrate so conclusively the strength of the democratic movement in 1800.

The Jeffersonian party stood not merely for democracy. It stood for the salvation of the nation. This is what historians who belittle the Jeffersonian accomplishments have always failed to recognize. The national movement had become so identical with the democratic movement that the democratic tradition after 1800 became inseparable from the national tradition as a whole. Politicians, irrespective of class, who after 1800 failed to recognize that fact, were foredoomed to failure. To be successful, they had to speak the language of democracy, even when they violated that language in practice.

In the course of elections in the states, held at different times



in 1800, Federalists attempted to intimidate the Jeffersonians by stationing troops from the standing army at the polls. To prevent interference by the Federalist armed forces, local units of the Democratic state militia were frequently called out. With voting taking place in the presence of troops representing the two opposing parties, the country seemed on the verge of civil war.

Party conflict also raged in the Northwest Territory. In 1798, the Northwest population had reached proportions sufficient for it to advance to the stage of territorial self-government. In December, 1798, elections to a Territorial legislature took place, and Jeffersonians were predominant in the new body. Over the head of their appointed governor, General St. Clair, they elected William Henry Harrison as their delegate to Congress, the first spokesman from the Public Domain. During the session of 1800, Harrison forced through Congress two bills, which deepened the Federalist distrust of the West. The first divided the Northwest Territory into Eastern and Western divisions. The second revised the Land Law of 1796 by providing that land should be sold locally in half-sections of 320 acres, half the size of the tracts formerly offered for sale. It also extended credit for a period of four years. Under these new provisions, purchases directly from the Federal Government increased. The growing power of the West intensified Federalist bitterness.

While the contest for power was raging, that class unable to participate in open political struggles forced itself upon the attention of the republic. The discovery of the plans for Gabriel's slave insurrection in Richmond, Virginia, in September, 1800, revealed dramatically the contradictory character of the bourgeois-democracy of the period.

The slaves had never remained unmoved by major political events in American history. They had seen their hopes for freedom, which had burned so brightly during the revolutionary years, snuffed out after 1793, as cotton culture fastened itself on the lower South. In that same year, Congress had enacted a Fugitive Slave Act for the entire Union. Slavery had been carried beyond the mountains into Kentucky and Tennessee. Talk of emancipation was dying down, as Virginia and Maryland

planters began to see the possibility of profits from the sale of slaves to the lower South. The emancipationist societies had accomplished nothing for the slaves of the South. Instead of putting forward a program of struggle, some of these societies had in fact addressed insulting messages to the Negro people, urging upon them the virtues of patience, sobriety, and hard work.<sup>2</sup>

At the very moment when slaves were despairing of emancipation through the Federal or state governments, they were being inspired by stories of the heroic and successful revolution in Haiti. They reflected bitterly on the democratic doctrines of the rising Jeffersonian party which were not applied to them. They knew that a few among the white democrats did recognize the rights of the slaves.

Despairing of aid from any other quarter, large numbers of slaves in Virginia, the birthplace of Jeffersonian democracy, decided—before their chains should become more heavily forged—to take for themselves that freedom which the white democrats were defending, but which they were not offering to the enslaved black toilers. According to James Monroe, then Governor of Virginia, most of the 32,000 slaves in the area around Richmond and the lower Piedmont were involved in the preparations for revolt undertaken in the summer of 1800 under the leadership of Gabriel Prosser, his brother Martin, and Jack Bowler. The evidence produced at the trials later revealed that a few white people and some Indian tribes had assisted them. After many months of organization which included the collection of weapons, hidden in the woods, they planned an armed march on Richmond. There, they proposed to seize the arsenal, certain mills, and food supplies. They planned to slay their oppressors and, using Richmond as a base, to arm the slaves of the whole surrounding country. Gabriel gave careful instructions to his followers not to harm Frenchmen, Quakers, or Methodists, white people who were evidently regarded as sympathetic.

The plans for the insurrection were revealed to the authorities by a traitor after a storm had prevented the attack on the night first selected. Richmond immediately became an armed camp.

Troops from the Federalist standing army were called to Richmond by the Democratic state government which had increased its militia in order to resist those same troops. The militia and the standing army united against the slaves. Searches and seizures commenced. Gabriel Prosser, Jack Bowler, and thirty-four others were finally captured and hanged for attempting, as one of the slaves stated in his defense, to accomplish for their people what Washington and the other revolutionary leaders had accomplished for the white people of America.<sup>3</sup>

The governor who had called out the troops against the slaves was James Monroe, an outstanding leader of the Democratic-Republican Party. The state militia used against them was the same force which later helped to save the Union by preparations to avert a Federalist seizure of power which would have destroyed democracy for the white people. Nothing could have revealed more dramatically the contradictory character of the Democratic-Republican Party or of the bourgeois-democratic state which that party was then fighting to preserve. The democratic state of the day, although extremely advanced in the rights it afforded the white masses, was always a naked dictatorship over the slaves.

No one was more keenly aware of the deep contradiction in the heart of the democracy of his day than was Thomas Jefferson, who sent Governor Monroe a plea for mercy toward the leaders of the slave movement. Jefferson's views on slavery were widely known. From the time of the reorganization of the Virginia government after the Declaration of Independence, he had fought for gradual emancipation. The longest paragraph in his original draft of the Declaration had been a denunciation of George III for his crimes against the innocent people of Africa, and for fostering the evil system of slavery in America. When the Continental Congress removed that paragraph, he was deeply pained. He had sought to prohibit slavery in all the West, hoping thus by preventing its growth to exterminate it more readily on the South Atlantic seaboard. Not only had he attacked slavery, but he had spoken in terms of respect for the Negro people as a people. In his *Notes on Virginia*, he had questioned the whole theory of racial inequality, declaring "The

opinion that they [Negroes] are inferior in the faculties of reason and imagination must be hazarded with great diffidence."<sup>4</sup> He urged that racial differences be studied scientifically, and suggested that they might prove to be the result of differences in opportunity alone.<sup>5</sup> When in 1809 evidence was submitted to him of the achievements of Negroes under freedom, he stated that he was glad to find that in their grade of understanding "they are on a par with ourselves."<sup>6</sup> Thus, he came to recognize that Negroes possessed equal abilities when afforded equal opportunity. Concerning slavery, he declared, "I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just."<sup>7</sup>

However, the forces capable of abolishing slavery had not been aroused. The North and West were not then threatened or restricted by the slave system, and the democratic forces were thus not sufficiently affected by the sufferings of the slaves to take action. Furthermore, sections of the slaveholders, because of their anti-mercantile interests, were temporary allies of the democratic forces. Thus, Jefferson had mobilized the party of democracy to wrestle only with those problems over which the people as a whole were aroused. Keenly aware of the contradiction inherent in his own party, because of its tolerance of tyranny over black men while fighting for freedom for white men, Jefferson wrote that "Nothing is more certainly written in the book of fate than that these people [the slaves] are to be free."<sup>8</sup>

Yet, in his day, Jefferson was unable to formulate a solution for the problem. Fearing that the hatred between Negro and white, bred by age-old oppression, would lead to slaughter were freedom proclaimed and that there could never be peace between the two peoples in one country, Jefferson toyed with schemes of emigration of the Negroes to Africa. Sadly expressing his own confusion over the problem, he once compared the slaveholder class to a man who, having seized a wolf by the head, feared either to hold or let go.<sup>9</sup>

The Federalists, pointing to Jefferson's well-known views on slavery, gleefully sought to fasten the responsibility for the slave conspiracy on the Democratic-Republicans. They hoped thus to frighten the South—both slaveholder and small pro-

ducer—into keeping in power what they proclaimed to be the only party capable of preserving slavery and suppressing insurrection. Had not Gabriel instructed that no harm be shown Frenchmen? Were not the Jeffersonians the French party? Here was surely the connection. Everyone knew Jefferson as an enemy of slavery. This surely was his handiwork. Thus spoke the party of "law and order"—in spite of the actions of Monroë and the democratic militia.

Many Democrats retaliated by seeking to fasten the blame on Federalists. Was it not peculiar that the insurrection should occur during the election and that Federalists sought to use it for political capital? Why at this time? Clearly only Federalists incited it. Thus the party of democracy avoided the fundamental issue, and failed to extend its democratic program to the slaves. There was no party in all America to speak for those for whose freedom Gabriel had fought and died. The opportunity for sarcasm did not escape the Federalists, who, making no pretense to democratic theories themselves, frequently engaged in satire over the "masters of slaves" who talked about "freedom and equality."

When the Electoral College met to cast its vote for the Presidency, it failed to give a majority to any candidate. There was a tie between Jefferson and Burr, apparently caused by the Federalist conspiracy to elect Burr president. Thus, the election was thrown into the House of Representatives.

The House of Representatives began the work of choosing a President on February 11, 1801. Congress was then holding its sessions for the first time in Washington, the new capital on the Potomac, a scattered village, whose unfinished buildings gave it the appearance of a frontier settlement. Before the casting of ballots took place, a series of mysterious fires broke out, burning many records in the Treasury and War Departments. There were widespread rumors that Federalists were destroying incriminating documents before a Democratic administration could have the chance to bring them to light.

On the first ballot taken in the House, eight states voted for Jefferson and six for Burr. Two were divided. Nine were necessary for the choice of a President. From February 11 until

February 17, there was almost constant balloting, at times extending far into the night. Throughout this period, the votes by states remained the same.

Through the democratic press, the whole country was informed of the plots of the Federalists to steal the election. Democratic congressmen reported every move at the end of the hourly ballots to the editor of the *National Intelligencer*, a democratic paper which had just been established in Washington upon the advice of Jefferson.

Rumors of a new Federalist plot leaked out. Certain Federalists were scheming to have the House declare its inability to cast a majority for any candidate and then, by law, to declare the Secretary of State, the Federalist John Marshall, the new President.

In the face of these threats, Governor Monroe of Virginia and Governor M'Kean of Pennsylvania sent word that their state militias were in readiness for an immediate march on Washington in the event that news reached them of any violation of the popular will. While Gallatin was organizing this plan to prevent by armed force a Federalist coup d'état, Democratic newspapers, acting upon a plan devised by Jefferson, called for a new popularly elected Constitutional Convention in case Federalists should violate the popular will.

Meanwhile, petitions poured into Washington demanding the election of Jefferson. Such demands came even from members of the Federalist Party. Crowds of artisans and farmers stood outside the capitol in the snow throughout the long days and nights of balloting carrying banners demanding "Jefferson, the Friend of the People." Their shouts penetrated the walls of Congress.

There was no escaping the rage of a people, kept informed by the Democratic press of every plot and backed by armed forces in the form of the Democratic state militias. The Federalists quailed before the threat of a new Constitutional Convention to be popularly elected and to proceed in the full light of day. Finally, on February 17, enough Federalists followed the advice of Hamilton by casting blank ballots to throw the election to Thomas Jefferson. Hamilton's opposition to the plots of his

own party to elect Aaron Burr was the greatest service he ever performed for his country.

Thus Jefferson was elected—as the result of the vigilance of an aroused people backed by armed force. The triumph of democracy dissipated the Federalist threat of violence and civil war. The Constitution and its Bill of Rights were saved. The nation was free to take the steps necessary for its defense against foreign aggression.

The election of 1801 drove the Federalist Party from power for all time. For a while it continued to dominate certain New England states and it still controlled the judiciary, but nationally the Federalists had become so completely discredited and the subsequent actions of their leaders degenerated into conspiracies of such treasonable character that the days of the Federalist Party were now numbered. Hamilton was now almost completely isolated, so totally had he failed to comprehend the real relation of forces in post-revolutionary America.

The election of 1801 brought to an end one epoch in the history of the American Republic. That election was not a revolution, as some historians have called it. No class was overthrown, and thus no fundamental change in class relations was effected. Furthermore, the Democratic-Republican Party never sought the overthrow of any class. This is what those historians who seek to belittle the achievements of the Jeffersonians never grasp. The significance of the Jeffersonian triumph in 1801 was that it prevented the victory of counter-revolution. It safeguarded the achievements of the Revolution of 1776-89. It preserved bourgeois democracy. It gave to the small producers, in alliance with sections of the great landed interests, temporary control of the legislative and executive branches of government. Not only did the Jeffersonians not seek to abolish any existing property rights, but they did not exclude—or even seek to exclude—the mercantile, financial capitalists from representation in the government. The basis did not exist for another revolutionary change in the America of 1801. Having succeeded in preserving bourgeois democracy, the Jeffersonians were able to achieve certain reforms and to follow a policy of genuine national defense and genuine national development. It is in this

light that the new epoch which opened for America in 1801 must be understood.

Only two weeks remained after the election of Jefferson until his inauguration. Thwarted in their plots to maintain power, the Federalists used to the full this two-week period. Possessing power in the “lame duck” Congress which they would lose with the incoming Congress, the Federalists had already passed bills for the purpose of hamstringing Jefferson’s administration. Their main strategy was to entrench themselves further in the Judiciary, and to convert this independent branch of government into one of supreme authority. A Judiciary Act had provided for new district judges, and a number of new Justices of the Peace for the District of Columbia were created. During the two weeks prior to the inauguration, John Adams appointed the outstanding Federalist, John Marshall, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and, together with Marshall, worked day and night appointing Federalists to the newly created judgeships. The Federalist Senate in the last moments of its existence was kept busy ratifying the appointments. Until midnight of March 3, Adams and Marshall were busy filling out the appointments for the notorious “Midnight Judges.”

The next morning, while John Adams sped ungracefully on his homeward journey, in flight from even the sight of Democrats in power, farmers and artisans crowded into the new and unfinished capitol to celebrate the new experience of participation in the Federal Government. Jefferson, their leader, who had once helped them to see the possibility of a democratic national government, was now to undertake the task of actually standing at the head of that government.

**PART THREE**

Victory of the American Nation  
Over Foreign Aggression  
1801-1815

## CHAPTER VIII

### JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY IN POWER

THOMAS JEFFERSON has been, in many respects, the greatest single hero of American democracy. All the democratic currents of colonial and revolutionary times found their culmination within the movement which he led. Jeffersonian democracy has become the great tradition of the American people, and under its banner every major struggle for freedom and progress throughout the history of the United States has been conducted.

Thomas Jefferson always stood forth as the *leader* of the democratic forces. He was always the philosopher. No other popular leader in American history has enunciated so clearly a democratic theory as a guide to action. Never was Jefferson a dogmatist seeking to enforce upon the living struggle a program for which it was not ready. He did not hesitate to change his program when conditions demanded it or to work out new policies to meet new problems. But never did he merely follow in the wake of the mass movement. Always he saw farther than the democratic forces of the moment. Always he sought to mobilize and lead the people. The program he enunciated exceeded that which was capable of immediate solution. That is why every subsequent democratic advance in America has been conducted in his name. If the program of Thomas Jefferson was not fully scientific, it was because a genuine social science had not in his day developed and because the conditions making possible such development were not present. To the best of his ability, Jefferson relied upon natural science as the means of obtaining understanding.

A child of the western frontier of colonial Virginia, Jefferson was born into the democratic movement. His pioneer father, Colonel Peter Jefferson, had become the political leader of his

neighbors, representing them in the House of Burgesses and consistently fighting for their rights. Peter Jefferson had reared his son in democratic principles from his birth. Jefferson's mother was a Randolph, a member of one of the oldest and most prominent of the slaveholder families. Through her, Jefferson obtained all the culture of her class. Never once, however, is there evidence that he was swayed from democratic principles by the ideology of his mother's class. At his father's home, Shadwell, he knew intimately his small farmer neighbors. With them he established warm ties of personal friendship which were never broken, for throughout his life he maintained his home only a few miles from his birthplace.

As a lad in his teens, Jefferson attended William and Mary College in Williamsburg. There, he came in contact with professors steeped in the teachings of John Locke and with students in whose minds democratic ideas were in ferment. While a student, the struggles over the Stamp Act occurred, and young Jefferson often went to the House of Burgesses, where he came in contact with the early stages of the revolutionary movement. He came to know Patrick Henry and heard his fiery diatribes against both George III and the Established Church. In the evenings, he frequently visited the homes of the planters along the James and York rivers, where he was welcomed as the son of a Randolph.

After returning from college, Jefferson became a candidate for the House of Burgesses from his home county in 1769, and was elected. But the assembly to which he was elected was dissolved by the Royal Governor, and Jefferson was among the representatives who, in retaliation, framed the non-importation agreement. Subsequently he served on the Committee of Correspondence for Virginia, and in 1775 was sent as delegate to the Second Continental Congress. Thus, when he was selected at the age of thirty-three to draft the Declaration of Independence, he was already a veteran in revolutionary struggle.

Anxious to participate in the internal revolution in Virginia, Jefferson submitted to the Constitutional Convention of his state in 1776 a proposed constitution. The flaming preamble to the Virginia Constitution was adopted from his draft. After-

wards, Jefferson returned to Virginia to run for re-election to the legislature. There, he was successful in securing the abolition of entail and primogeniture. He also obtained the passage of a bill for the complete revision of the laws of Virginia. While the revised law did not go as far as Jefferson desired, it included many reforms. Jefferson's proudest achievement was his success in securing first the partial and then the total separation of church and state through the final adoption of his Statute for Religious Freedom.

Jefferson's struggles for other reforms were not so successful. He introduced a bill for the gradual, though complete, abolition of slavery. He also fought for a system of free public education, continuing through the higher schools for those showing the greatest aptitude, regardless of wealth or class origin. William and Mary College was to crown this system as state university, and from its curriculum he urged the elimination of theology and the addition of natural sciences. These bills were too advanced for the slaveholders.

After these activities in the revolutionary legislature, Jefferson was admitted less and less into the homes of the planters, who began to denounce him as a "renegade aristocrat." Groups of slaveholders even plotted with the British against his life. However, the democratic forces were sufficiently strong to elect him Governor of Virginia from 1779 to 1781. When Virginia was invaded by the British in 1781, his enemies succeeded in holding him partially responsible, and he resigned; though, after an investigation, the legislature absolved him of all blame, and atoned for the slanders against him by a vote of thanks.

After his period as Governor, Jefferson served in Congress under the Confederation. There, he was a leader in securing the cession of the Western lands to the Union, wrote the ordinance providing for the formation of free and equal states in that stronghold of democracy, and fought for the abolition of slavery from all the land west of the Alleghenies. When he was appointed Ambassador to France, as successor to Benjamin Franklin, it was an open secret that the big propertied interests were anxious to remove him from the country. Upon returning



from this mission, Jefferson became Secretary of State under Washington and commenced to mobilize the party which in 1801 placed him in power as official head of the American Republic.

Frederick Engels once remarked that the great epoch of democratic struggles at the dawn of modern history was an age which required and produced giants, men of many-sided talents, gifted in widely separated fields, such geniuses as appeared during the Renaissance in Italy. Thomas Jefferson was such a giant in America. Architect, writer, philosopher, agriculturist, educator, inventor, student of the arts and sciences, he excelled in many fields. He designed the exquisite buildings of the University of Virginia, the capitol of Virginia, and many of the loveliest homes in that state so rich in old and beautiful dwellings. He was constantly making little mechanical inventions, experimenting in agriculture, corresponding with and visiting the foremost scientists of his day. He was deeply interested in biology, in Indian customs and languages, in anthropology, in mineralogy and the development of natural resources, in geography and exploration. He collected works of art, and sponsored and supported the arts to the best of his ability. The development of transportation fascinated him, as did new manufactures. He actively supported the American Philosophical Society, founded by Benjamin Franklin. His closest friends were such scientists as Benjamin Rush and Thomas Cooper. Nothing so engrossed him as plans for a national system of education. He urged young men to learn French that they might study the scientific and philosophic writings produced by the enlightened thinkers of that great country. After his retirement from the Presidency, he founded the University of Virginia, and gave instructions that religion never be taught or religious services held within its walls, in order that its students might study science and philosophy free from any atmosphere of bigotry or intolerance. Yet, he proposed that the various denominations be given land grants for their own schools just beyond the walls of the university, hoping that the exchange of ideas among students of many beliefs might result in tolerance. On the wall of one of the buildings of his University, one reads today his oath,

"I have sworn upon the altar of God eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of man."<sup>1</sup>

In relying upon the natural sciences, Jefferson embraced mechanistic materialism as a philosophy. An immaterial substance he declared to be nothing. Thinking, he maintained, was a function of matter. While not an atheist, he was a Deist, as were Franklin, Paine, and most of the Encyclopaedists of eighteenth century France. Whenever he spoke of God, it was always of the "God of nature." If God existed, He had a body. Spiritualists he denounced as the real atheists, since spirit apart from body was nothing. Many historians have attempted to deny Jefferson's materialism. Not only did he voice its doctrines in much of his correspondence but in his letter to John Adams of August 15, 1820, he spoke definitely of "my creed of materialism."<sup>2</sup>

While he scrupulously avoided offending the religious beliefs of the people, thus preventing the Federalists from isolating him from the masses, his whole conduct indicated that he regarded organized religion as a means of holding the people in ignorance and superstition. He revealed a deep devotion to the ethical principles of Christianity, which he applied to politics, in sharp contrast to the bigoted clergy who fought him. He compiled all the ethical passages from the Gospels, and outlined and started to write a book entitled *The Morals and Life of Jesus of Nazareth*. Deeply hostile to theology, he revealed the greatest distrust of clergymen. Yet he always distinguished between the old established churches of the ruling classes and popular sects such as the Baptists of his day, who supported his party.

Jefferson rejected completely the cynical view held by the big bourgeois materialists of the innate selfishness of man and instead enunciated the view, held also by Rousseau in France, of man's essential goodness. Rejecting any conception of an unchanging human nature, he proclaimed the Lockian and Encyclopaedic doctrine of the infinite perfectibility of man when assured of democracy, ownership of the means of sustenance, and education.

In the midst of heated political struggles, Jefferson often stole away for philosophic or scientific discussions or study, to

tinker with some invention, or to correspond at length over some problem in anthropology or linguistics. To the Federalist politicians, he was a man of mystery. The holding of offices was personally distasteful to him. The needs of the age, his devotion to democracy, the insistence of his friends led him to assume offices as a duty to his principles and his people. But always he sought to develop new leaders to continue his work, and insisted that democracy, by producing many leaders, could never depend on one or even a few. He never lost an opportunity to return to Monticello, where he could roam over his fields, talk with his neighbors, gaze upon the broad and magnificent view from his mountain top, and engage in quiet study. At all moments of his life, he was the devoted son, the devoted husband during the short years prior to his wife's death, the devoted father, neighbor, and friend, ready to go to any length to do a personal kindness. In the course of his political activity, he spent his entire personal fortune, which had been mostly inherited, and in his old age his home was saved only by a lottery granted by the Virginia legislature. His absolute integrity and kindness of heart were such that even his bitterest enemies could not question them. It was this selflessness in political life which made him the outstanding leader of American democracy. The inscription, written by his own hand, over the simple grave in the woods beside his hilltop home, reveals his disdain for official pomp. Of all the prominent positions he held, not one is mentioned. He preferred to be remembered as "Author of the Declaration of American Independence, of the Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom, and Father of the University of Virginia." These achievements in the cause of freedom and enlightenment were the things which to him were important.

This disdain for official pomp was seen in Jefferson's first act as President. The Federalists had maintained forms and ceremonies characteristic of European courts, utterly foreign to the spirit of democracy and to the American character. Jefferson swept them away with a single stroke. Assuming office as one of the people, he walked on foot to his inauguration, without parade or ceremony.

This simplicity continued throughout his administrations. The

White House was open to all comers, and Jefferson welcomed the humblest visitor. He rode horseback unattended whether on business or for pleasure. He often received diplomats in riding attire or even in dressing gown and house slippers. There was not a man in all America more courteous than Jefferson, there was no more perfect host, no one with more exquisite taste. But Jefferson's courtesy sprang from love of people; his taste from sensitive feelings and a refined mind.

Jefferson's *Inaugural Address* amazed all hearers for its moderation and appeal for harmony. "We have called by different names brethren of the same principle," he declared. "We are all republicans, we are all federalists."<sup>3</sup> Jefferson referred to the official programs of the two parties and the real beliefs of most of their followers. His own party had always supported the Federal Union. Federalists had never officially opposed the republican form of government, and only among their leaders were monarchists to be found.

To those who professed fear that democracy was weak, Jefferson maintained, "I know, indeed, that some honest men fear that a republican government cannot be strong; that this government is not strong enough. But would the honest patriot, in the full tide of successful experiment, abandon a government which has so far kept us free and firm, on the theoretic and visionary fear that this government, the world's best hope, may by possibility want energy to preserve itself? I trust not. I believe this, on the contrary, the strongest government on earth. I believe it is the only one where every man, at the call of the laws, would fly to the standard of the law, and would meet invasions of the public order as his own personal concern."<sup>4</sup>

His aim of government he enunciated as "A wise and frugal government, which shall restrain men from injuring one another, which shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned. This is the sum of good government."<sup>5</sup>

He proceeded to enunciate his program. "Equal and exact justice to all men, of whatever state or persuasion, religious or political; peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all na-

tions, entangling alliances with none; the support of the state governments in all their rights as the most competent administrations for our domestic concerns and the surest bulwarks against anti-republican tendencies; the preservation of the general government in its whole constitutional vigor, as the sheet anchor of our peace at home and safety abroad; a jealous care of the right of election by the people—a mild and safe corrective of abuses which are lopped by the sword of revolution where peaceable remedies are unprovided; absolute acquiescence in the decisions of the majority, the vital principle of republics, from which is no appeal but to force, the vital principle and immediate parent of despotism; a well-disciplined militia, our best reliance in peace and for the first moments of war, till regulars may relieve them; the supremacy of the civil over the military authority; economy in the public expense, that labor may be lightly burdened; the honest payment of our debts and sacred preservation of the public faith; encouragement of agriculture, and of commerce as its handmaid; the diffusion of information and arraignment of all abuses at the bar of the public reason; freedom of religion; freedom of the press, and freedom of the person under the protection of the habeas corpus, and trial by juries impartially selected.”<sup>6</sup>

This program, faithfully followed throughout the Jeffersonian administrations, proposed no revolution in economic life. Although the character of the administration of the government changed radically following Jefferson's inauguration, no change in the form of government was contemplated or undertaken. By his references to commerce with all nations and the honest payment of debts, Jefferson gave assurances to the mercantile, financial interests that their pursuits would not be restricted. But in referring to commerce as the “handmaid of agriculture,” he warned that the interests of the minority classes were to be *subordinated* to the will of the majority. Behind the appeal for harmony lay also a democratic threat in the proposal for economy, for reduction of the debt through its honest payment, for reliance upon the democratic militia in subordination to the civil authority, for preserving for labor the bread it should earn. The full bourgeois-democratic program of equality was clearly enun-

ciated by the proclamation of “equal and exact justice to *all* men.” Thus, the class character of the Federalist regime was denounced, although there was enunciated no aim of depriving the Federalists of civil rights. The Jeffersonians always felt that numerical superiority alone, when based upon widespread ownership of land, could preserve democracy. The aim of the Jeffersonian administration was, therefore, the widest possible extension of bourgeois-democracy consistent with conciliation of all classes.

This aim of government was radically different from that of the Federalists, whose conception of the state was that of the open regulation of economic life for the benefit of the mercantile interests. The Jeffersonian political theory was more that of *laissez-faire* in the interest of the small producers. This theory in the long run proved most conducive both to the development of the nation into its western domain and to the rise of industrial capitalism.

While the accession of the Jeffersonians to power marked a profound change in the character of the administration of the state, no break in economic development was discernible. Although special privileges for merchants and speculators ceased, no restrictions on trade were imposed until the conflict with England and France in 1807 necessitated economic retaliation against those powers. Commerce continued to flourish at an unprecedented rate. To the degree that the interests of the nation demanded, commerce was protected—first of all in the war against the British-inspired pirates of Tripoli. All government opposition to settlement of the West ended, and the government actively fostered such settlement. Encouragement to small commodity production fertilized that soil so rich for the development of small industrial enterprises, and these grew widely under the Jeffersonian administration.

The total population of the American states had increased from 3,929,214 in 1790 to 5,308,483 in 1800. Within this total, the number of Negroes had grown from 757,208 to 1,002,037.<sup>7</sup> Only 4 per cent of the population dwelt in cities of over 8,000, of which there were only six.<sup>8</sup> The extent of immigration from Europe continued to be small, only 50,000 having entered the

country during the decade from 1790 to 1800, while 70,000 entered from 1800 to 1810.<sup>9</sup> There were by 1800 almost 1,000,000 settlers in the area west of the Allegheny watershed, from which Americans had been excluded by the Royal Proclamation of 1763. Of this number 386,413 inhabited new Western states and territories.<sup>10</sup> The principal Western settlements in 1800 were in the Mohawk Valley of middle New York; the upper Ohio Valley of Western Pennsylvania; Northwestern Virginia; the Southeastern portion of the Northwest Territory; the Blue Grass region of central Kentucky; the valleys of East Tennessee; the Cumberland region of middle Tennessee; and the upland country of Northeastern Georgia. Pittsburgh possessed 1,565 inhabitants; Lexington, Kentucky, 1,795; Frankfort, Kentucky, 628; Cincinnati, Ohio, 500; and Nashville, Tennessee, 355.

The figures on cotton production indicate how this crop was already fastening itself upon the Southern states. In 1793, the year of the invention of the cotton gin, between two and three million pounds of cotton were produced in back country Georgia and South Carolina. The very next year, production of cotton in the United States jumped to eight million pounds. By 1798, it had doubled. In 1801, the figure was 40,000,000 pounds, and, in 1811, 80,000,000 pounds. Three-fourths of this amount was raised in South Carolina and Georgia alone—one-half, in South Carolina.<sup>11</sup> Since cotton was cultivated by slave labor, these figures demonstrate not only the entrenchment of slavery, but also its expansion. In 1801, one million pounds of cotton were produced in the frontier state of Tennessee,<sup>12</sup> and tobacco had been brought from Virginia to Kentucky. Slavery was thus being established in the West.

The prosperity of American foreign commerce was uninterrupted by the Jeffersonian accession to power. By the end of 1793, American tonnage and the extent of American trade ranked second to that of England. In proportion to population, it ranked first. This had been the economic cause of Britain's persistent aggression upon American trade. Taking advantage of the Napoleonic Wars, which raged throughout Jefferson's administrations, American merchants gradually took over so

much of the commerce of England and France that they handled about one-third of the world's commerce. Thus, commercial prosperity was never greater than it became during Jefferson's administrations. The tonnage in foreign trade steadily increased from 127,329 to 1,089,876 tons between 1789 to 1807.<sup>13</sup> By the latter year, over 90 per cent of the total foreign trade of the United States was carried in American boats, a proportion never reached before by any nation and never reached after that period by the United States.<sup>14</sup> Between 1790 and 1807, exports jumped from \$20,205,000 to \$108,343,000; imports from \$23,000,000 to \$138,500,000.<sup>15</sup> About 35 per cent of the goods imported into America were re-exported to other lands. In fact, the foreign goods re-exported from the United States frequently exceeded the domestic imports.<sup>16</sup> This fact reveals the lack of dependence of the shipping interests on their own home market. As a result of the enormous growth of American shipping from 1789 to 1807, the wages of sailors increased during this period from \$8 to \$30 a month.<sup>17</sup> Many foreigners obtained naturalization in America in search of either commercial profits or higher wages.

This continued prosperity explains the failure of the merchants of that day, hostile to democracy on principle, to engage in a more determined opposition to the Jeffersonian administration. Bitterly denouncing Jefferson and his party, the merchants, nevertheless, followed the line of least resistance, pursuing their enterprises with the least possible conflict. The Federalists, in their irreconcilable opposition, which finally led to treason, increasingly ceased to be a party representing the merchant capitalists as a whole, and tended to become a mere clique of disgruntled politicians deprived of the spoils of office until the conflict over foreign policy during 1807-14 again intensified the merchants' opposition.

Industry continued to develop slowly until 1807. Then, under the Embargo, a rapid development commenced. Little hoards of accumulated capital began to appear among the most prosperous artisans and farmers, whose versatility, the product of wilderness life, enabled them to begin the development of America's abundant raw materials and water power. A grow-

ing number of skilled workers migrated from England to America. Steam, which had been used for some time in pumping mines in New Jersey and Rhode Island, seems to have been first applied to machinery in a New York sawmill in 1803. Improvements in machines and inventions were beginning to be made, among them Whitney's development of standardized parts and interchangeable mechanism for firearms and Oliver Evans' invention of a high-pressure steam engine.

During this period, extensive construction of roads and canals on the part of private capital was taking place. The first turnpike in the country had been constructed by the Lancaster Turnpike Co. between 1792 and 1794 from Philadelphia to Lancaster, a distance of 66 miles. This private activity, stimulated by the rivalry of cities and the needs of the farmers, led to Jefferson's proposal in 1806 for national public highways.

In spite of the false impression given by many historians, Jeffersonian democracy was not hostile to commerce or industry. Representing fundamentally the small farmers and artisans, the majority and the progressive classes of the period, the Jeffersonians sought the advantage of those classes primarily, entering for that purpose into an alliance with slaveholding planters. While seeking to prevent the exploitation of the small producers, they nevertheless sought conciliation with the capitalist interests. As Britain's economic power became an increasing menace, they actually tried to stimulate native industries as a means of developing economic independence.

Full state power never passed into the hands of the small producers. When Jefferson took office, there was not a single Federal position of even a minor character in the executive or judicial branches of government in the hands of a Democrat. This fact proves that it was not the Jacksonian Democrats who first established the "spoils system," as is so often maliciously alleged. It was already in operation when the first Democratic administration took office. It was inaugurated by the Federalists, the first party in office. The Federalists had threatened that the Jeffersonians would overturn the entire administrative apparatus, and had warned of dire calamities. Many Democrats were looking for a thorough turnover of officeholders. Jefferson's

Inaugural Address indicated, on the contrary, that there would be no removals for party affiliation. Thus, the first effort of the Democrats was to prevent the further development of a "spoils system." The continuance of Federalists within the Executive apparatus and their complete control of the Judiciary meant that the small producers and their slaveholder allies never obtained complete control of the state machinery.

The Federalists seemed taken aback by Jefferson's moderation. A few days after inauguration, the Federalist press also espoused conciliation. The will of the people had expressed itself, so it declared. Jefferson had proposed no overturn of government, as many had feared. It was up to all, therefore, to co-operate. So ran the editorial comments. In private correspondence, Federalists expressed the hope that they could split the Democratic Party. There was a Jacobin Left wing in Jefferson's party, they gloated, which would not like Jefferson's moderation. It was clear that when the Federalists espoused co-operation they wanted all the co-operation to be on Jefferson's part.

Radical followers were indeed somewhat surprised by the mildness of Jefferson's tone, and soon he was besieged by inquiries. His reply indicated that he was motivated by the need for preventing disunion. It was necessary, he declared, to distinguish between Federalist leaders and their followers. Although the first were for the most part incorrigible, Jefferson believed the majority of Federalist followers to be republican at heart. They had been frightened and misguided by Federalist propaganda. It was necessary to win them over and to destroy the mass base of the Federalist Party. Removals for party affiliations, Jefferson maintained, would merely deepen the gulf between Democrats and Federalist followers. It was necessary to unify all genuine republicans and to isolate the really monarchist Federalist leaders by basing these removals on grounds against which no purely partisan objections could be made.

All officers appointed *after* the election, Jefferson declared, would be removed. As for the others, could not many be impeached on grounds of inefficiency and corruption? While making no move at the outset of his administration against any of

the Federalist judges except those appointed after the election, Jefferson determined that in order to check their power all United States' attorneys and marshals must be Republican. As for other officeholders, Jefferson considered it best to make no changes both for the sake of efficiency and unity. He promised, however, that all vacancies would be filled by Republicans until a balance would be obtained. While unable to see the possibility of ever abolishing all party divisions, Jefferson definitely hoped, through his policy of conciliation, to obliterate completely the type of division which had arisen under the first administrations and to unify the country completely along general republican lines.

With this policy, the Federalists refused co-operation. When Democratic appointments were made, they cried aloud that Jefferson was "persecuting the Washington sect." On the other hand, some of the disappointed careerists within Jefferson's own party became renegades when they failed to obtain offices. Aaron Burr besieged Jefferson for personal patronage, and upon being received with coldness he moved openly into the Federalist camp.

Jefferson's Cabinet was thoroughly Democratic. Its most brilliant members were James Madison, Secretary of State, and Albert Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury. Three of the other four members were New England Democrats. Jefferson clearly sought to demonstrate to the New England people the falsity of the Federalist charge that his administration would mean the "tyranny of Virginia" over the rest of the Union.

Jefferson introduced into his Cabinet the democratic principle of collective work. Weekly meetings were held. The problems of each department were discussed by the whole Cabinet, so that decisions resulted from joint deliberations. Before delivering his messages, he always sent a draft to each Cabinet member with a request for criticisms and proposed changes. Jefferson's messages, therefore, represented the collective position of his whole Cabinet.

As a means of sweeping aside all practices copied from monarchist courts, Jefferson issued a democratic "code of etiquette" for state functions. Recognition of foreign titles was abolished.

The previous custom of giving precedence to certain foreign ministers over others in accordance with the greatness of the power represented was abandoned, and all diplomats were treated as equals. No distinction in rank between one government official and another or between any government official and private citizens was recognized at any state functions. The old court levees were abolished. This new procedure evoked a "tempest in a tea pot" in Washington society. The British Minister, previously accorded first rank among diplomats, on finding himself treated as an equal, displayed his wounded feelings by rudely refusing ever again to attend a social function at the Presidential mansion; and, in retaliation, James Monroë, Ambassador to England, found himself snubbed and insulted on every hand at the British court.

The first major achievement of Congress under Jefferson's administration was the repeal of the most reactionary acts of the Federalists. The law for the deportation of aliens and the Sedition Act had automatically expired, and the Democratic victory of course made impossible their re-enactment. The Enemy Alien Act remained in operation. However, the naturalization law, requiring fourteen years' residence, was repealed by Congress and the length of time reduced to five years. The act creating the new Federal Judges for district courts was repealed, and the Judiciary Act of 1789 restored, with the addition of one new judge to the Supreme Court.

The "Midnight Judges" were characterized by Jefferson as "excrescences on the Judiciary." Jefferson instructed Madison not to deliver the commissions for the new justices of the peace in the District of Columbia. Thus, the "Midnight Judges" were not given their appointments. Federalists fought venomously for retention of the judges, maintaining that judges, once appointed, were guaranteed their offices, upon good behavior, for life. Their temporary flirtation with the word "co-operation" ended.

While fights raged in Congress and the press over the "Midnight Judges" and executive appointments, the Jeffersonians enunciated and put into practice their financial policy.

It was too late to come to the aid of those swindled by the



funding act of 1790. The National Debt lay at the basis of the whole currency and financial structure of the United States. To have repudiated it would have been a madness never contemplated by the Jeffersonians. The Bank was already established and functioning. It formed the basis for the currency. The charter extended only until 1811, so the Democratic policy was to leave it untouched until it expired in 1811, at which time it was not renewed.

While repudiation was never considered, the proposal was made, contrary to Hamiltonian policy, for paying the debt as rapidly as possible, in order to prevent further accumulation of capital at the expense of the people and to break the grip of the speculators upon the government. Gallatin at the same time called for the reduction of taxes. The Federalists mocked that either of these policies might be followed by itself, but not both at the same time. Yet the Jeffersonians undertook both payment of the debt and reduction of taxes—and succeeded. The war taxes of 1798 had expired, and Congress repealed the hated Whiskey Tax. The means for carrying out the policy of debt reduction were strict economy in government expenses, including heavy curtailment of appropriations for the army and navy, and the retention of the Tariff of 1789 as a source of revenue, supplemented by the sales of Western lands. Declaring that Federalists had created many useless offices, Jefferson lowered the budget by eliminating officeholders throughout the entire Federal service. He especially aroused Federalist ire by removing all the officials appointed after his election. Abolition of elaborate social functions was another means of economy. The debt, which had steadily increased under Federalists, began to be drastically reduced. At the end of each year of Jefferson's two administrations, the Treasury was able to show a surplus, and at the end of eight years, \$33,580,000 of the public debt had been paid.

Gallatin announced a policy of strict accounting to the nation, and he regularly submitted to Congress itemized and detailed accounts of all sources of revenue and of all expenditures. Hamilton's common sinking fund was abolished, and requests for appropriations were always made for specific pur-

poses. Separate funds were kept for the different departments of government.

While the Jeffersonians were busy inaugurating these domestic policies, the first necessity for dealing with foreign affairs arose in 1801 when the Bey of Tripoli suddenly launched new attacks upon American ships. Washington's administration had followed the European practice of paying tribute to the Barbary pirates as a means of purchasing immunity, although Jefferson, as Secretary of State, had called for strong measures against the British-inspired depredations. When seizures commenced again, Jefferson dispatched a naval squadron into the Mediterranean to protect American commerce. The war on the Tripolitan pirates was vigorously pursued until 1805, when, in the face of growing conflicts with England, the payment of ransoms was resumed. While the pirates were not completely defeated in the Tripolitan War of 1801-05, the sea lanes were kept open for American ships, and the navy obtained that experience which enabled it to play a valorous role in the War of 1812. Following the conclusion of that War, the navy finally ended the raids.

Meanwhile, the Federalists unleashed a barrage of abuse against the administration. The repeal of the Judiciary Act, by whose authority the "Midnight Judges" had been appointed, was denounced as an "attack upon the judiciary." Federalist newspapers appeared with black borders. The strategy of the Federalists was revealed by the threat that "By the Judges this bill will be declared null and void."<sup>18</sup> Jefferson's financial policies would bankrupt the nation, it was charged. The repeal of the Whiskey Tax was condemned as a breach of faith with the nation's creditors, to whom taxes represented security. During the debate on its repeal in Congress, Robert Morris virtually issued an invitation to merchants to defy the tariff law and thus to bankrupt the United States through smuggling. The reduction of the bureaucracy was contemptuously called mean-spirited "avarice," which would destroy the government apparatus.

"We have a country governed by blockheads and knaves," declared President Dwight of Yale.<sup>19</sup> Toasts calling for the hanging of the President were drunk at Federalist festivities.



Hamilton founded the *New York Evening Post* in 1801 as an organ of opposition to the administration, and secretly wrote editorials and articles denouncing Jefferson's policies. In one of his anonymous articles, Hamilton, West Indian by birth, did not hesitate to attack Gallatin for his foreign origin. When Tom Paine was entertained in the White House upon his return to the nation he had helped to found, Federalist invectives against Jefferson for associating with the "atheist" knew no bounds. Scurrilous personal slanders continued to be made against Jefferson.

Had a mere fraction of the attacks on Jefferson been made by Democrats against Adams, prison and mob violence would have been the penalty. Not one move against even the most malicious and slanderous of the Federalist papers was made by the Jeffersonians. The character of the democracy of the period is revealed by the story of a conversation in the White House between Jefferson and the German scientist, Baron von Humboldt. Finding an utterly false personal attack on Jefferson in a paper on the President's desk, Humboldt asked why such libels were permitted. With a smile, Jefferson replied, "Put that paper in your pocket, Baron, and should you hear the reality of our liberty, the freedom of our press questioned, show them this paper—and tell them where you found it."<sup>20</sup> Here was expressed the full aim of middle-class democracy—utopian in its effort to grant complete freedom in a society where classes existed, yet incapable in the absence of a strong working class of eliminating completely the enemies of democracy.

While Federalists fumed in frustration, Hamilton proposed a plan for the reconquest of power. He claimed that Federalists had ignored the principle that "men...are for the most part governed by their passions," and reminded them of the party's temporary popularity following the XYZ affair.<sup>21</sup> He urged a new organization to win the masses. The two issues which he felt would appeal to their passions were the defense of the Christian religion and of the Constitution. Jefferson was to be charged with plotting the downfall of both. Intricate details were outlined for the formation of clubs, the publishing of propaganda, expenditures for "charity," the establishment of

"relief" societies for immigrants and of schools for mechanics. Hamilton saw the need for demagoguery and for establishing organizations modeled after the Democratic Clubs as the only means of regaining power. This plan, however, was rejected by Hamilton's colleagues. Preferring to ride roughshod over the masses after the manner of absolute monarchies, they disdained the resort to demagoguery on a big scale.

The Federalists still looked to the judiciary as the key to power. One of the "midnight appointees," Marbury, brought suit before the Supreme Court, against the Federal Government, demanding a court order to force Madison to deliver his commission. Although this suit failed to obtain offices for these "Midnight Judges," the decision made by Chief Justice Marshall in 1803 in the case of *Marbury vs. Madison* established the precedent whereby the Supreme Court usurped its greatest single power—a power not granted it by the Constitution.

Marshall declared in that decision that Marbury was entitled to his commission, but that the Supreme Court had no constitutional power to issue a writ of *mandamus* ordering Madison to deliver it. The reason given was that cases such as that of *Marbury vs. Madison* could not, according to the Constitution, be brought before the Supreme Court except on appeal. The Judiciary Act of 1789 had provided that such cases might be brought directly before the Supreme Court, but this provision of that act Marshall declared unconstitutional and therefore null and void.

The immediate result of Marshall's decision was that the "Midnight Judges" were not seated. Thus, the people acclaimed the decision as a victory. Marshall realized that the popular sentiment was such that any decision to the contrary would have led to open defiance of the Supreme Court, perhaps to the legal curtailment of its powers. Had he wished, he might have claimed the right, on the basis of the Judiciary Act of 1789, to order the delivery of Marbury's commission. Considering this course unwise, Marshall deliberately found the means for establishing a legal precedent for the right of the Supreme Court to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional.

That power had not been granted to the Supreme Court by

the Constitution. Yet Marshall knew the legal practice whereby courts render decisions not merely upon the basis of the written law, but also upon precedents set by previous court decisions. In the *Marbury vs. Madison* case, he established a precedent for the nullification of Congressional legislation by voiding a section of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Every subsequent nullification of laws of Congress by the Supreme Court has been based upon the *Marbury vs. Madison* decision.

There is evidence that some of the framers of the Constitution had hoped to convert the Supreme Court into an agency for nullifying Congressional acts but they had not dared include that right in the Constitution. The people of 1788, remembering their experiences before British courts, were suspicious of courts in general, and had, during the revolutionary period, placed numerous restrictions upon state courts. Had the Constitution contained the right now claimed by Marshall, its chance of ratification would have been weakened.

Jefferson and the Democratic leaders saw immediately what lay behind Marshall's decision, but it was not an issue around which the people could be mobilized for action. The Jeffersonian doctrine, as enunciated in the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions, was that two-thirds of the state legislatures, elected by the people, were to determine the constitutionality of acts of Congress. It was against this democratic doctrine that Marshall aimed his decision. The people regarded the decision as a victory over the "Midnight Judges," and it was impossible to get them to see the legal technicalities which were so ominous for democracy in the future. Jefferson could merely call for vigilance against the future use of Marshall's precedent.

Marshall's whole procedure in this case indicated how the Federalists were conspiring to convert the judiciary—according to the Constitution, one of three equal and independent branches of government—into an organ of supreme authority. Democratic vigilance during the Jeffersonian period made it impossible for Federalists, entrenched in the courts, to use the new precedent set by Marshall. Nevertheless, in one decision after another, Marshall steadily perfected the machinery which, at the convenient time, could be put into motion against the exercise of

democracy. Subsequent decisions strengthened the power of the national government at the expense of the states, but on an undemocratic basis.

Throughout the Jeffersonian administrations, the Federalists retained the judiciary as their last line of defense. From this position, they found it possible to obstruct the Democratic policy. Federalist judges delivered from the bench party speeches prepared in party caucuses. They denounced the government, its laws, and its President in the texts of their decisions. These practices forced the Democrats to undertake a more determined opposition, and preparations were made for impeachment proceedings against certain judges. These were launched during Jefferson's second administration.

Throughout the early years of Jefferson's presidency, bitter fights took place in the states. Democratic majorities were elected to the state legislatures of Rhode Island and Vermont. Heavy inroads were made upon the Federalist majorities in Massachusetts and even Connecticut. In the latter state, still governed by the royal charter of Charles II, a powerful movement for a written Constitution and the separation of church and state had arisen, the Baptists playing a leading role. The threat was so great that Federalists, whose contempt for the people had prevented them from soliciting votes, were forced to undertake what they regarded as the "vulgar" practice of electioneering.

A new doctrine began to be enunciated by the Federalists. Abandoning their former devotion to the rights of the Federal Government, they suddenly championed *states' rights*. "Make State justice and State power a shelter of the wise and the good and the rich," was the advice of Fisher Ames.<sup>22</sup> This showed that Federalists were for the Federal Government only when their party controlled it. When only certain states remained in their hands, they were for defiance of the Federal Government by the states they dominated.

While the democratic forces were growing and securing reforms in the states, there were similar developments in the territories. In 1802, Georgia, the last among the original thirteen states to do so, ceded its Western territory to the Union, with the provision that Georgia be paid \$1,200,000 from the

sales in that area, that Indian titles to certain lands within its domain be abolished, and that a half million acres be used to satisfy claims already made. The ceded land was added to the territory of Mississippi which had been first organized in 1795 after Spain had finally transferred that land to the United States. In 1802, Mississippi embraced what is today both Alabama and Mississippi, with the exception of a strip along the Gulf Coast, known as West Florida and possessed by Spain. The Georgia cession passed on to the Federal Government the settlement of fraudulent sales of land in the Yazoo area, which subsequently caused much bitterness and confusion.

In 1801, William Henry Harrison was appointed first governor of the Indiana Territory, carved out of the Western portion of the Northwest. In April, 1802, Congress passed its first "Enabling Act," authorizing the Eastern Division of the Northwest Territory to frame a constitution in anticipation of admission as the first of the Public Domain states. The Constitutional Convention that assembled in November was almost solidly Jeffersonian, and proceeded in utter disregard of the old appointed Federalist Governor, General St. Clair, bitterly hated for his sabotage of the Indian campaign of 1792. St. Clair had deepened the gulf between himself and the frontiersmen by convoking the first Territorial legislature in Cincinnati, where his own influence was strongest, and by vetoing every important bill passed by that body. A venomous attack at the convention upon the "Enabling Act" and the President was the occasion for his removal by Jefferson.

The constitution framed in Ohio was the most typical expression of frontier democracy so far manifested. Some efforts were made by Southern planters, who had migrated to that territory with slaves, to put aside the prohibition against slavery contained in the Northwest Ordinance, but these efforts were overwhelmingly defeated. The new constitution placed special restrictions upon the executive department of the government. The governor was denied the power of veto or appointment and placed in complete subordination to the legislature. Restrictions were likewise placed upon the courts, whose judges were to be elected by both houses of the legislature "for the term of seven

years, if so long they behave well." The right to vote was extended to the entire white, male population over twenty-one who had paid or been charged with a state or county tax. A militia consisting of the entire male population of military age was established, and soldiers were given the right to elect their officers. A detailed Bill of Rights, commencing with the words, "All men are born equally free and independent," constituted about one-third of the entire constitution.

Ohio was admitted as a free and equal state on February 19, 1803. Congress provided that 3 per cent of the proceeds from the sales of public lands by the Federal Government in Ohio "be applied to the laying out and making public roads" in the new state and connecting it with the "navigable waters emptying into the Atlantic." In return, Ohio agreed not to tax for five years any of the public land sold in its territory. On the basis of this agreement, Congress subsequently, upon Jefferson's initiative, undertook construction of the first national highway.

Edward Tiffin, Democratic leader in the former struggle against Governor St. Clair, took office as first governor of the new state in March, 1803. The state legislature chartered a new bank, which issued paper currency, and steps were taken for the development of trade through the mouth of the Mississippi River.

At the very moment when the Western farmers were looking for new outlets for their goods, the news broke like a bomb-shell that Louisiana had been ceded by Spain to Napoleon Bonaparte and that the Spanish authorities of New Orleans had closed the port to American trade. From its primary concern with domestic issues, the new administration was now forced to devote major attention to its foreign affairs.

## CHAPTER IX

WESTERN EXPANSION AND FEDERALIST  
TREASON

AT the end of the French and Indian War, the old French possessions between the Mississippi River and the Rocky Mountains, known as Louisiana, had been ceded by England to Spain with the provision that at no time in the future should that land ever be transferred to another power. In 1800, however, Spain, under the influence of Napoleon, secretly ceded that territory back to France.

Napoleon planned to reconquer the Negro republic of Haiti, to re-establish slavery in that island, and to use Louisiana as a source of food supplies for its plantations. There was danger that he might use Louisiana as a base through which at some future date to wrest the Trans-Allegheny region from the United States. The transfer of Louisiana to France was to remain secret until that area should actually be occupied by French troops.

Preparatory to the occupation of Louisiana, Napoleon in 1801 sent troops to Haiti. There, his officers captured Toussaint l'Ouverture by the most shameless act of perfidy. Violating the international code of honor among belligerents, the French dragged l'Ouverture in chains from a conference for the duration of which he had been guaranteed immunity. Troops proceeded to occupy Haiti and to attempt to restore slavery. Thereupon, the Negro people rose again, and, aided by an epidemic of yellow fever, virtually annihilated Napoleon's army. Only one-seventh of it escaped to France. It was this uprising which prevented Napoleon's troops from landing in Louisiana. To this heroism of the Negro people does America owe its easy acquisition of that vast area and in some measure the preservation of its independence.

The struggle for the control of the Mississippi River and the vast valley dependent on it, extending from the Appalachians to the Rockies, did not end until after the War of 1812. That struggle started in colonial times as a conflict between the European powers of France and England. The cession of the Western half of that valley to Spain helped determine the alliance of the French monarchy with revolutionary America in 1778. When the United States obtained the land to the east of the river, it was clear that the Mississippi could not remain the permanent boundary of the United States. The power which held New Orleans possessed the key to the whole Mississippi Valley. Either the United States would sooner or later acquire New Orleans and the west bank of the Mississippi or it would lose all its holdings west of the Appalachians.

While New Orleans was held by Spain, the danger was not so great since Spain was a relatively weak power. The moment Louisiana fell into French control, however, the shadow of Napoleon fell across America.

By the fall of 1802, rumors of the cession of Louisiana had been confirmed. Jefferson wrote immediately to Robert R. Livingston, Ambassador to France, that the cession "completely reverses all the political relations of the United States. . . . There is on the globe one single spot, the possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy. It is New Orleans, through which the produce of three-eighths of our territory must pass to market. . . . [Spain's] pacific dispositions, her feeble state, would induce her to increase our facilities there. . . . Not so can it ever be in the hands of France. . . . The day that France takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence which is to restrain her forever within her low-water mark. It seals the union of two nations who in conjunction can maintain exclusive possession of the ocean. From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation. . . . We must . . . make the first cannon, which shall be fired in Europe the signal for tearing up any settlement [France] may have made. . . ."<sup>1</sup>

News of the cession was followed by the report that the Spanish authorities at New Orleans had withdrawn the right of deposit in operation since 1795. This spelled ruin for the whole

Mississippi Valley. Word reached Jefferson that the pioneers of Kentucky and Tennessee were ready to shoulder rifles and take the warpath for New Orleans. There was evidence that British agents were actively fanning belligerent moods. Jefferson sent a demand for repudiation to Spain and instructed the Ambassador to France both to demand a guarantee that France would continue to grant the right of deposit and to open negotiations for the purchase of New Orleans.

Suddenly the Federalists became "champions of the West." Upon Jefferson's proposal for peaceful settlement, they were on their feet in Congress howling for war with Spain. This of course meant war with France and alliance with England. Jefferson was a "coward," cried the Federalists, and was betraying the West. Federalists indirectly appealed to the Westerners to seize New Orleans without waiting for government action. Their aim was to discredit Jefferson among his strongest followers, to break the union of Western farmers with the democratic forces of the East, to ruin the Jeffersonian financial policy through war, and to secure their old aim of closer ties with England. The Jeffersonians, however, refused to be provoked. Frontiersmen, while itching for their rifles, followed their party rather than their "new friends," and awaited guidance from the leaders they trusted.

James Monroe, regarded everywhere as the champion of the small farmers, was dispatched as special envoy to France. Yet scarcely had his appointment been confirmed before Federalists sought to ruin any chance of peaceful negotiation by the belligerence of their speeches. But Federalist war provocation was soon made ridiculous by the disavowal in Madrid of the action of the authorities in New Orleans.

At this time Jefferson prepared to send an expedition headed by two of his neighbors in Virginia, Meriwether Lewis and William Clark, to explore the Western country beyond the frontier as far as the Pacific. Jefferson had cherished this plan from the time of the Revolution. The timing of these preparations helped demonstrate that the administration was resolutely looking toward Western expansion.

Jefferson was keenly aware of Napoleon's difficulties. The

expedition to Haiti having failed, Bonaparte was in no position to protect Louisiana. At the moment, he was planning to renew war with England. He needed trade with America, and certainly did not relish the idea of an alliance between America and Britain. Since England did not recognize the right of Spain to cede Louisiana, there was the danger that British troops would land there, and Napoleon was in no position to prevent it. Furthermore, Napoleon needed cash. Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, in prolonged conferences, carefully analyzed these contradictions. They came to the conclusion that Napoleon would prefer to see New Orleans in American hands rather than under British control; that he would have to consider American trade and neutrality of more value than New Orleans; and that his need for cash, in addition to these other considerations, would easily lead him to sell.

Napoleon's desire to keep England out of America and to continue friendly relations with the United States was greater than Jefferson had anticipated. Before Monroe's arrival, Napoleon offered to sell the whole of Louisiana to the American Ambassador, Livingston. On April 30, 1803, Livingston and Monroe signed the treaty for the purchase of this huge territory for the sum of \$15,000,000. The treaty required that the territory be incorporated into the United States at the earliest possible moment, that its inhabitants retain all previous rights and possess equal rights with other American citizens. It also provided that French and Spanish vessels should have special privileges in Louisiana for the next twelve years, following which time France would be placed on the basis of the most favored nation.

The Louisiana Purchase was the most brilliant diplomatic victory since the establishment of the American Republic. Without the shedding of a drop of blood, a dangerous foreign power was removed from the border of the United States and the territory of the country was doubled in size.

The treaty was a perfect vindication of the Jeffersonian peace policy. Yet the Federalists did not keep silent. They fought the purchase tooth and nail. What a shameful thing it was, cried Federalist merchants, to *buy* territory! Great nations took land by force of arms. What an exorbitant price was \$15,000,000,

cried those who had sneered at Jeffersonian "avarice" in economizing on government expenditures and reducing the debt, which Federalists had always sought to raise. Louisiana was all "wild land," uninhabitable, and worthless, claimed some. Furthermore, there was no provision in the Constitution for acquiring new territory, shouted the former loose constructionists. Moreover, the Federalists denounced the treaty as immoral. Britain, they said, represented all the powers that make for good and was fighting America's war, while Napoleon represented the forces of evil. At this crucial moment, they fumed, Jefferson dared to stab the forces of righteousness in the back by giving money to the arch foe of mankind, Napoleon.

The Federalists revealed their real cause for opposition. The Jeffersonians advocated the purchase, they alleged, for narrow party purposes. They wished to bring in more Western states in order to depopulate the East and to outvote for all time the Federalist Party. If Louisiana could be annexed as a colony, it would be very well, declared certain Federalists, but to incorporate it into the Union meant giving too much power to the "wild Westerners," already too powerful.

Thus, those who had clamored for war in order to seize one city alone now moved heaven and earth to prevent the peaceful doubling of the nation's territory. The more far-sighted among the Federalists, men like Alexander Hamilton and John Quincy Adams, could not stomach the narrow partisan, anti-nationalist position of most of their colleagues. In spite of his hatred for Jefferson, Hamilton admitted that the acquisition of Louisiana was the greatest step toward national development since the formation of the Federal Government.

Jefferson, who had always opposed the usurpation of unconstitutional powers by the Federalists, drafted a constitutional amendment to authorize acquisitions of territory. However, his colleagues, fearing that Federalists might possibly obstruct or delay the necessary two-thirds vote, saw the danger of British occupation of Louisiana unless the treaty be ratified immediately. On the grounds that the constitutional power to make war and treaties covered the right to acquire territory, and knowing that the majority of the people enthusiastically hailed the purchase,

the treaty was submitted to the Senate and ratified. Both houses authorized the admission of Louisiana as a territory within the Union and gave Jefferson authority to form a territorial government.

Thus, the Jeffersonians stressed strict construction of the Constitution and states' rights only when these were in the interest of the people. Whenever the opposite policies were necessary for the good of the nation, Jefferson never hesitated to use the full power of the Federal Government. Historians have written at length of the so-called "inconsistencies" of Jefferson, but have failed in the main to show his real consistency—devotion to the people. His "inconsistencies" were changing tactics demanded by his consistent support to the principle of democracy.<sup>2</sup>

Foiled in their efforts to keep Louisiana out of the Union, Federalists in Congress commenced a scheme for the dismemberment of their country. While speaking as patriots in the halls of Congress, Senators Timothy Pickering, former Secretary of State; Uriah Tracy and James Hillhouse of Connecticut; William Plumer of New Hampshire; Representative Roger Griswold of Connecticut; and a number of others held secret sessions throughout the winter of 1803-04. They urged the British Ambassador, Anthony Merry, to secure the rejection by England of a boundary treaty with the United States. In the words of a letter from Merry to England, this "would prove to be a great exciting cause to then go forward rapidly in the steps they have already commenced toward a separation from the southern part of the Union." Merry's letter continued, "They naturally look forward to Great Britain for support and assistance whenever the occasion shall arrive."<sup>3</sup> The conspirators conferred with the Vice-President, Aaron Burr, who agreed to run for Governor of New York in the next election, in order to swing New York into the secessionist plot. As a bribe, Burr was proposed as head of the new Northern Confederacy.

The conspirators found many of the foremost Federalists in sympathy with their plan, but the majority regarded the scheme as an impracticable adventure. Life had beaten into their heads the lesson that the people could not be overlooked. Alexander Hamilton and such bourgeois nationalists as John Quincy Adams



and Rufus King bitterly fought the whole plot. The conspiracy collapsed with the defeat of Burr in the gubernatorial election.

Burr's defeat led to the famous duel which terminated the life of Alexander Hamilton. Attributing his defeat to Hamilton, Burr demanded the retraction of certain reported remarks concerning his integrity. The duel, in which the ruthless bourgeois nationalist, founder of the Federalist Party, fell before the pistol of a traitor, dramatically symbolized the real victory of treason over bourgeois nationalism in the first party of reaction in American history.

The Federalists simulated grief over the death of their former leader, but many of them were already enmeshed in counter-revolutionary intrigues with Great Britain. The former Hamiltonians were confronted with the alternative of abandoning opposition to bourgeois democracy or becoming tools of a foreign power. Most of those who continued as leaders of the Federalist Party chose the latter path.

The conspiracy of 1804 was not publicly exposed, although, through intelligence work organized by the Postmaster-General, Jefferson was kept informed of its whole development. Relying upon the democratic and nationalist sentiments of the people, Jefferson decided to allow the plot to die a natural death as he saw that its aims were frustrated on every hand.

The conspiracy of 1804 was merely the first in a long series of counter-revolutionary plots which did not cease until after the War of 1812. Immediately after the defeat of the North-eastern secessionist intrigue, the scheme which has come to be known as *the Burr Conspiracy* was launched. While this plot has borne the name of Burr, who was its chief organizer, its program was that of the Federalist Party and its chief backers were Federalists. Burr was merely an instrument for the realization of the now treasonable program of the party of reaction.

Following Hamilton's death in the summer of 1804, Burr realized that all chances of public office in the East were destroyed. While still Vice-President and while hiding in fear for his life, he communicated, through Colonel Charles Williamson, with the British Ambassador Merry, and placed himself fully at the disposal of the British Government.

Burr planned to entrench himself in the West, in order to enter Congress as a representative of one of the Western states or territories, and to use his official position as a screen to hide his plots to disrupt the Union. Skillfully he sought to make capital of his duel with Hamilton. Personal combats were part of the frontier code, and the man who had killed Hamilton was the object of much hero worship in that region so bitterly anti-Hamiltonian. Before his tour of the West, a traveling showman had already been exhibiting wax figures of the duel in which Burr "slew the leviathan of Federalism."<sup>4</sup>

Burr proposed a union of the Creole slaveholding landlords of Louisiana, discontented with their transfer to the United States, with the American frontiersmen, on whose old anti-Federalism he counted. Through their union, he hoped to effect a rebellion against the United States, resulting in the establishment of a separate empire beyond the Alleghenies. Burr requested that Britain advance \$500,000 for equipping his counter-revolutionary army and, at the appointed time, send a fleet to block the Mississippi River. Before Britain was held the lure of using the new empire for the conquest of Spanish Mexico. Requests for money were sent by Merry to the British Government.

Since investigation never uncovered the full extent of the Burr Conspiracy, it is impossible to determine how many people of wealth and political importance Burr actually recruited. In the words of the historian McMaster, "Into his plot had been drawn men of every rank and of every description from New Orleans to New York—Senators and ex-Senators, judges, soldiers, men of education, men of wealth, young men, boatmen, field hands, laborers. To each, with infinite skill, had been presented that allurements he was least able to resist. For the ambitious, there were titles, honors, military rank; for the avaricious, prospects of boundless wealth; for the poor and ignorant, acres of land."<sup>5</sup> This description by McMaster gives the false impression that members of all classes participated equally in the Burr Conspiracy. Although recruits did come from all classes, the poor who were involved were either demoralized, declassed elements or were betrayed through an appeal to their



real grievances into supporting a movement whose real character they could not know.

Regardless of the particular, personal motives of the various leaders of the conspiracy—all politicians, high-ranking army officers, capitalists—it was the mercantile capitalists of the day who formed the class basis for the Burr Conspiracy. The plan to sever the West from the Union through British aid was their plan. The conspirators were their agents. It was the Federalist Party which nurtured and was thus responsible for the whole conspiracy. Federalist hostility to the West, opposition to the Louisiana Purchase, and reliance on Great Britain created the program which Burr's Conspiracy sought to effect. It was with Federalist backing that Burr first became a traitor. He had been their tool since 1800. Such Federalists as former Senator Jonathan Dayton were among his chief accomplices. Others, such as Senators Timothy Pickering and Josiah Quincy, at least knew of its existence and gave it moral support. Finally, the entire Federalist Party came to Burr's aid when his plot was exposed, and saved him from the punishment for which all classes, except the merchant capitalists, clamored. The traitors involved in the Burr Conspiracy were thus not accidental figures but the products of a counter-revolutionary class. The old world was fighting against the new democracy. In that fight any corrupt adventurer or bankrupt spendthrift easily became an instrument of counter-revolution.

General James Wilkinson, Commander of the United States Army, became Burr's major accomplice. Wilkinson had already been a paid agent for Spain for many years. Now, in entering the secret service of England, he became involved in a truly complicated situation. While the commander of the armed forces of one nation, he became the secret agent of two foreign governments, each of which was bitterly hostile to the other. To each of his masters he was false.

Through Wilkinson, Burr met and conferred with a number of Western Congressmen, who sought to assist his entrance into Western politics. One of these Congressmen, elected by the Creoles of Louisiana, informed the French Ambassador of the

plot. Hence, France was as fully informed as England of the plans of the counter-revolutionists.

Burr made a tour through the West in 1805. In places, whole towns came out to hail the man who had shot Hamilton. On this journey, Burr conferred with every possible disgruntled, adventurous leader as well as with many whose devotion to the Union was above reproach. To each individual, he told the tale best suited to his particular ambition, hate, or prejudice, and often he obtained aid from those entirely ignorant of his real aims. To Andrew Jackson of Tennessee, Burr pretended that he bore a secret commission from Jefferson to mobilize an army to drive the Spanish troops from Louisiana, which they had not evacuated.

At New Orleans, Burr had his greatest success. That city, founded as a convict colony by France, surrounded by plantations on which slavery assumed its most savage form, long governed by the most corrupt Spanish officialdom, ancient site of international intrigues, the traditional hangout of pirates, bandits, thieves, outlaws, was teeming with adventurers and underworld characters ready to undertake any desperate plan which promised loot. Among the old French settlers, there was much hatred of Spain and among the wealthy Creoles equal hatred for American democracy, whose officials were then examining all land titles. Before planters, merchants, and adventurers, Burr dangled the hope of the conquest of Mexico by means of his proposed empire, whose capital would be New Orleans, with himself emperor and Wilkinson chief commander. To Mexican revolutionists, Burr offered aid in overthrowing the rule of Spain.

Upon returning to Washington in the fall of 1805, Burr found no answer from England, and he threatened to turn to France. When England, evidently considering his scheme hopeless, refused him money, he approached Spain, against whom he had just been plotting. The former Federalist Senator, Jonathan Dayton, spoke for Burr to the Spanish Ambassador. If Spain would supply money, Dayton promised that Burr would change his plan of seizing Mexico. Instead, he proposed to smuggle into Washington an army of disguised adventurers,

who, at an appointed time, would kidnap Jefferson and the other leading government officials, "pitch them into the Potomac," and then seize the government money, the arsenal, naval yard, and naval vessels. In the confusion, Burr would disperse Congress, seize power, and permit his conspirators, without opposition from the United States, to carry out the secession of Louisiana from the Union. If unable to hold power, Burr's men would escape with the government funds in the naval vessels at Washington to New Orleans. From there the dismemberment of the Union that would bring the American West under Spanish influence could be effected. This plot seemed practical to the Spanish Ambassador, who afterwards paid small sums to Burr and Dayton. These conferences with the Spanish Ambassador occurred at the very moment when Spanish aggression against the United States was taking place in West Florida.

With money furnished by a credulous and ambitious Irishman named Blennerhasset, boats were constructed along the Ohio River, and guns and an army of desperadoes were assembled for the purpose of carrying out the secession of the West. Burr used the project of a settlement in the Red River Valley as a screen for all these preparations. Plans were made to seize five thousand government guns at Cincinnati. Meanwhile, Burr prepared a "Declaration of Independence" for the West. He planned to descend on New Orleans for his "coronation" after the conspirators there should issue him a formal invitation from their legislature.

While this vast conspiracy was developing, the democratic forces in power, unaware of the secret intrigues against the Republic, continued their efforts toward national development and democratic reform, and carried out a Presidential election. Not until 1806 was the government informed of suspicious activities by Burr in the West. Even then, it was some time before evidence was finally secured of what was really taking place.

Early in 1804, debates took place in Congress over a new land law as a result of popular agitation for the right to purchase smaller lots at cheaper prices. On March 26, 1804, a law was

passed permitting the purchase of quarter-sections of 160 acres, half the size of the smallest farms previously sold, at the old price of two dollars an acre. The four-year credit arrangement remained, and purchasers who paid on time were exempted from interest charges. Two years later, when many settlers were unable to make the last payments on their purchases, Congress passed the first of many relief laws extending the time of payment.

Prior to the election of 1804, the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution was ratified to prevent the recurrence of any such deadlock as that of 1801. It designated that electors vote on one ballot specifically for the President and on another for the Vice-President, so that a Vice-Presidential candidate might not be elected to the Presidency in defiance of the will of his party.

For Vice-President in 1804, the Jeffersonians chose George Clinton of New York, who had fought the Burr machine in his state. The Federalists, running Charles C. Pinckney and Rufus King, raised the old slanders: Jefferson was a "French agent," the "Anti-Christ," the friend of Paine, the enemy of the courts, the utopian philosopher. They complained of the high cost of Louisiana and of the "tyranny of Virginia." However, the country was growing and prospering, and this stale propaganda had no effect. Every state in the Union voted for Jefferson except Delaware and Connecticut. The old Federalist stronghold of Massachusetts created the sensation of the election by casting every electoral vote for Jefferson. Only seven Federalists remained in the Senate, while only twenty-five out of one hundred and forty-one remained in the House.

Impeachment proceedings against certain Federalist judges were begun after the election. Jefferson submitted to the House evidence on the subversive behavior of certain judges. John Pickering of New Hampshire and Samuel Chase of Maryland were both impeached, whereupon they appeared before the Senate for trial. Pickering had not merely violated every judicial procedure but had habitually appeared on the bench in a state of drunkenness, cursing like a maniac. Yet every Federalist in Congress defended him, arguing that Jefferson was "wreck-

ing the Judiciary." Pickering was removed. Chase, whose career had been unsavory from the time he had attempted to obtain a corner on wheat through use of his information as a member of the Continental Congress, was perhaps the most vicious of all the Federalist judges. He had handed down opinions on cases before hearing the lawyers, had accepted as jurors individuals who had openly stated their opinions in court, had made it impossible for lawyers to proceed with their arguments, and had delivered from the bench tirades against Jefferson and the deliberations of the Maryland legislature. Jefferson had suggested impeachment on the fundamental grounds of his "seditious and official attack on the principles of our Constitution, and on the proceedings of a State."<sup>8</sup> However, the Democrats in the Senate, wavering before the Federalist charge of party persecution, based their trial on more colorful examples of particular injustices. Thus, they vulgarized the whole prosecution and fell into the hands of the Federalists, whose lawyers were technically better trained. With the opportunistic argument that this would heal party strife, enough Democrats finally voted with the Federalists to secure the acquittal of Chase by a slim majority. No further impeachments were made. Although Federalists were not removed from control of the judiciary, the judges were considerably frightened.

In certain states, such as Pennsylvania and throughout the South, Federalism seemed to have disappeared after 1804. Unification of different classes within the Republican Party did not prevent, however, the emergence of factions within that party. One faction continued to represent small farmers and artisans, while new groups began to voice a less radical policy more consistent with the big property-holding interests. Class divisions being what they were, Jefferson's efforts for unification could establish a temporary coalition but could not obliterate the actual class conflicts.

A faction of the Republican Party, representing the interests of certain slaveholders in the upper South, began to emerge under the leadership of John Randolph of Roanoke. Around Randolph gathered such Congressmen as Nicholson, Macon, and Monroe. Preparations were started to run Monroe for the

Presidency in 1808 in opposition to Madison, the choice of the Republican majority.

The faction first appeared during debates over the disposition of lands fraudulently sold in the Yazoo area. While the administration favored some compensation to those speculators who had bought lands fraudulently obtained, the Randolph group was opposed to any compensation whatsoever and prevented any settlement of the dispute until after a Supreme Court decision in 1810. In his savage denunciation of Northern capitalists and in his contempt for all not born to landed wealth, Randolph foreshadowed the language of the Confederate rebels of 1860, although, unlike the slaveholders of that day, he spoke apologetically of the institution of slavery itself. As conflicts with foreign powers developed, the Randolph group of planters revealed a pro-British sentiment, based upon their dependence on British markets. This placed them increasingly at odds with their own party and finally led them into a position coinciding objectively with the foreign policy of the Federalists, whom in all other respects they violently denounced.

While internal conflicts continued, the danger of foreign aggression increased. England, France, and Spain were kept informed during 1805-06 of the Burr Conspiracy, which was then maturing. Knowledge of this vast plot, of which the United States government was ignorant, made them bolder in their hostility toward the young republic.

Bitterly aggrieved by Napoleon's sale of Louisiana, Spanish authorities delayed moving their troops after American annexation of that territory. They began to interfere with the transportation of American goods through the rivers of West Florida. Further conflict arose over the boundaries of Louisiana, which the treaty of purchase had not fully clarified. The French minister Talleyrand had secretly expressed the opinion to the United States that West Florida was part of the purchase. It was also believed by many that Texas was included. Not anxious to intensify Spain's irritation, France urged America to postpone settlement of the boundary disputes, clearly hoping to use the resulting strife for her own ends. Monroe was sent to Spain in 1805 to attempt to negotiate the annexation of West Florida,

but, meanwhile, Spanish officials, relying on their alliance with France, seemed bent on provoking war. Federalists and Randolph Republicans, in pursuing their pro-British aims, also did their best to foment war with Spain and thus with France.

At the very moment when Spanish-French aggression seemed to be pushing the United States toward closer friendship with England, that power unleashed merciless attacks upon American trade. These attacks were not only a part of Britain's efforts to win the Napoleonic wars through control of the seas, but also a deliberate attempt to destroy the rival commerce of the United States. American ships were seized and seamen were increasingly impressed into the British service. British armed vessels actually entered New York Harbor, and, within sight of the Battery, fired across American vessels, which they stopped and searched.

Under attack from three powers, Jefferson saw the necessity for maintaining peace if the United States was to avoid becoming a pawn in the hands of either side in the huge Napoleonic conflict. The war of France had long ceased to be one of national liberation which it was in the interest of America to support, and American national interests now did not coincide with the interests of any of the powers involved. France, as well as England, was attacking American ships.

Of all the aggressors, Britain remained the most dangerous. The farmers of the Mississippi Valley, increasingly dependent on foreign markets, were bitter against the aggression on the seas which blocked the outlet for their crops and depressed prices.<sup>7</sup> While France was guilty of aggression on the seas, England menaced America by land. Britain refused to recognize Spain's cession of Louisiana to France, because of the terms of the treaty of 1763. Thus, she constituted a threat to America's claim to Louisiana. Her entrenchment in Canada made her by far the greatest danger to agrarian interests. The Western farmers, therefore, demanded resistance to England as the solution of their market problem. On the other hand, fear of the West and economic dependence on England led the merchants and a small section of the slaveholders to continue to champion resistance to France and Spain.

In December, 1805, Jefferson addressed two messages to Congress. In an open message, he adopted a warlike tone toward Spain but in a secret message he explained that he believed peaceful negotiations possible if Congress would provide the means. His public utterances were meant to strengthen the hand of the government in negotiation. The French government had indicated to Jefferson that it could arrange the purchase of West Florida in return for trading rights favorable to France. Without stating his plans, since he knew that there were agents of foreign powers in Congress, Jefferson relied upon certain Republican Congressmen to introduce a bill providing funds to be used at the discretion of the Executive Department. The bill was passed after delay caused by both the Randolph Republicans and the Federalists. However, Jefferson's diplomacy failed, because Federalist Congressmen revealed all the secret proceedings of Congress to the same Spanish Ambassador who had been financing Burr. Not until 1810 was the West Florida dispute finally settled by annexation, following the overthrow of the Spanish Government of that area by the American settlers who formed nine-tenths of its population.

In March, 1806, after furious debates, Congress passed the first of its many measures threatening economic retaliation on Britain. It warned that all importation of certain British goods would cease after nine months unless British aggression on the seas should stop. Meanwhile, James Monroe and William Pinckney were instructed to seek satisfaction from England through negotiation. But the treaty finally sent to Jefferson by Monroe and Pinckney was as humiliating as that of Jay in 1795, and Jefferson, with anger such as he rarely showed, rejected it without even showing it to Congress. He demanded that Monroe proceed on the basis of his original instructions. Monroe's capitulation to England reflected his temporary flirtation with the Randolph Republicans.

In the midst of these conflicts with foreign aggressors, the conspiracy of Aaron Burr was finally exposed. For some time before his message to Congress in December, 1806, Jefferson had been receiving rumors of Burr's mysterious conduct in the West. In fact, Burr had been brought prematurely to trial by a

Federalist attorney in Kentucky before sufficient evidence had been collected, and with young Henry Clay as his lawyer Burr had been acquitted. However, Jefferson warned the governors of the Western states and territories of the danger of an insurrection, and sent a member of the State Department on Burr's trail with authority to arrest him when the opportunity seemed ripe. In his annual message, Jefferson informed Congress of the conspiracy and of the steps already taken for its suppression.

The final exposure of Burr came from his chief accomplice. Finding that Burr had exaggerated the strength of his support, General Wilkinson, posing as the loyal defender of his country, played traitor to treason, and exposed the plot to Jefferson. Shortly afterwards, Burr was seized by military authorities in Mississippi and brought for trial before the District Federal Court, at Richmond, Virginia.

The Federalist judiciary and the lawyers for Burr's defense sought to convert the trial of Burr during the fall of 1807 into a trial of Jefferson. From the time of his arrest, Federalists pretended indignation that the former Vice-President had been "hunted by Jefferson and his ragamuffins," as they called the army of the United States, and "dragged through the country like a horse thief."<sup>8</sup> Federalist newspapers alleged that Jefferson, for personal motives, was persecuting an innocent man. While awaiting trial in Richmond, a trading center for the plantation area and a Federalist stronghold, Burr was wined and dined like a visiting prince. Chief Justice Marshall himself attended a banquet in honor of the traitor whom he was shortly to try. But popular feeling was quite different. There was extreme difficulty in selecting a jury because one prospective juror after another expressed the opinion that Burr should be hanged. Throughout the trial, Marshall permitted the grossest attacks on the government. He issued a subpoena for Jefferson to appear as a witness, but Jefferson with a sharp rebuke to the Chief Justice refused to comply.

Over one hundred witnesses with indisputable evidence of Burr's guilt were assembled by the prosecution. Their evidence has subsequently been confirmed by documents in the possession

of the British, French, Spanish, and Mexican governments. Yet Marshall overruled two of his own previous decisions by a definition of treason which ruled out of court all the evidence assembled by the prosecution. In a former trial, that of Swartwout and Bollman, two of Burr's accomplices who had been dismissed, Marshall had delivered the opinion that "If a body of men be actually assembled for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable purpose, all those who perform any part, however minute, or however remote from the scene of the action, and who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors."<sup>9</sup> Laboriously, Marshall reversed this decision in the trial of Burr by maintaining that only if there was an "overt act," actual presence at the spot where actions against the government occurred and at the moment of the occurrence, was there proof of treason.

The stories of the more than one hundred witnesses were all consistent and have never been shaken. The facts that arms were collected, that an army was formed, that Burr was the leader of the whole movement, that foreign powers were involved, that the aim was to separate the West from the Union, conquer Mexico, establish a new empire, and overthrow the government of the United States were indisputable. Yet no one had evidence of the commission by Burr of an overt act of treason as defined by Marshall. The authorities had not waited for him to strike. Hence, all the evidence assembled by the prosecution was ruled out of court. The jury brought in a verdict, declaring: "We the jury say that Aaron Burr is not proved guilty under this indictment by any evidence submitted to us. We therefore find him not guilty." The unusual wording of the jury's decision, as the Federalists indignantly recognized, indicated that the jury considered Marshall's procedure highly irregular.

The action of Marshall, triumphantly acclaimed by Federalists, indicates how fully his own party was permeated with treason. Although there are no grounds for believing that Marshall, a bourgeois nationalist of the Hamiltonian school, was a partner to the conspiracy, he certainly realized that a conviction of Burr would lead to the downfall of his party by exposing

how it was literally honeycombed with treason. Thus, Marshall placed party politics above devotion to his country.

Charges of the commission of overt acts in Mississippi and Ohio were afterwards brought against Burr and Blennerhassett. However, the two conspirators broke bail and escaped to Europe, where for some years they vainly sought to sell their treason to one European power after another. However, they were no longer of any value even to the enemies of their country.

Although this particular conspiracy was frustrated in 1806-07, Federalists continued to cherish its aims. They bided their time, and, in the very midst of war for national existence in 1812, they sought to achieve that program by working for the defeat of their country. The Hartford Convention of 1814 was the final culmination of all the many counter-revolutionary plots launched against the government of the United States during Jefferson's administrations.

## CHAPTER X

### JEFFERSONIAN PLANS FOR FUTURE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

WHILE treason was being exposed and its aims frustrated, the Jeffersonian administration uninterruptedly pursued its policy of peaceful national development. Jefferson's message to Congress in December, 1806, contained a report of the Lewis and Clark expedition, which had returned from its transcontinental tour to the Oregon coast. Holding forth the prospect of great riches in natural resources in the West, Jefferson enunciated a program of broad, long-range internal development. Unable to foresee the effects of future industrial growth, with its looting of the Public Domain, its encouragement of immigration, and its impoverishment and ruination of the small producers, Jefferson expected that sufficient land lay to the West to

supply the majority of the people with farms of their own for "the thousandth and thousandth generation," as he had declared in his first Inaugural Address. To this development of small-scale farming he ever looked as the guarantee for democracy.

Jefferson held that the national economy necessarily consisted of agriculture, industry, and commerce. Though he urged the encouragement of all, he maintained that industry and commerce should be regarded as handmaidens to agriculture, which was fundamental. While at the time of the Revolution he had expressed hostility to the development of industry, the long struggle with Britain caused him to see the necessity for stimulating native industry as the means of preserving independence. However, he warned against concentrated industrial development in big cities, as in England. Seeking to prevent the expropriation and thus the proletarianization of the small producers, Jefferson advocated the encouragement of small, scattered enterprises employing artisan labor. This was in fact the stage of development for which American small commodity production was then ripe.

To stimulate production and the development of national unity, Jefferson urged an extensive program of internal improvements. Rejecting any proposal to lower tariffs as an aid to foreign powers, he recommended that the Treasury surplus and the growing proceeds from the tariff be used for education, for roads, canals, and other waterways. "By these operations," he declared, "new channels of communication will be opened between the States; the lines of separation will disappear, their interests will be identified, and their union cemented by new and indissoluble ties."<sup>1</sup>

As a public educational project, Jefferson advocated the founding of a national university, whose aim should be primarily the development of the natural sciences, such as was not to be found in private institutions.

State governments had for some time been contributing to the construction of roads, and many requests had come to the Federal Government for similar aid. Many maintained that Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, granting Congress the power to establish post roads, to raise and support armies, and



to regulate commerce, gave sufficient constitutional power. Jefferson, however, proposed an amendment, emphasizing the need for continuous revision of the Constitution to meet new problems.

Jefferson's proposals show clearly that the slaveholder Democrats who, after the War of 1812, began to block all proposals of Federal aid for internal improvements were not following the pathway projected by Jefferson. Because of his stand on internal development, the Jeffersonian party received support from the rising manufacturers as well as from small producers. The Federalists, still concerned with overseas trade, scoffed at Jefferson's plans. They tried to portray the land beyond the Mississippi as uninhabitable and worthless, and they ridiculed his proposals for national growth as the pipe-dreams of a philosopher.

The contract with Ohio for the construction of roads with funds obtained from sales of public land in that state enabled the Jeffersonians to undertake the construction of the first national turnpike. On March 29, 1806, Congress voted to build a road from the East to Ohio. In 1811, work commenced on the famous Cumberland Road connecting Ohio with Cumberland, Maryland. The road reached Ohio in 1830, and was steadily continued through Ohio and Indiana until by 1852 it extended to Vandalia, Illinois. This National Pike became one of the main avenues to the West.

Discussions over transportation led to a detailed report on the subject by Gallatin in the spring of 1808. Gallatin recommended the construction of canals through the many peninsulas jutting into the Atlantic, a turnpike to follow the Atlantic Coast from Maine to Georgia, four roads across the mountains to connect the headwaters of the eastern with those of the western rivers, improvement of the rivers for navigation, roads from Pittsburgh to Detroit, St. Louis, and New Orleans, and a whole series of canals. This report laid the foundation for many subsequent Congressional debates.

Experimentation had been in progress for some time for the use of steamboats, and, in 1807, Robert Fulton made his successful voyage up the Hudson in the *Clermont*. However, not

until after the War of 1812 did the new method of transport come into extensive use.

Struggles of wage-earners in America aroused national attention for the first time in 1806. Following a strike for higher wages in Philadelphia during that year, journeymen shoemakers were sentenced by Federalist judges on the charge of "a combination and conspiracy to raise wages." The law on which they were sentenced was a part of the British common law, dating from the period when prices and wages were regulated by both masters and journeymen in the guilds.

The cause of the shoemakers was championed by the Jeffersonians, who challenged the Federalist Judiciary on the fundamental issue of the right to apply the British common law in America. It was the Republican contention that this law had been swept away by the Revolution, and that American democracy must make its own laws. Thus, the rights of the shoemakers were seen as one with the rights of the whole American people in their defense of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The issue was one of sweeping away all the legal remnants of Old World feudalism. In fiery articles, the decision against the wage-earners was denounced by the leading Jeffersonian paper, the *Aurora*. The Republican lawyers who defended the workers pointed ironically to the growing combinations of merchants and employers for the purpose of raising profits. Thus, the Jeffersonian party championed the cause of the rising working class.

From the beginning the emerging proletariat in America found bourgeois-democratic liberties at hand, through which it could organize and struggle legally. In its early fights, the workers were by no means isolated. They found allies among virtually the whole people, and the party in power came to their aid. The rising working class of no other land found similar freedom or support.

So popular was the cause of the journeymen that when again in 1809 striking shoemakers were brought to trial on the same charge, the Federalist judges changed their procedure. No longer did they pronounce as criminal the effort to raise wages, but they sentenced the journeymen for seeking a legal end



through means which they pronounced illegal—striking, picketing, and circulating scab lists. The light fine imposed—one dollar plus costs—reflected the strength of popular indignation.

Historians, following the Federalist tradition, have made much over Jefferson's opposition to the rise of a city proletariat, trying to create the false impression that Jeffersonian democracy was hostile to the working class. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Jefferson's opposition to a proletariat was, in no sense, that of class hatred. It was only within his party that wage-earners found their interests represented. Jefferson sought to prevent impoverishment of the small producers, to save them from the disaster of loss of property. In his day, no one had foreseen the future role of the industrial working class as the revolutionary force for the establishment of a new and higher society. To Jefferson and the small producers generally, the condition of the proletariat was a calamity, as indeed it was—hence, something to be avoided. All that Jefferson could see in the city proletariat was suffering, poverty, brutalization, political subjugation to employers, the loss of that material security which alone could make democracy real. Hence, in advocating industrial development he favored small industries employing craft workers.

This was ever the program of the farmers and artisans threatened with ruination by the rise of capitalist industry. The struggles of the small producers against proletarianization kept alive the struggle for freedom, protected the people from the full savagery of the capitalist offensive, made possible the more rapid settlement of the West, and protected the material base for the exercise of democracy.

In no sense can the Jeffersonian program be compared to such fanatical agrarianism as that of the Russian Populists<sup>2</sup> of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Russian Populists put forth a purely agrarian program after a highly concentrated, organized, and militant proletariat had already arisen, after the theory of scientific socialism had been developed, at a time when Marxist parties were being formed. Their antiquated program sought to turn back history. Jeffersonian democracy, during the dawn of capitalist industry in America,

consistently sought to advance history by championing the cause of the progressive small producers of the day. At the same time, Jefferson never proposed imprisoning the future within the limitations of any specific program designed for the needs of one age. "Each generation," he declared, "is as independent of the preceding, as that was of all which had gone before. It has then, like them, a right to choose for itself the form of government it believes most promotive of its own happiness; consequently, to accommodate to the circumstances in which it finds itself, that received from its predecessors; and it is for the peace and good of mankind, that a solemn opportunity of doing this every nineteen or twenty years, should be provided by the Constitution."<sup>3</sup>

Jefferson's was a program consistent with the aims of the small producers, namely, to maintain liberty and security for all, to avoid the enslavement of any. That program voiced those democratic aspirations which the proletariat shares with all other exploited classes. This is why the industrial working class, upon arising as an independent class, has been able to elaborate and pursue its own specific class aims under the general banner of Jeffersonian democracy. The struggle for democracy is the struggle which enables the working class to form alliances with all other exploited classes.

Consistent in his program of freedom for all, in his message of 1806 Jefferson recommended legislation to abolish the African slave trade by the end of 1807. Since his youth, he had regarded this as the first step toward the abolition of slavery as a whole. However, the Constitution had prohibited any interference with this trade before 1808.

"I congratulate you, fellow-citizens," he declared in this message, "on the approach of the period at which you may interpose your authority constitutionally, to withdraw the citizens of the United States from all further participation in those violations of human rights which have been so long continued on the unoffending inhabitants of Africa, and which the morality, the reputation, and the best interests of our country, have long been eager to proscribe."<sup>4</sup>

On March 2, 1807, Congress passed the law prohibiting the

African slave trade after the end of the year. The slaveholders were divided on this issue. Those of the slave-breeding states of the upper South supported the new law in the interest of maintaining high prices for slaves. Those of the lower South, where the plantation system was expanding most rapidly, were anxious for the continuance of the African traffic for this meant cheap prices for slaves. It was an open secret that the planters of the lower South planned to violate the law by smuggling. Consequently the debates in Congress revolved more around the question of what to do with slaves illegally imported than around measures for enforcing the law. For many years, the law remained largely a dead letter. Slave ships generally bore the Spanish flag, and smuggling occurred through the Spanish ports of Fernandino and Galveston and the adjacent Indian territory. The Federal officials in the South made almost no efforts to prevent this traffic or to bring smugglers to punishment. Not until 1818 was an act passed providing for more serious enforcement.

Jefferson's endeavors to secure internal reforms were again interrupted during the summer of 1807. The British attack on the *Chesapeake*, a vessel of the United States Navy, constituted an act of war which, together with other instances of aggression, forced his administration to devote most of its energies thereafter to national defense.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1807-1811

BRITISH aggression on the high seas during the period preceding the War of 1812 formed only one aspect of the general British onslaught against the young American nation. Although the diplomatic controversy with England centered

mainly around the outrages committed at sea, there lay behind the issues raised officially between the two governments general recognition of British preparations for an attack against her lost colonies on all fronts. Misled by the diplomatic controversies and the Federalist accounts of events, many historians have puzzled vainly over the question as to why the United States finally chose to declare war upon England when France was equally aggressive at sea.

The very fact that it was the agrarian classes and not the shipping interests which pressed for economic retaliation and finally for war against England indicates that it was not solely over interference with overseas commerce that the conflict with England raged. America was attacked by both Britain and France at sea, but she was threatened by Britain on land. This explains both why England was recognized as the main danger and why it was the agrarian classes which pressed for resistance.

The small farmers and slaveholders—especially in the Mississippi Valley—were not concerned with protecting the “Yankee” merchants’ trade. However, they had a stake in overseas commerce themselves, and were definitely anxious to keep the sea lanes open for their surplus crops.

Prior to the attack on the *Chesapeake*, Britain had proclaimed a blockade of the European continent, and Napoleon had replied through the Berlin Decree of November, 1806, with a blockade of England. Neither blockade had been stringently enforced at sea, though each power claimed the right to seize neutral vessels. Through military force, Napoleon frightened one European power after another into closing its ports to British trade. This made England dependent upon American commerce as never before. Determined that France should not benefit from American trade, and relying on the economic dependence of the Federalist merchants upon her market and credit, England sought to regulate American shipping to her own advantage. America was still in a semi-colonial position economically in relation to England, and Britain issued orders as though America was an actual colony. Britain’s first Order in Council in 1807 forbade neutrals to trade between any ports controlled by Napoleon. Between 1803 and 1807, 528 American ships were

seized by England and 389 by France. But in spite of these losses, the total volume of American commerce steadily increased.<sup>1</sup>

Britain's blockade of Europe, by restricting the market for American goods, greatly lowered the prices for cotton, tobacco, hemp, and other farm produce. The inability of Western farmers to meet their payments on land purchased from the Federal Government reflected how England's policy was depressing the economic life of the agrarian population of America. The mercantile Federalists, hating the West, were willing either to surrender to Britain's demands as long as they could continue trade with England or to take their chances in running the blockade. However, British plots against the West caused the bulk of farmers and planters to demand resistance to England. These classes were concerned with far more than the overseas commerce.

While Louisiana had been acquired peacefully from Napoleon, American possession of that area was challenged by England on the basis of the Peace of 1763, which forbade Spain ever to cede it to another power. It became clear to the United States that British occupation of Louisiana at the end of the Napoleonic wars was almost certain. Not only did England lay claim to Louisiana but she violated American sovereignty over the region between the Appalachians and the Mississippi, and thus challenged American power over the whole Mississippi Valley.

Britain was entrenched in Canada, from which she organized Indian wars in the Trans-Allegheny area. In the Floridas, British agents as well as Spanish authorities incited Indian attacks. Through the organization of the Indian Confederation of Tecumseh, Britain succeeded in uniting Indian tribes from Canada to the Floridas around the program of driving the American settlers east of the Alleghenies. The very existence of this movement made every hour on the frontier one of terror. Its success would have driven a British wedge into the very center of American soil, separating the seaboard states from Louisiana, which could then more easily have been occupied.

As another step toward achieving her vast scheme, Britain

planned to occupy the Floridas, over which the hold of Spain was weakening. The occupation of the Floridas and Louisiana would have encircled the nation with military bases, which, in conjunction with the Tecumseh movement in the Trans-Allegheny region, could have been used as a means for reducing the United States to the narrow coastal area east of the Appalachians. Moreover, British conspiracies with Federalists for the secession of the Northeast could have resulted in the reduction of the United States to the Southern seaboard states, which could easily have been subjugated. British attacks at sea were merely one phase of the general endeavor to render the United States impotent before the British offensive.

Such was the grand strategy of British aggression. It coincided completely with the aims of the old Burr conspiracy, and Britain relied upon the Federalist Party within America as one of the main instruments for its realization. Thus, the very existence of the United States as an independent nation was threatened by Britain. French attacks on American shipping were annoying, but they could not threaten national existence.

Nothing so aroused the Western frontiersmen as Britain's organization of the Tecumseh movement. It was the policy of the Republican administration to establish friendly relations with the Indians, although American fur traders, trappers, and frontier settlers constantly violated the policy of their government. The administration sought to secure all lands by reciprocal treaties with the Indians. In return for lands, annual donations of certain commodities were sent the tribes, and agents were dispatched by the government to establish and maintain friendly relations, although local authorities constantly secured treaties through fraud. In spite of this, many of the Indian chiefs were friendly to the American leaders during the administrations of both Jefferson and Madison. There were indications that the tribes might be weaned away from British and Spanish influence. Britain's aim in supporting the organization of Tecumseh's Confederation was to prevent the growth of peaceful and friendly relations between Indians and Americans.

Loose confederations among Indian tribes for the purpose of fighting for hunting lands had long existed, long before white

settlers penetrated America. As white traders introduced commodity exchange among the Indians, these confederations, if permitted peaceful growth, could have given rise to national development among the Indians. However, efforts among the great powers to utilize Indian confederations against the independence of the United States made this impossible. Had the United States undertaken to support an Indian confederation on territory whose boundaries she would have respected and protected, had she been able clearly to demonstrate friendliness in such a practical way, she might have formed an alliance to the mutual advantage of both the Indians and herself. However, the hatred for Indians fostered among the American people by their whole history prevented the realization of such a policy.

Following the conclusion of treaties between the United States and the Indians for the cession of lands in Indiana Territory during 1804-05, two Shawnee warriors, Tecumseh, the Crouching Panther, and his twin brother, the Prophet, launched a movement which challenged the authority of the chieftains within the old forms of tribal organization. Under British guidance, Tecumseh advocated among the warriors the formation of a vast confederation of all the tribes from Canada to the Floridas. He proposed a territorial organization resembling a republic to supplant the supremacy of the tribes. The chieftains were to be replaced by a class of warriors, ruling throughout the confederation. Opposition to the chieftains was based upon their friendliness with the government agents of the United States. The aim of the confederation was to drive the pioneers from their settlements.

The Prophet was the orator of this British-inspired movement. Claiming to have been raised from the dead and to be in constant touch with the Great Spirit through the sun and other forces of nature, he warned of the extermination of the Indians unless they resisted the American settlers. He threatened supernatural destruction through earthquakes and lightning for those tribes which did not join the league. Protection by the Great Spirit would be the lot of those who joined. Other "prophets" arose in the various tribes to become local leaders for the new confederation.

In 1805, Tecumseh and his followers occupied the lands of Tippecanoe Creek where it enters the Wabash, and here they established Prophets' Town. Warriors from many tribes subsequently assembled at Tippecanoe, and the British sent great supplies of arms from Fort Malden in Canada.

Bitter internal conflicts, meanwhile, had been raging within the territory of Indiana between the pro-slavery and anti-slavery forces. Under the leadership of Governor William Henry Harrison, a Virginian by birth, the advocates of slavery had sought to violate the Northwest Ordinance. Slaves had been imported into the territory and slavery virtually legalized by a series of indenture laws. However, the majority of small settlers finally defeated the efforts to make slavery legal in Indiana. Harrison, at the end of the conflict, was bitterly hated by the people of his territory. Partially to restore his political fortunes, he undertook after 1807 a rapid expansion in the Northwest through a series of Indian treaties.

A treaty of cession signed by certain chieftains with Governor Hull at Detroit in 1807 was the signal for agitation by the prophets to kill the chieftains who had concluded the treaties. This agitation coincided with the British attack on the *Chesapeake* and was certainly not disconnected from that event.

During the summer of 1807, the British *Leopard* stopped the *Chesapeake*, a vessel of the United States Navy. When the captain of the *Chesapeake* refused to permit a search, the British opened fire, knowing that the *Chesapeake* was not fitted out to fight. Three men were killed and eighteen wounded, while four seamen were seized by the British, only one of whom proved to be a deserter from a British ship. This was the first time Britain had attacked a vessel of the United States Navy.

Jefferson at once sent London a demand for apology and reparations. By proclamation, he ordered all British armed vessels from American waters, forbade the entry of any ships except those bearing dispatches, ordered that no provisions be supplied to any British boats, and commanded that the coastal defense be strengthened and all state and national armed forces be held in readiness. As news came of increased British agitation among the Northwest Indians, the governors of Ohio, Indiana and Mich-

igan were instructed to attack whatever tribes put on warpaint. The nation flamed with the anger of '76. Huge demonstrations against Britain occurred throughout the country, and British sailors were handled roughly.

Britain's arrogance indicated a deliberate effort to provoke an unprepared war as a means of destroying American trade, and effecting the conquest of the United States. Refusing to be provoked, Jefferson and his Cabinet determined upon peaceful negotiations. Monroe, as Ambassador to Britain, was instructed to demand "the entire abolition of impressment," as well as reparations. In the event of British refusal, he was ordered to return to the United States after instructing all American vessels to leave British ports. Britain refused to make the end of impressment a condition for settlement, whereupon Monroe left London.

In November, 1807, Britain issued a second Order in Council, the most arrogant of all her demands. All neutral ships bound for any port between Copenhagen and Trieste were ordered to enter British ports and pay duties or be seized. Napoleon replied to this with the Milan Decree forbidding any neutral vessel, on pain of seizure, to obey Britain's second Order in Council.

Thus, in 1807, there was open season on the high seas on all neutral vessels. American ships, caught between a criss-cross fire, were seized coming and going. If they submitted to England, they were attacked by France. If they refused submission, they were attacked by England.

Continuance of overseas trade under these conditions meant surrender either to England or France or war with both powers. Surrender to either power meant war with the other, for which America was unprepared. To choose war with either aggressor meant not only facing the military might of a major power, but bitter opposition from within America. The young republic in 1807 faced the severest crisis in its national existence.

Jefferson was never a pacifist. He had not ignored the possibility of being forced to wage a war of national defense. While he had drastically reduced the standing army, commanded by the treasonable Federalists, he had supported the strengthening of the state militia as the best means of defense under the pre-

vailing conditions. He had strengthened the navy at the expense of Federalist ridicule; and against Federalist opposition he had secured the establishment of the United States Military Academy at West Point. However, he recognized the danger of war with a great power, and always regarded war as the last resort.

Carefully analyzing every possible course of action, Jefferson proposed the only peaceful solution—a total embargo on all foreign trade until one of the two powers should recognize American neutrality on the seas. Thus, America would preserve her wealth, much of which was being seized or destroyed; would avoid involvement in the conflicts of Europe, which did not then concern American national interests; and, through economic pressure, would attempt to force respect for American rights. Trade could thus become the bargaining point for a peaceful settlement of grievances. This Jefferson regarded as the democratic foreign policy of a nation having no aims of conquest. In the words of Claude G. Bowers, the embargo was presented as "a civilized substitute for war."<sup>2</sup> As Jefferson saw the problem, there were only two possible alternatives for democratic America—embargo or war.

The Embargo Act, on December 18, 1807, forbade all vessels from leaving for foreign ports. Every Federalist voted against it. John Randolph, a Republican leader, introduced the resolution, but voted against his own measure, because of his old pro-British policy. The slaveholders as a whole, however, supported it.

The Federalists, during this crisis, denounced their own government, defended Britain's actions, and openly called for abject surrender. Treason, more dangerous than that of Aaron Burr, became now their official program. After the passage of the embargo, the whole Federalist Party openly paraded its treason. Senator Timothy Pickering conferred throughout the Congressional debates with the British envoy Rose, and arranged for a secret correspondence with him when he returned to London. Rose was able to inform Prime Minister Canning that the Federalists possessed sufficient strength to make the embargo ineffectual. Pickering wrote a pamphlet, circulated by the tens of

thousands, in which, without mentioning the Orders in Council, he accused Jefferson of preventing a peaceful settlement with England and of being under orders of Napoleon. He justified and minimized impressment, openly called for defiance of the law and of the government, and advocated nullification of the law by states. On July 4, 1808, Federalists burned in effigy the President of their country, the author of its Declaration of Independence.

Extensive smuggling from the New England coasts and across the Canadian border commenced. Hooligan mobs were assembled to prevent officers from enforcing the law. State courts in New England declared the embargo unconstitutional, and not only refused to enforce it but sentenced officers who sought to do so. There were Federalist plots to organize sedition within the armed forces. In order to keep in constant touch with its "fifth column" in New England, Britain sent from Canada one of her paid spies, John Henry, a renegade Irishman, through whom messages were sent to London. All pretense of American loyalty had now been thrown to the winds. The shining lights of the party which once ruled so arrogantly now consciously worked with the professional spies of their country's bitterest foe.

All genuine nationalists within the Federalist Party now openly deserted it. John Quincy Adams, the son of John Adams, long alarmed at the treasonable conduct of his party, wrote a biting denunciation of Pickering's pamphlet, and in 1808 took his seat among the Republicans in the caucus that selected Madison as Jefferson's successor. Even among the wealthy merchants there were defections from the Federalist Party. William Gray of Salem, Massachusetts, a Patriot of '76, and one of the wealthiest and most powerful merchants, who had helped open the trade with the Far East, came forward staunchly in defense of Jefferson. As a result of their patriotism, Adams and Gray were venomously denounced by their colleagues, ostracized, and made the victims of the grossest slanders. These new recruits to the Republican Party did not abandon their former Federalist principles. They remained bourgeois nationalists. But their party was now fully treasonable, and there was no party in which bourgeois

nationalists could function except the party of democracy. Such was the strength of democracy in 1807.

On the other hand, there were defections and waverings within the Republican Party. While the people of New England burned Pickering and his cohorts in effigy and threatened them with physical violence, some of the Jeffersonian politicians weakened before the Federalist onslaught. Governor Sullivan and Lieutenant Governor Levi Lincoln of Massachusetts, taking advantage of their right to license imports of food for immediate home consumption, permitted vast quantities of goods to enter their ports for smuggling to England. The Secretary of the Navy, Robert Smith, a wealthy merchant, failed to fulfill his duties until sharply called to task by Jefferson. General Dearborn, the Secretary of War, whom Jackson had suspected of complicity with Burr, wished to resign, but his resignation was rejected.

The embargo resulted in suffering for all classes who depended upon a foreign market. As a means of alleviating the distress of the farmers, relief laws were passed permitting extension of credit for those owing payments for public land. Federalists were able to arouse some whimpering here and there. But only the merchants refused as a class to sacrifice for the nation's safety.

While there was hardship, there were also gains. For the first time since the formation of the republic, native industries began to thrive. Industrial capitalists solidly supported the embargo and the Jeffersonian party. Woolen and clothing factories, paper mills, iron works, and numerous light industries sprang up on every hand, not only in New England, but in the Middle Atlantic states and in North Carolina. In some instances, capital began to flow into industry from commerce. Industrial development, vainly sought by Hamilton, received its first big impetus after the Revolution from the Jeffersonian embargo.

The chances of forcing a change of policy in England seemed bright in 1808. The British manufacturers, deprived of raw materials and markets, brought tremendous pressure upon their government for abandonment of the Orders in Council. So did the working class, thrown into unemployment by the closing



of mills at the moment when prices were soaring. One-third of Britain's foreign trade was lost through the embargo. Only the mercantile interests supported the Orders in Council as a means of ruining their American rivals.

In the midst of the struggles over the embargo, the election of 1808 occurred. Efforts to get Jefferson to accept a third term were fruitless. Fearing that the precedent of long terms in office might play into monarchist hands, he followed the example set by Washington. His own choice for a successor was Madison, and the vast majority of his party concurred in his preference. Randolph's group ran Monroe in opposition. For a while, to Monroe's own embarrassment, the Federalists toyed with the thought of backing him. They recalled his failure to follow Jefferson's instructions in negotiating the treaty with England and also undoubtedly hoped to take advantage of his opportunistic tendencies and somewhat fanatical adherence to states' rights. But he and his supporters were too clearly democratic and hostile to the commercial interests. The Federalists ran their former candidates, Charles C. Pinckney and Rufus King.

The Jeffersonian majority declined. This reflected the suffering caused by the embargo. The Federalists had been able to exaggerate the extent of the distress and to obscure for some the desperate need for economic sacrifice. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority endorsed Jefferson's policy by voting for Madison. Delaware and Connecticut remained Federalist. Three New England states—Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire—slipped back into the Federalist fold by a slight margin. All the other states cast a majority of votes for the Republican candidate. In only two of these were there a few electoral votes for the Federalists. Nearly two-thirds of the total electoral vote went to Madison.

Despite this popular endorsement of the embargo, many Republican politicians began to waver before the Federalist offensive. They disregarded Jefferson's opinion that, unless the nation persevered in its economic pressure, war would be the outcome. Jefferson called for strict measures for enforcement, which were passed. He proposed a decision to continue the embargo at least until June, and urged a special session of Congress in May to

discuss further procedure. However, as Governor Trumbull and the Massachusetts legislature both called for open defiance of the embargo, the Northern Republicans beat a retreat. Military events in Europe had meanwhile opened Spanish markets to England.

During the last days of Jefferson's administration, Congress repealed the embargo, and passed a Non-Intercourse Act, which went into effect on March 4. This act reopened trade with all countries except England and France, and gave the President power to reopen trade with either belligerent which would abandon its restrictive measures. Thus, the possibility of indirect trade with the belligerents was reopened, and American vessels were again permitted to become prey on the high seas. War now loomed more ominously on the horizon.

It was not the embargo that failed in 1809. It was the Republicans who failed in the strength and determination required for putting it fully to the test. "A sudden and unaccountable revolution of opinion took place the last week, chiefly among the New England and New York members, and in a kind of panic they voted the 4th of March for removing the embargo," wrote Jefferson to his son-in-law. "This, too, was after we had become satisfied that the Essex Junto had found their expectation desperate, of inducing the people there either to separation or forcible opposition."<sup>8</sup>

Jefferson retired to his beloved Monticello in the midst of this great national crisis. His administration had saved the nation from dismemberment and destruction, doubled its size, preserved democracy from counter-revolution, effected many democratic reforms, improved the material well-being of the people, pointed the pathway to future democratic reforms and to future national development. Although retiring from active public life, Jefferson helped to guide the nation through four subsequent administrations. His closest disciple and colleague succeeded him. Monroe, who followed Madison, abandoned his flirtation with Randolph and continued to be Jefferson's close follower. Both Madison and Monroe were his neighbors and friends in Virginia, and, throughout their administrations, they were in constant consultation with their great predecessor. Many were



the gatherings of the three leaders at Monticello. The American republic felt the guiding hand of Jefferson for the next sixteen years. From that day on, every movement for freedom, enlightenment, and well-being for the people in America has continued the fight for the far-reaching aims of Jeffersonian democracy.

Madison's first administration was devoted to efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict with England. Yet after the repeal of the embargo, the only alternatives which remained, as Jefferson had warned, were submission or war.

The divisions in the Republican Party which crystallized in 1808 continued throughout the ensuing period. Those Republicans who had opposed the embargo prevented Madison from appointing the Cabinet he desired. The only member of Madison's original Cabinet who proved to be a staunch Republican was Albert Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury. All other members had to be removed for inefficiency sooner or later in the course of the conflict with England.

Through tricky diplomacy, England succeeded in betraying Madison into abandoning the non-intercourse policy. Acting on instructions from London, the British Ambassador Erskine gave the President assurance that England was ready to stop the application of the Orders in Council to the United States if America would reopen trade with England while continuing non-intercourse with France. On the basis of this solemn promise, Madison issued a proclamation repealing non-intercourse with Britain after June 10, 1809. On July 25, however, the British Ambassador was recalled to England, and London disavowed the agreement he had made with Madison. By that time whole fleets of boats bound for England had already left American ports. While the old Orders in Council were repealed, new ones were issued.

Upon learning of Britain's perfidy, the ships of the Northeastern merchants lost no time in leaving port for England before a new proclamation could restrain them. Two weeks later, Madison issued an order reviving non-intercourse.

In September, a new ambassador from England arrived. One of the most arrogant of Tory diplomats, Francis James Jackson is remembered for his remark that all Americans were alike

"except that some few are less knaves than others!"<sup>4</sup> Jackson had instructions to offer no reasons for England's disavowal of Erskine's promises and to make no offers; he was merely to listen to American offers. With such high-handed instructions, he proceeded in the most insolent manner. Madison discontinued all communication with him. Jackson then issued, in the form of a circular letter to the British consuls, what amounted to a crude appeal to the American people over the heads of their government. Upon this, Madison exposed the arrogance of Great Britain by publishing the diplomatic correspondence with Jackson. The Federalists consistently defended Jackson as the victim of the Republicans.

At this point, the Republicans attempted through tempting offers to secure from Britain and France the repeal of the orders and decrees affecting American trade. After bitter debates, a bill was passed which reopened free trade with England and France until March 3, 1811. It made the offer that if either power should repeal its orders or decrees, non-intercourse was to be revived against the other if at the end of three months the other power had not repealed its restrictions. For England, this act, which had no teeth, meant nothing. It left her free to trade with America, and she relied on her navy—not on American law—to prevent trade with France. For Napoleon, whose country was subject to blockade and weaker on the seas, the situation was different. Napoleon declared that he would revoke the application of the Berlin and Milan decrees to the United States on November 1, 1810, if by that time Britain had repealed her Orders in Council or the United States had taken steps to cause America's "rights to be respected by the English." On November 2, Madison served warning on Great Britain that if the Orders in Council was not repealed before February 2, 1811, non-intercourse with the British Empire would immediately be revived.

During this period, while Congress was vainly attempting to continue overseas commerce and to maintain peace, military conflict was taking place in Florida. Movements for independence from Spain in the Latin American colonies, inspired by the example of the United States, had been growing during the Na-

poleonic wars. The fall of the Spanish monarchy and the establishment of Joseph Bonaparte on the throne of Spain in 1810 was the signal for revolts throughout Spanish America. These nationalist and democratic revolutions were hailed in the United States, for the establishment of Latin American republics spelled the end of the menace from Spain. Americans living in the Floridas and in Mexico supported the revolutionary movements, and subsequently an army of eight hundred and fifty Americans, largely from the Mississippi Valley, volunteered for service in the cause of Mexican independence.<sup>9</sup>

Britain, for her own imperial interests, also supported the revolutionary movements against Napoleonic Spain. While British aid rendered easier the overthrow of Spanish power, it constituted a potential menace to the United States, especially in Florida.

In the summer of 1810, the people of West Florida, nine-tenths of them American, raised a lone star flag and issued a Declaration of Independence. In September, they overthrew the Spanish government at Baton Rouge and appealed to Madison for annexation to the United States. Madison immediately proclaimed the territory annexed to Orleans. Governor Claibourne was dispatched with troops to assist the revolutionists, and very soon power passed from Spain to the United States throughout practically all of West Florida except the city of Mobile.

Unable to obtain reinforcements from the Napoleonic regime in Spain, with which Spanish ruling circles in America were at odds, the Spanish governor offered to surrender both Floridas to the United States unless he received military aid by January 1, 1811. Congress thereupon ratified in secret session the annexation of West Florida. It issued a warning to Great Britain to refrain from attempts to occupy Florida, declaring, "The United States, under the peculiar circumstances of the existing crisis, cannot, without serious inquietude, see any part of the said territory pass into the hands of any foreign power." The President was authorized to take possession of any part of East Florida as soon as the local authorities requested it or in case of attempted occupation by a foreign power. With this authorization, Madison dispatched troops to the borders of Florida to

await developments. The officers in charge prepared to assist the revolutionists openly and General Matthews secretly gave them aid. However, subsequent obstruction from Northern Republicans hostile to Southern expansion prevented the annexation of East Florida until several years after the conclusion of the War of 1812.

While events were leading toward war on the Florida border, the country approached military conflict in the Northwest. In 1809, Harrison had secured from certain Indian chieftains the cession of the whole valley of the Wabash, the last hunting grounds that remained in Indiana Territory. The followers of Tecumseh immediately commenced preparations for war, though, during the winter of 1810 and 1811, each side bided its time.

Following the annexation of West Florida, a bill was introduced in Congress for the admission of the Orleans Territory as the state of Louisiana. To it was added the land west of the Pearl River, while the rest of West Florida was included within the Mississippi Territory. The proposal for admission of the first state from the Louisiana Territory was met by the Federalists with a new campaign of hatred against the West. Speaking of the danger of Congress being flooded by "foreigners" from beyond the Missouri and Red rivers, fifteen hundred miles from the seaboard interests, Senator Josiah Quincy declared that the admission of a state from "foreign" soil would make it the "duty" of the Northeastern states to prepare for secession—peacefully if possible, forcibly if necessary. With war approaching, Federalists threatened to assist the foreign foe by armed insurrection from within. By a very narrow vote, Louisiana was admitted as the eighteenth state. The Louisiana Constitution granted the suffrage to all white male citizens who had resided in their counties for one year and who had paid a tax or purchased land from the United States.

By February 2, 1811, the date set for the revival of non-intercourse with England unless the Orders in Council were repealed, no change in British policy had occurred. By this time, the country had expressed its desire for determined resistance to Britain even to the point of war. Large numbers of Re-

publicans who had wavered before British aggression were defeated in the Congressional elections of 1810 in favor of many young and militant Republicans, especially from the West and South, where the demand for war was heard increasingly. However, the new Congress did not convene until November of 1811. The defeated Congress in its "lame duck" session did not yield to the will of the nation but continued its temporizing policy, which had been so bitterly denounced. Long and confused debates occurred, in which the policy of the Federalists and Randolph Republicans was to stall for time. In spite of its threat of non-intercourse, Congress finally passed a bill providing merely for non-importation from Great Britain. Shipment of American goods to Britain was not forbidden.

During the embargo, exports had dropped from \$108,343,000 to \$22,430,000, and imports from \$138,500,000 to \$56,990,000. Following the repeal of the embargo, exports rapidly rose, amounting in 1811 to \$61,316,000. Imports, however, had continued to fall, reaching \$53,400,000 in 1811.<sup>8</sup> These figures indicate the economic basis for the mercantile opposition to all restrictions on trade. The failure of imports to rise reflects the growth of native industry and explains why the industrial capitalists, who supported the Republican Party, opposed total embargo and non-intercourse, yet favored non-importation.

With the adoption of the non-importation act against Britain, the eleventh Congress, to the relief of the country, adjourned. In addition to its confused bungling in respect to foreign policy, this Congress had, after long debates, refused to continue the National Bank, whose charter thus expired on March 4, 1811. A period of rapid expansion in state banks followed. The issuance of bank notes far in excess of specie holdings resulted in rapid inflation of the currency. The reduction of imports had reduced the government's revenue, and this necessitated the extension of the national debt, which steadily increased with the preparations for war.

In the spring of 1811, Tecumseh visited the Southwest. Here, the Chickasaws and Choctaws of the West, the Creek Confederation of the East, and the Seminoles on the Florida border were all being crowded by American pioneers from their lands.

Following the visit of Tecumseh, prophets, unknown to the chiefs, commenced active organization of the warriors, who were called "Red sticks" because of their weapons. Thus, in 1811, Indian warfare along the whole frontier from Canada to Florida threatened the American nation. Behind the Indians stood Britain and the Spanish authorities of Florida. While Tecumseh was in the South, sporadic outbreaks occurred in Indiana.

While conflicts over the Southwest and the Northwest deepened, renewal of trade with France resulted in a British attempt to blockade the American coast. Commodore John Rodgers was ordered to give protection to American ships with his frigate, the *President*. An encounter with the British *Little Belt* on May 16, 1811, resulted in a crushing defeat of the British vessel. The news of this victory at sea played a great role in bolstering American morale and in deepening the determination for armed resistance. This determination was strengthened by news of the schemes for Indian war throughout the West.

## CHAPTER XII

### PREPARATIONS FOR AN OFFENSIVE WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

THE War of 1812 commenced as an undeclared war on the part of Great Britain long before the United States openly recognized a state of war in its declaration of June 19, 1812. Violent aggression had continued sporadically on the seas and on the frontier since the conclusion of the American Revolution. It was intensified by the attack on the *Chesapeake* in 1807. American resistance began to assume armed form with the revolution in West Florida in 1810 and the defeat of the *Little Belt* by the *President* in 1811. Military action against the British-inspired Tecumseh Confederation finally began on a large scale in the fall of 1811.

During the elections to the twelfth Congress and prior to its first session in November, 1811, a fully nationalist program for armed resistance began to be elaborated. Spokesmen from the frontier, especially from Kentucky and Tennessee, advocated a military offensive both into Canada and Florida and the permanent annexation of these regions into the United States as the means of removing foreign aggressors from the borders of the United States. Some called for the annexation of Texas as well. Henry Clay of Kentucky and others, with romantic enthusiasm, envisioned the expansion of the United States over the entire North American continent from the Arctic to South America.

All advocates of war—slaveholders, manufacturers, farmers, artisans—at first paid lip service to the program for the annexation of Canada and Florida. Yet subsequent events proved that the only firm supporters to this program of annexation in both directions were the frontiersmen of Kentucky and Tennessee, subject to Indian attacks from both North and South, and dependent upon the ports of the Gulf.

Events proved that the war party was not united in its aims. Two classes with conflicting goals led the fight for war with Britain. The small farmers as a whole, particularly those in the Northwest, came out consistently for the seizure of Canada. While the slaveholders at first voiced this program also, subsequent developments proved that they advocated an attack on the Canadas purely as a military tactic. The planters, growing prosperous from cotton, no longer entertained any thought of emancipation, and they feared the admission of more free territory to the north. Growing numbers, therefore, began to champion the seizure of the Floridas and even of portions of Mexico in preference to a Northern offensive. The fear that annexation would result from a military campaign against Canada finally led many to oppose any military action whatsoever on the Canadian border. In their desire for seizures to the southwest, the slaveholders were supported by the small farmers of that area, although the Southwestern frontiersmen did not share the planters' hostility to the annexation of Canada. The Northern Republicans were becoming alarmed at the growth of slave-

holder power. Thus, many of them opposed a Southwestern offensive with a hostility almost equal to that of the planters in regard to Canada.

The degree to which opposition to Northern or Southern expansion was felt by slaveholders or Northern Republicans led a considerable group to oppose the whole war program of the frontiersmen. John Randolph voiced such sentiment in the South; DeWitt Clinton, in the North. This enabled the pro-British Federalists, numerically small in themselves, to find allies on the issue of the war both among sections of the middle class in the North and among certain slaveholders in the South. As the nation moved toward war, the complicated character of class conflicts became clearer. As the nation expanded to the west, as class differentiation increased, so the regional character of class conflicts became ever more pronounced. These conflicts obstructed and almost paralyzed the efforts of the "War Hawks" to achieve unity for the coming national war.

The existence of British military bases to the north of the Great Lakes made a Canadian invasion, as a military tactic, absolutely necessary. The frontiersmen saw the importance of defeating the enemy on enemy soil as a means of keeping the war outside the United States and of breaking the power of Britain on the North American continent. Only in Canada could America strike at Britain. The constant plots against the United States through incitement of the Indians were all organized in Canada. As a program for permanent peace and defense, it was necessary to destroy this last stronghold of America's most dangerous foe.

The program for the inclusion of Canada within the United States was as old as the movement for independence. There had been a military campaign for the liberation of Canada from British rule during the early days of the American Revolution, and in Canada there was widespread sympathy with the American cause. However, during the Revolution, British troops had been able to separate the thirteen colonies from their sister colonies to the north and to suppress revolutionary tendencies within those sparsely settled areas. The program for the extension of the Union to the north had never died.

In 1812, Canada was not a nation. National development occurred there only after the democratic struggle during the 1830's. Thus, the program for the annexation of Canada in 1812 was not for the subjugation of another nation but for the liberation of Canada and for its amalgamation into the American nation. Such amalgamation in 1812 could easily have occurred. It was regarded both in the United States and in Canada as advantageous to the Canadian people.<sup>1</sup>

The produce of many farmers found its way across the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes, but trade was restricted by English barriers. The belief had grown that Canada formed a natural part of the American home market and that trade outlets through the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes without British restrictions were necessary to those living on both sides of the border. Since the Canadian population was small, settlement by Americans would have deprived no one of land. In fact, the extension of American democracy to Canada could have brought cheap land on easy terms to the Canadian people themselves. The democratic forces of America rightfully believed that the interests of the Canadians coincided with those of the United States and that they should be a part of the American nation, enjoying all its rights. They regarded their program as one against the monarchist oppressors of Canada and for the extension of bourgeois democracy to their brothers to the north.

The revolutionary character of the "War Hawk" program was revealed by the statement in the Republican newspaper, the *Fredonian*, on April 8, 1812, that there would be no hope till "another WAYNE shall force them (savages) to become our friends, and another WASHINGTON exterminates from the Canadas, the base remains of royal perfidy."<sup>2</sup>

The administration apparently wavered for a time between the moderate Republicans, who favored continued negotiations with England, and the advocates of war. However, the elections to the twelfth Congress and the growing sentiment for a military offensive moved it in the direction of war. The administration stood fully for defense of both the North and the Southwest and for offensives in both directions. Yet subsequent events proved that while the administration clearly favored expansion

into Florida it regarded a Canadian campaign as a military tactic only. This reflected the growing influence of the slaveholders. To a far greater degree than Madison, James Monroe, the Secretary of State, seemed hostile to any permanent occupation of Canada.

As Indian outbreaks began in Indiana, while Tecumseh was in the South, Harrison, who had been looking for an opportunity to attack, led an armed force of regular troops and Kentucky volunteers toward Prophet's Town. On the night of November 7, he was suddenly attacked at his camp site. After a hard and bloody battle, the Indians were forced to retreat, whereupon Harrison also withdrew. This was the famous Battle of Tippecanoe, of which so much political capital was made in 1840. It was not a decisive encounter but was the first clash on the Northern frontier of what grew into the War of 1812. It intensified the frontiersmen's determination for war and for the seizure of Canada. It also helped break the Prophet's myth of supernatural power, and helped sway many of the warriors from their former allegiance to Britain's puppet league.

Three days before the Battle of Tippecanoe, the new twelfth Congress gathered in Washington. Among the "Young Republican" or "War Hawk" leaders were such men as Peter B. Porter of New York, John A. Harperry of New Hampshire, Felix Grundy of Tennessee, John Caldwell Calhoun of South Carolina, William Crawford of Georgia. Henry Clay of Kentucky, elected as speaker of the House, first came into national prominence as the "War Hawk" leader.

In response to Madison's message, Congress commenced preparations for war. The American Ambassador to England had already left, in despair of reaching a peaceful solution. Resolutions were introduced for enlarging the regular army, mobilizing an additional force of volunteers, placing state militia at the disposal of the President, putting the navy in readiness, and arming merchant vessels. Yet every step toward preparedness was obstructed by the friends of Britain in Congress—the Federalists and their new allies among the Republicans.

The Federalists maintained a sphinx-like silence in all Congressional debates, and voted *for* all the war measures. Their

strategy was twofold. First, they sought to create the impression that the "War Hawks" had deserted true Republican doctrines for Federalism. Thus, they hoped to deepen the split in the Republican ranks. Their silent and sinister support of every warlike measure helped to swell the ranks of the pro-British Republicans far more than would their open opposition to that program. They were aided in this by certain old Republicans, who tried dogmatically to bind the Republicans of 1811 to their anti-militarist program of 1798. These "old Republicans" sought to create the impression that there was now a conflict between young and old and that the youngsters were violating Jeffersonian principles. Had not the Democrats always fought standing armies, were they not opposed to taxes and a big national debt? Yet war meant taxes, debt, and an army and navy. The Federalists were shrewd enough not to voice these opinions themselves.

While they sat silently in Congress, the Federalists clearly voiced their second aim in secret conferences with the British Minister. They now *wanted* war with England as they were convinced that only British arms could destroy Republican power. By dividing the country at the moment of war, they hoped to assure British success, to discredit the Republicans so thoroughly as to assure a Federalist victory in the next elections, following which a Federalist administration would make a "solid peace" with England.<sup>3</sup>

The war measures were adopted, but they were so modified by amendments as to make enlistment unpopular, to intensify financial distress, and to make military conduct of the war ineffectual. The pro-British Republicans, in the face of defeat, tried to out-"War Hawk" the "War Hawks." They introduced amendments increasing the proposed enlargement of the regular army from 15,000 to 25,000 men and the length of enlistment from two to five years, with the provision that a full staff of officers be commissioned and paid whether the ranks of the army were filled or not. The obvious aim was to discourage enlistment and increase the national debt. Yet enough Republicans were hoodwinked to secure the passage of these amendments with certain restricting qualifications.

A provocative amendment was added to the bill for raising 50,000 volunteers. Each volunteer was to sign an oath that he was willing to serve outside the borders of the United States. This immediately precipitated a long Constitutional debate which resulted in the defeat of the amendment. This was exactly what the treasonable Congressmen who introduced the amendment wanted, for they all knew that full military success in the coming war would be decided in Canada and also, in all likelihood, in Spanish Florida. The defeat of this amendment enabled treasonable army officers in the course of the war to refuse to lead their volunteers across the Canadian border, thus leaving the war in Canada to be fought by small detachments of regulars. Had no amendment been introduced, volunteers could easily have been ordered across the frontiers.

A bill to establish a uniform national militia was defeated. As a result, the government had to depend upon state militias throughout the war. The lack of a centralized military command, which had proved such an obstacle during the Revolution, was perpetuated. States under Federalist and anti-war Republican administrations were able openly and legally to aid the foreign foe by withholding their militia from national service. It was impossible for the Federal Government to order state militia beyond the American border or even to command the militia within American territory.

A navy bill was passed, but it failed to authorize the building of more frigates or the construction of a dockyard. Following the passage of military measures, new taxes were adopted and a loan of \$11,000,000 at 6 per cent interest was authorized.

During February, 1812, letters fell into the hands of President Madison which proved conclusively the character of British intrigues in the United States and also that the Federalists were in alliance with the enemy of their country. The British spy, John Henry, who had conferred with New England Federalists, had not been paid the price he demanded in London. While brooding over his "grievance," he was approached by a "sympathetic" stranger, a French spy who had been trailing him. The Frenchman, upon wresting from him his tale of woe, persuaded Henry to offer his documents to Madison, thus hop-



ing of course to help Napoleon by further embroiling England with the United States. The aggrieved British spy jumped at the plan, and for \$50,000 sold his documents to Madison, who published them.

After the publishing of these revealing letters, one last effort for peace was made. On April 4, 1812, after supposedly secret debates, Congress imposed a total embargo on England for sixty days. During this period, Britain was given a last chance to repeal her orders. However, during the "secret" debates, Madison's foes in Congress informed commercial firms of the coming decision, so that vast quantities of goods were hurriedly shipped to England before the passage of the bill.

On the first of June, Britain's policy remained unchanged, and Madison, in a secret message, called for a declaration of war. On June 4, the House declared war. After two weeks of debate, the Senate did likewise.

The vote of 79 to 49 in the House revealed the deep class and regional divisions. The representatives of the Western states, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio, and of the Southern states, Georgia and South Carolina, voted unanimously for war. The border slave states, North Carolina, Virginia, and Maryland, cast large majorities for war, the Virginia vote being the largest. Pennsylvania voted for war by a very large majority, New Hampshire and Vermont by smaller majorities. The Congressmen from Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Delaware voted unanimously against the war. Small majorities voted against the war in Massachusetts and New Jersey, a large majority in New York.

Fully aware of the disunity provoked by Federalist treason, President Madison, in his Proclamation of War, issued on June 19, 1812, appealed to the people for unity. "I do moreover exhort," he urged, "all the good people of the United States, as they love their country, as they value the priceless heritage derived from the virtue and valor of their fathers, as they feel the wrongs which have forced on them the last resort of injured nations, and as they consult the best means under the blessing of Divine Providence of abridging its calamities, that they exert themselves in preserving order, in promoting concord, in main-

taining the authority and efficacy of the laws, and in supporting and invigorating all the measures which may be adopted by the constituted authorities for obtaining a speedy, a just, and an honorable peace."<sup>4</sup>

Enlistments in the army were slow before the declaration of war, but immediately afterwards volunteers swarmed to the recruiting offices, especially in the Western communities. Soldiers were paid in land grants as during the Revolution, but many towns or state legislatures offered additional cash bounties to induce enlistments.

By the time of its second war for independence, the United States had become much stronger than during the Revolution. From the time of the first census in 1790 to the third in 1810, the population had almost doubled, growing from 3,929,214 to 7,239,881,<sup>5</sup> while the territory of the Union had more than doubled, expanding from 800,000 to more than 2,000,000 square miles. The number of states had grown from thirteen to eighteen, and there were five territories. Forty-nine Indian treaties had opened to settlement vast stretches of new land. The settled area had almost doubled, comprising 240,000 square miles in 1790 and over 400,000 square miles in 1810. Approximately four-fifths of American soil, however, still remained unpenetrated by white settlers. The line of demarcation between the wilderness and the areas penetrated by settlers ran from Southern Maine across New Hampshire and Vermont around the Adirondacks to the St. Lawrence, thence to the shores of Lakes Ontario and Erie to Cleveland. It cut south from Cleveland to central Ohio, moved west into Eastern Indiana, followed the Ohio to the Mississippi, including a strip of territory running north along the Mississippi in what became Illinois and Missouri, then moved southeastward through central Tennessee, leaving nearly all of the Mississippi Territory and all of Western and most of Southern Georgia unsettled. A large island of settled territory existed beyond the frontier line in Louisiana. Smaller islands were found here and there, mainly in Mississippi, at Detroit, and the mouth of the Arkansas.<sup>6</sup> The urban population had grown from 3.3 per cent of the total in 1790 to 4.9 per cent of the total in 1810. There were now eleven cities



with a population of over 8,000, while there had been only six both in 1790 and 1800.<sup>7</sup>

Intensification of sectional differences, accelerated by poor methods of transportation, had accompanied this national expansion. The rapid growth of manufacturing in the Northeast, including the Northern Middle Atlantic states, had been accompanied by the rapid growth of slavery in the South and Southwest. The Negro population had grown far more rapidly than the white, from 757,208 in 1790 to 1,377,808 in 1810.<sup>8</sup> While there had been 73,222 bales of cotton (500 pounds per bale) produced in 1800, production had increased to 177,824 bales in 1810. The average annual export of cotton from 1796 to 1800 had been only 8,993,200 pounds, while from 1806 to 1810 it had reached 52,507,400, comprising 65.38 per cent of the total crop production as opposed to 49.41 per cent in the earlier period.<sup>9</sup>

In spite of this rapid growth in population, wealth, and territory, the United States was still a weak power when contrasted with the British Empire. The sectional differences which obstructed full national unity created the greatest single source of weakness. Only by striking while England was occupied with the major conflict in Europe did America have a chance to defend her national interests. The "War Hawks" saw this clearly, and they struck while the time was ripe. About the issues between England and Napoleon, they remained unconcerned. They remained deaf to all the Federalist propaganda that they were agents of Napoleon. Their aim was to defend America against her foe while there was time.

## CHAPTER XIII

### THE WAR OF 1812

PERHAPS no war in American history has been so widely misunderstood or misinterpreted as has the War of 1812. Most of the early histories were written by Federalists or those sympathetic to their viewpoint. They have portrayed that war as a miserable mistake and failure. The school-books have played up the naval victories as inspiring episodes, but have tended to pass over the rest of the war as a shameful interlude in our history concerning which the least said the better. Recent historians, such as William E. Dodd and Claude G. Bowers, have analyzed with considerable objectivity the democratic character of the early Jeffersonian period, but little attention has been paid to the democratic and progressive character of the War of 1812. Julius William Pratt, in stressing the frontier character of that war, has corrected many foolish misconceptions repeated by the school-books. Pratt, however, did not attempt to analyze the whole war, and his emphasis on the expansionist aims of the frontiersmen and slaveholders does not discriminate clearly enough between different types of expansion. Thus he does not refute with sufficient emphasis the characterization of that war by such writers as Louis M. Hacker and Charles and Mary Beard as imperialist,<sup>1</sup> a view which has subsequently become popular among so-called "liberal," "enlightened," and Social-Democratic quarters.

The War of 1812 was decidedly not a failure. The expansionist program of its most ardent protagonists was not realized, but its fundamental defensive aims were thoroughly successful. The failure to acquire Canada and Florida was almost entirely the result of internal treason of a high order. The victory was all the more amazing in view of the bitter disunity within the American nation.

The character of any war must be interpreted in terms of the

class which wages war and the aims for which it fights.<sup>2</sup> The main class which demanded and fought the War of 1812 was the class of small farmers, especially those of the Western frontier. It was supported by the small producers and the developing industrial capitalists, by all the progressive classes of the time. The slaveholders, who supported that war, although they were by that time seeking the growth of the slave system, were still within the progressive camp in so far as their efforts to increase the territory of the Union were necessary for national defense against oppressive monarchies. The demand for more slave territory had already commenced; but at this early period the reactionary character of that demand was subordinate to the general program of national defense, with which the aims of the planters coincided. The war was opposed consistently only by the most reactionary class, by the commercial bourgeoisie, which long before had become fully treasonable in its counter-revolutionary hatred for democracy. The War of 1812 was in every sense a just war for national liberation.

To call the War of 1812 imperialist is to misinterpret utterly the historical period, the class forces involved, and their aims. The Ordinance of 1784 and the terms of the Louisiana Purchase had indicated the impossibility of any kind of colonial expansion by the United States under the existing class relationships, and no such program existed or could have arisen from the class of small producers. In fact, the main cause of the violent opposition by merchant capitalists and groups of slaveholders to Canadian expansion was their bitter hostility to the incorporation within the Union of more democratic and free states. They knew that Canada could never be annexed as a colony and that slavery could never be introduced into its territory. Those who call the War of 1812 imperialist do so on the utterly false theory that any kind of expansion is imperialist. The democratic forces of 1812 declared war first, they launched an offensive against Canada, they sought to seize Canada and to incorporate it permanently within the Union; but they were not imperialist in any sense. Their program for the annexation of Canada and Florida was one for the liberation of the peoples of those areas.

The Federalists who since 1804 had been conspiring for the

dismemberment of the Union took advantage of the war with Britain to work for the defeat of their country. There is no more sinister record of open, wholesale treason in the pages of history. It is a shameful blemish on the objectivity of American historians that so many have been sympathetic to the Federalists during this most odious period in their history, that almost universally the Federalists have been described as men of integrity, to whom respect is due, that no history has set forth nakedly their actual infamy.

The economic basis for the treason of the New England merchants is revealed by figures on overseas commerce. American exports during the war fell from \$61,316,000 in 1811 to \$6,927,000 in 1814, while imports dropped from \$53,400,000 to \$12,965,000. Exports of foreign goods in 1814 amounted to only \$145,000.<sup>3</sup> Some 1,400 American merchant ships were captured by Britain in the course of the war. However, the cause of Federalist treason was political in every sense of the word. The Federalists preferred trading privileges under British rule rather than to live under American democracy.

Upon the declaration of war, flags were flown at halfmast in Federalist strongholds in New England. Town meetings were called to arouse opposition. The Federalists howled that the "Western War" was not against England but against commerce. Declaring that it was "Mr. Madison's war" and that he pay for it himself, the merchants refused to subscribe to government loans, at the same time profiteering from high prices and the sale of supplies to the British troops across the Canadian frontier. Throughout the war, Federalists supplied the enemy. Congregationalist clergymen thundered at the "anti-Christ" Jefferson, and his disciple, Madison, denouncing the war through Biblical quotations. Hooligan attacks were incited against recruiting officers. A privateer was sunk at Providence, Rhode Island, and efforts were made to incite mobs against all privateering vessels. A ship, held by the United States at New Haven, was burned by a Federalist mob. A Federalist newspaper bore the arrogant motto, "To tell you the truth, Southern brethren, we do not intend to live another year under the present national administration."<sup>4</sup> A whole scheme for sabotaging the recruiting of an

army and for increasing the national debt was worked out. Federalists enlisted after deliberately contracting debts, whereupon they would be arrested for failure to pay. Through Federalist court orders, they would then be released from prison but forbidden to leave their homes, though they would legally demand their pay from the government.

When the call was issued by the Secretary of War for the use of state militia, the governors of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island refused to comply on the grounds that the Constitution provided for Federal use of state militia only in case of invasion, insurrection, or defiance of the law. In any event, they maintained that militias were to be commanded by state officers alone. Governor Griswold of Massachusetts assembled the state legislature, which formally denounced the war and approved the action of the Governor. The Massachusetts Supreme Court also supported the Governor's stand. Refusal to permit the militia to serve under United States officers made a unified command impossible. The militias were completely withheld from service at moments of the greatest need.

Unlike the merchants, the rising industrial capitalists, long restricted by mercantile control in the Northeast, ardently supported the war. For them, curtailment of trade with England created golden opportunities. The democratic forces supported the growth of native industry for this meant breaking the economic chains which still bound the United States to England.

At the outbreak of the war, America was approaching a Presidential election. For the first time, the Federalists ran no candidate of their own but formed a coalition with the pro-British Republicans, who came forward, as a faction of the Republican Party, under the high-sounding name of *Friends of Peace, Union and Commerce*. The Federalists saw clearly that they had no chance of victory in their own name, so they sought to deepen the split in the Republican ranks and to hide their identity and their program behind a Republican banner. In the name of peace, they worked for the military subjugation of their country and for civil strife. In the name of union, they worked for disunion. As candidate in opposition to Madison, the faction ran the New York Republican, DeWitt Clinton.

During the first military campaigns, the new party sought to divide the nation under false and demagogic slogans. It did not openly call for surrender or defeat. It merely sought to blame Mr. Madison, and not England, for the war. It continued the old attack on the "tyranny of Virginia" or the "Virginia dynasty," and demanded that a New Yorker be President. The "Friends of Peace" claimed to be orthodox Jeffersonians, while they accused Madison's group of betraying Jeffersonian doctrines. Why Federalists supported them or why Jefferson himself supported the war and its offensive strategy they were unable to explain. They attempted to speak in the name of the Republican rank and file as opposed to the party caucus in Congress which renominated Madison. Even though Madison's nomination was rapidly approved by the legislatures of nine states, the new Republicans claimed that their small conventions were representative of "the people." They concentrated their campaign on certain local grievances, camouflaged as democratic issues, rather than on the most burning question, the war.

That their tactics were partially successful was shown by the fact that every electoral vote from New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware was cast for Clinton. The electoral vote from every Southern and Western state, except one, and from Vermont and Pennsylvania, went to Madison. In a word, the states most dependent on overseas commerce were swung by the opposition, though within these states Madison's vote was high, especially in the Western areas. Since the issues were deliberately confused, the extent of opposition to the war can by no means be determined from this vote.

The liberal policy of the government toward the treasonable minority of Federalists continued throughout the War of 1812. No effort was made at the beginning of the war to purge the army high command of treasonable officers. Seldom in the history of warfare has wholesale treason been allowed to work openly with such unchallenged freedom. Had it not been for the heroism of the people, that liberalism would have resulted in disaster. As it was, it made impossible the achievement of the full democratic program of expansion.

The people by no means fully supported the liberal policy of the administration toward the internal foes. As an answer to its violent denunciations of the war and the government, just before the outbreak of war a crowd in Baltimore destroyed the press of the Federalist newspaper, the *Federal Republican*, and tore down its building. The crowd afterwards unloaded cargoes from vessels ready for sea in violation of the embargo. A pitched battle occurred when troops were led against the crowd. When some of their number were imprisoned, the people stormed the jail and freed the prisoners. Some of the Federalists were killed or severely wounded. The old champions of the Sedition Act thereupon sought protection behind the cry of "Freedom of the Press," and the organizers of the hooligan mobs which sabotaged national defense howled against "Mr. Madison's mob."

In the midst of such bitter internal disunity, the American Republic embarked upon one of the greatest struggles in its history. If there was ever a war which illustrated the principle that "War is the continuation of politics by other [forcible] means," it was fully exemplified by the War of 1812. The internal political conflict affected every phase of its military strategy and tactics.

In the United States in 1812 the enrolled militia consisted of 694,735 out of the 1,119,594 white males between 16 and 45. In Canada there were only one-tenth that number, and there were no more than four or five thousand regular troops. There were around twice that number of regulars in the United States.<sup>5</sup> In contrast to the superior strength of American forces on land, the American navy possessed only sixteen ships, besides small coastal gunboats, with which to oppose the eight hundred ships of Great Britain. Only five warships were ready for action at the outbreak of war. However, England's war with France meant that the full force of the British navy could not be used against America, and American privateers supplemented the actions of the navy.

There were four general campaigns in the War of 1812—on the sea, along the Canadian border, in the Southwest along the Gulf, and on the Atlantic Coast. The first three were launched as American offensives. The campaign on the Atlantic was en-

tirely defensive. Military conflict in the North and Southwest had already opened in the form of Indian uprisings and combats with the Spanish authorities of Florida when war was declared. These armed clashes merged into the war with Britain.

It had been the opinion of Republican leaders for years that all that was necessary to seize Canada was to march. Clay had declared, on very good grounds, that the Kentucky militia by itself could take all of Canada. Large sections of the Canadian people, including the Canadian militia, were sympathetic to America. In upper Canada, there were many American settlers. The French of lower Canada were discontented under British rule.

From a military point of view, experts have agreed that the best point for an offensive into Canada would have been against Niagara, Kingston, Montreal, and Quebec. Control of the St. Lawrence would have opened all of Canada to the north. An attack on the St. Lawrence could have severed the routes through which American traitors shipped supplies to British forces.

However, the anti-war position of the New York government and the presence of troops in readiness in the Northwest, where they had been engaged with the Indians, led the government to order its first offensive from Detroit, under General Hull. General Dearborn was commanded to support Hull from New York, by seizing Niagara, in order to prevent the British forces near that region from uniting with those in the West. Thus, an offensive was launched from the area in which the strongest war spirit prevailed, but not against the most vulnerable part of Canada. Steps had not been taken to secure the vital naval control of Lake Erie.

The five warships which were prepared to fight were immediately ordered to sea, and others were rapidly put in shape. Troops were in readiness on the Florida border, awaiting an appeal from local authorities or from a successful revolution. The military strength of the Florida authorities was negligible, and sympathy with America was widespread.

The United States had a definite military advantage at the outbreak of the war. She possessed superiority of forces on land.



British harbors. So harassed was British trade at its own doorsteps that English vessels could not get insurance for voyages across the Irish Channel.

While brilliant victories were taking place at sea, the Canadian campaign, for which such high hopes were entertained, met the most dismal disaster. While on his way to Detroit, General Hull sent his papers ahead of him by boat across the undefended Lake Erie. The British seized the vessel, and were informed of Hull's plans before he reached Detroit. Hull advanced three miles across the Canadian border on July 12, and issued a proclamation to the people of Canada, calling for their support. Members of the Canadian militia deserted to the American forces, and it was clear that they awaited only energetic action to rally whole-heartedly behind the American cause. But energetic action never came. Hull remained at camp, waiting for the Canadians to come to him—if one can believe his words! He made no effort to seize vital British forts lying virtually defenseless before him. The small British forces in Western Canada, however, took full advantage of Hull's passivity, and rushed troops to the forts, which they rapidly occupied without opposition. Meanwhile, General Dearborn in New York disobeyed his orders and failed to support Hull's "action" with an attack on Niagara. Instead, he concluded an armistice. The troops which Dearborn failed to engage rushed toward Hull across Lake Erie, left open by naval unpreparedness. At the same time, Indians in the Tecumseh Confederation began cutting off Hull's communications with Ohio, and thus threatened his base. Thereupon, Hull fell back to Detroit.

The excuse for Dearborn's armistice was the sudden arrival in America of news of Britain's belated repeal of the Orders in Council. Historians, following Federalist interpretations, have made much of the fact that Britain really repealed the orders on June 23, a few days after America's declaration of war. This proved, the Federalists claimed, that the Republicans were hot-headed and belligerent, that England was willing to come to terms, and that the war was an unnecessary blunder, arising solely from Republican provocation and lust for land. However, repeal of the orders, through mass pressure from the

industrial capitalists and the working class of England, came too late. America had been negotiating since 1807 to no avail, and had been betrayed before by conciliatory promises. Furthermore, the Orders in Council represented only one of the many forms of British aggression.

When Madison heard of Dearborn's unwarranted truce, he ordered this insubordinate general to follow his instructions to assist Hull. But at the very time that Dearborn received these orders, on August 15, Hull surrendered both Detroit and his army without having fired a shot. Thus, when all upper Canada lay unprotected before the American forces, the treasonable conduct of Generals Hull and Dearborn resulted not only in failure to occupy Canada but in the surrender of American soil and American troops. It was not an inspiring sight when a few weeks later the soldiers on the New York border could see their brothers across the river as prisoners of the British.

In response to popular rage, General Hull was court-martialed and sentenced to be shot for cowardice. However, he was later pardoned by Madison. Hull's conduct was treasonable without doubt, but the treason went deeper than the people realized. It permeated the entire War Department and the high command of the army.

The first victory on the Canadian border was won by the navy on October 8. Two British boats on Lake Erie were captured by a vessel commanded by Lieutenant Elliott. This created a good opening for an offensive by the troops on land.

Seldom in warfare has the eagerness of troops for action been so frustrated as was that of the soldiers on the Canadian border in 1812. The officers quarreled among themselves, and never engaged in joint action. The New York militia was commanded by a Federalist, Major-General Stephen Van Rensselaer; the regular troops in New York by a representative of the slaveholders, Brigadier-General Alexander Smyth, who had been sent to Canada at his own request.

Van Rensselaer drilled his men endlessly until his soldiers accused him of deliberately delaying action because of his Federalist politics. After the naval victory on Lake Erie, he finally ordered his troops to cross the river for an attack on Queenston.



But the first boat to cross carried all the oars for the other boats. The troops vainly waited all night for it to return. They were mutinous when marched back to camp. This is just one example of a series of blunders and stupidities, the summation of which could mean nothing short of the deepest treason.

General Smyth conducted war by writing leaflets, ostensibly calling for recruits. His bombastic proclamations, by playing up the shame of Hull's defeat, the blunders of other officers, and the horror of Indian massacres, aroused only fear, pessimism, and disgust. Time after time, Smyth's troops were crossing the river when orders were issued for them to return. Soldiers broke their muskets in rage when ordered back from long-demanded expeditions. Some, from sheer frustration, began deserting. In their emotional state, fights and quarrels and occasional riots broke out. Their anger, however, eventually began to find the right mark. Soldiers commenced jeering General Smyth openly, and he was finally fired at by a militiaman. Receiving permission from General Dearborn, Smyth fled by unfrequented roads to Virginia, where he was hailed by those slaveholders whose tool he had been in holding back the army from Canada. His name was stricken from the army by Madison, but he was elected later to the Virginia legislature by a planter constituency.

When finally the regular troops were sent into Canada, the militia watched their brothers across the river engage in a life and death struggle, but their officers refused to order them into action. Demoralization arose among the soldiers themselves.

Some energy was shown by the forces under William Henry Harrison, who proceeded with troops from Kentucky to destroy in the Northwest the villages of the most warlike Indians. Harrison was subsequently made commander of the Northwest army. However, he was immobilized for a long time by failure of supplies to reach him.

The series of disasters in Canada led to the appointment of John Armstrong as Secretary of War. Armstrong had an unsavory past as author of the Newburgh letter, which, during the Revolution, had sought to introduce dissension among Washington's troops. His conduct during the War of 1812 deepened suspicion that he was secretly in sympathy with Great Britain.

During all this time, Andrew Jackson of Tennessee was moving heaven and earth to get any kind of commission in the army. He begged for the right to attack Canada. But the War Department steadily refused to accept his services. Because Jackson had considered Dearborn rather than Burr responsible for the Burr Conspiracy, Dearborn apparently had poisoned the mind of the administration against the man who later became the great hero of the war. Jackson's campaigns in the Southwest later showed that had a general of his determination and skill been sent to Canada, the war could have ended much differently. When Jackson finally entered the war, it was only by obtaining a commission in the Tennessee militia through appointment by Governor Blount.

In the fall of 1812, troops were ordered to be in readiness for the occupation of East Florida whenever Congress should sanction the move. Andrew Jackson, appointed Major-General of the Tennessee militia by Governor Blount, set forth for the Gulf with 2,700 militiamen on January 7, 1813. After his departure, Congress, under the influence of the anti-war forces and Northern Republicans, refused to sanction the occupation of Florida east of the Perdido River. Consequently, Jackson was stopped on the lower Mississippi with an order to return.

In Jackson, the frontiersmen had their own man as leader—one who regarded legal technicalities with scant respect. With the same rage that led frontiersmen in the Northwest to break their muskets and to drive General Smyth back to Virginia with rifle shots, Jackson flatly refused to disband his troops, made himself personally responsible for their pay and food, and proceeded to make new plans. Meanwhile, with Congressional approval, troops captured that portion of West Florida, including Mobile, which had not been seized in 1810.

In the fall of 1812, while Napoleon was in possession of Moscow, the Russian Tsar, Alexander I, whose country was also fighting a war for national liberation, offered his services as mediator of the issues between his ally, England, and the United States. The Tsar hoped thus to release all Britain's energies for the war against Napoleon. This offer the United States gladly accepted, and commissioners were sent to Europe. However,

England refused to accept mediation. In fact, she launched an offensive on the Atlantic coast early in 1813.

British ships first appeared off the coast at Hampton Roads, Virginia. Afterwards, there were numerous bombardments and raids along the entire coast, from Maine to Virginia. Pillage, murder, and rape were committed at Hampton. There were widespread burning, destruction, and looting along the Chesapeake. Many towns were forced to pay tribute. Britain hoped, through wanton acts against the civilian population, to create panic, intensify disunity, and divert troops from the Canadian front.

In the face of apathy on the part of municipal authorities, citizens of one city after another took action over the heads of their local governments by establishing Committees of Defense. The citizens of Philadelphia were the first to act. They were followed by those of Wilmington.

The people of New York mobilized with the greatest efficiency. Those who had remained indifferent beforehand became fully aroused in the face of direct threats to their own lives and homes. The artisans, workers, and free Negroes were especially active. The people's assembly first inquired of the authorities what steps were being taken for defense. They called for local volunteer infantry and artillerymen, and undertook the construction of forts and earthworks. Businessmen contributed money. Workmen gladly contributed their labor. Journeymen societies, organizations like the Sons of Erin and the African Church, groups of teachers and students, all contributed a day's work. As the danger increased, construction continued throughout the night. People from towns and villages twenty miles away came into the city to help. These activities revived the unity and revolutionary fervor of '76.

The blockade was never able to prevent American armed vessels from leaving shore. However, it did practically ruin the overseas and coastal trade. An unprecedented development of American industry and inland transportation resulted. Capital began to flow out of commerce into industry. In the area of Providence, Rhode Island, the number of cotton mills increased during the war from 41 to 169. Similar developments occurred

throughout the Northeast and upper Middle Atlantic states. Mills began to arise in the Hudson and Mohawk valleys, the lake region of New York, and even beyond the mountains in Louisville, Cincinnati, and other towns.

The destruction of coastal commerce led to inland transportation by wagons. Steady streams of wagoneers appeared on all the roads running from north to south. The number of wagons reached 4,000 and of oxen 20,000. The wagon drivers became known as "horse marines." The drivers gave their wagons such names as "Neptune Metamorphosed," "Mud-Clipper," "Sailor's Misery," "Tecumseh," "Jefferson's Pride," and "Don't Give Up the Ship." Some bore streamers with such slogans as "Free Trade and Teamsters' Rights" or "Free Trade and Oxen's Rights."<sup>8</sup> The drivers were known as captains, and, like captains of ships, were required to keep logs of their routes. The Federalist authorities of New England sought to retard the new enterprise by enforcing the old Puritan "blue laws" against traffic on Sunday. At the same time, steamboats were being introduced on the Hudson.

While America was on the defensive along the Atlantic coast, offensive plans continued to go awry on the Canadian border, although some victories were won in the summer of 1813. Meanwhile, general Indian war commenced in the Southwest.

One of the most shameful of Britain's many acts of perfidy occurred on the River Raisin on the Northwestern front early in 1813. British officers shamelessly abandoned prisoners, to whom they had promised protection, to massacre by Indian warriors. The Creek warriors who had gone north to join Tecumseh in 1812 participated in this massacre, and then left for the Southwest. On their homeward route, the warriors murdered settlers along the Ohio.

Benjamin Hawkins, American representative to the Creek Confederation, demanded the surrender of the warriors responsible for the murders, whereupon the chieftains had the warriors executed. Thereupon the prophets aroused the tribesmen to drive out the warriors who had carried out the executions. The chieftains then fled for their lives to join Hawkins, and the "Red Sticks" planned a general war of extermination against

the whole white population. The white settlers rapidly sought refuge in stockades throughout the country between the Tombigbee and the Alabama. In August, nearly all of the more than five hundred settlers who had sought protection at Fort Mims were massacred, and two hundred and fifty scalps were carried by the Indians on poles to Pensacola. Terror reigned over the whole Alabama area. Homes were burned, crops destroyed, and settlers slain.

Andrew Jackson, with David Crockett and Sam Houston serving under him, began a march of one hundred and sixty miles from Tennessee through the wilderness toward the Creek strongholds on the Hickory Ground at the junction of the Coosa and Tallapoosa rivers. Under great difficulties, Jackson held his troops together as they sought for food on the way, constantly engaged in Indian fights. Meanwhile, the Georgia militia under General John Floyd marched into the Creek country.

While the forces under Andrew Jackson were mobilizing for an offensive in the Southwest, disaster in the Northwest was averted by the navy. In the summer of 1813, mastery of Lake Erie was secured through the brilliant victory won by the American fleet under the command of Commodore Perry. This was the first American triumph over an entire British fleet. It saved the Northwest from British conquest, and Perry at that time became the outstanding hero of the war. American control of Lake Erie forced the British to retire from Michigan, and, for the first time, a real offensive was launched into Canada under William Henry Harrison. A major victory was won in Canada in the fall of 1813 at the Battle of the Thames. In this battle, Tecumseh was slain, and the power of his Confederacy was broken forever.

Miserable failures continued along the New York border. To that area, the new Secretary of War sent General Wilkinson after this old accomplice of Burr had been removed from the Southwest as the result of a popular petition against him. In New York, Wilkinson caused disruption by quarreling with the Southern General Wade Hampton. Armstrong established the War Department at Sackett's Harbor, but his intervention in

the quarrel merely deepened the feud. Armstrong disorganized the whole frontier by withdrawing troops from the West to the St. Lawrence in preparation for a campaign which he never carried out. He indulged merely in raiding parties which burned Canadian towns. Followed by immediate withdrawals, these raids served no purpose except to destroy Canadian sympathy with the United States. The British seized the forts to the west, which had been left defenseless by Armstrong, burned Buffalo, and plundered the whole surrounding area. The historian McMaster declares: "Had this series of shameful disasters been the purpose of the campaign, Armstrong could not have been more composed."

During the winter of 1813 and 1814, in response to popular pressure, new officers were brought forward from the ranks on the Canadian front. Under the leadership of Jacob Brown, Peter B. Porter, Winfield Scott, and others, the American troops in the summer of 1814 began to drive the British from the forts they had occupied. For the first time, a steady, determined offensive began. The famous drawn battle of Lundy's Lane took place on the Canadian side, and the British were unable to dislodge the Americans from their posts.

By January, 1814, the Creeks were victorious in the Southwest, and both Jackson and Floyd had to retreat in opposite directions. By the sheer weight of his personal leadership, Jackson prevented mutinies among his troops. Sternly he began to eliminate the old anarchistic tradition of the militia which had made it possible for traitors to disorganize the army. He introduced regular military discipline, with shooting as the penalty for desertion or disobedience. His own courage and energy in bearing more hardships than anyone else won from his men their love and admiration. They gave him the name, "Old Hickory."

When Governor Blount refused to send reinforcements, on the ground that the legal quota had been filled, Jackson in a blistering letter reminded the governor of a duty higher than legal technicalities. Blount was stung into action.

A bloody slaughter occurred at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend. Five hundred and fifty-seven of the nine hundred Indian war-

riors engaged were slain. Among them were the three leading prophets. This broke the Indian offensive. The warriors were routed, and took refuge across the Spanish border. On July 10, Jackson met in conference with the Creeks at the Hickory Ground to present the demands of the United States. Under threat of extermination, he forced them to sign a treaty on August 9. It required the surrender of half the old Creek lands, three-fifths of what is now Alabama, and a strip along the Florida border in Georgia, about one-fifth of that state today. The purpose of the latter cession was to prevent future incitement of the Indians from Florida. The treaty prohibited all commerce with Spain or with any individuals except those bearing licenses from the United States. It granted the right to open roads, canals, forts, trading posts. It also required the surrender of the prophets.

Jackson was anxious to continue his offensive into Florida, from which the "Red Sticks" had received ammunition and supplies, but Armstrong prevented him from doing this. By demanding the surrender of the fugitive warriors from the Spanish authorities at Pensacola, however, Jackson sought to provoke a conflict. The seizure of Pensacola by the British in July, 1814, resulted solely from restraints placed upon the army from Washington. A military base was needlessly surrendered to the enemy.

In the late summer of 1814, while Napoleon was a prisoner at Elba, temporary peace in Europe enabled England to concentrate her force upon America. The veterans of Wellington were sent to Canada. The offensive on the Atlantic coast increased, and the British fleet planned an attack on New Orleans. Simultaneously, the Federalists undertook preparations for armed insurrection from within the United States to be accomplished through the secession of the Northeastern states. At this very moment, England finally offered to negotiate with the United States for peace. Britain hoped to dismember the United States through military conquest, aided by Federalist treason, and then to conclude a peace which would leave America with only a fragment of its former territory. In this dark hour, the United States approached the decisive conflicts.

In August, 1814, the representatives of Britain and America assembled at Ghent. England sent as commissioners men of obscure rank to indicate her contempt for the American government. As the conversations opened, American territory was falling to the British.

Wellington's veterans launched an offensive into New York down the west bank of Lake Champlain. At the same time, the British invaded the Potomac. Armstrong and General Winder, in charge of the defense of Washington, had made no plans for defense, as the enemy knew. General Winder offered only sham resistance, and the capital of the country was seized. Government buildings and many others were burned amidst Tory jests by the British General. Meanwhile, all of Maine had been invaded and incorporated into New Brunswick. The shores of Cape Cod were ravaged and destruction occurred along Long Island Sound.

The British commissioners at Ghent demanded all the territory seized by British arms and that the Northwest be abandoned by the United States for the establishment of an Indian puppet state. The American commissioners refused even to consider such terms.

While American resistance stiffened before the onslaught of Great Britain, the dagger was raised by Federalists for a final stab in the back. During the latter part of 1814, bills for raising an army by conscription were defeated in Congress at the moment of greatest need. This left all further raising of troops to the initiative of states. The Federalist states of New England proceeded to increase their militia, but not to fight the British. Upon the initiative of Governor Strong, the Massachusetts legislature issued a call in October, 1814, for a convention of delegates from all the New England states. The appeal was made over the bitter opposition of the Republican minority, which passed a resolution of its own, warning that the aim of the convention was to make a separate peace with England, to open the gates of the Union to enemy troops, and to launch civil war in alliance with the foe. The Republicans demonstratively walked out of the Massachusetts House in protest against issuance of the invitation. The legislatures of Connecticut and Rhode Island

responded by electing delegates, but the legislatures of New Hampshire and Vermont refused to participate in the treasonable convention.

While preparations were on foot for the Hartford Convention of traitors, military events in America, as well as events in Europe, began to make untenable the British demands at Ghent. Following the capture of Washington, an outcry arose against Armstrong. The militia sent a resolution to Madison refusing to serve any longer under him as Secretary of War. As a result, Armstrong was forced to resign, and James Monroe served thereafter as both Secretary of State and Secretary of War.

The British proceeded from Washington to attack Fort McHenry at Baltimore. This was the occasion for the writing of the *Star-Spangled Banner* by Francis Scott Key. Unable to take Baltimore, the troops, which had long terrorized the coast, sailed for Jamaica. From there they were ordered to proceed against the Gulf coast. Some twenty thousand of the most seasoned of Wellington's troops were sent under General Pakenham to join these forces for the onslaught against the Gulf. They were borne by a British fleet of fifty ships, bearing one thousand guns. Britain now planned to occupy the entire West through the seizure of the Floridas and New Orleans.

While Andrew Jackson prepared for the decisive military conflict of the war, the brilliant victory of Captain Macdonough on Lake Champlain prevented the British from capturing central New York and the Hudson River Valley. That victory forced the British troops to withdraw. The land forces, still held in check by the high command, were unable, however, to follow Macdonough's success with an effective offensive.

As Pakenham's troops approached the Gulf, the British planned to execute the old Burr Conspiracy. They issued a blustering proclamation from Pensacola, calling upon the Louisiana Creoles to overthrow the "brawlers for liberty." They threatened the frontiersmen with Indian massacres unless they displayed on their cabins the flags of Britain, Spain, or France. France was then under domination by Britain and her allies. The British officers mobilized the "Red Stick" warriors in Pensacola, dressed them in red coats, and drilled them daily. There

was evidence that English agents planned to incite a general slave insurrection in Louisiana.

In September, the British attacked Mobile without success. After a delay caused by lack of sufficient troops, Jackson launched an offensive into Florida early in November, and drove the British from Pensacola and Fort Barrancas. Beforehand, he had issued a stirring appeal for assistance to the people of Louisiana and to the large population of free Negroes in New Orleans. He returned from Florida to Mobile, and thence proceeded to New Orleans.

The authorities of that city had taken no real steps for defense. A citizens' committee had been formed, but it had been inactive. Early in December, news arrived of an American naval defeat by Pakenham's fleet. The news shocked the city into the most energetic activity. Jackson established military rule. He had to overcome the opposition of business men who feared that he planned to burn the city if forced to retreat. Volunteers rushed to Jackson from all sides. From the military point of view, the most decisive battle of the war was approaching.

While feverish preparations for the defense of New Orleans were being made, the Federalist traitors held their convention in Hartford, Connecticut. Twenty-three delegates—twelve from Massachusetts, seven from Connecticut, and four from Rhode Island—were assembled. They were joined by two individuals elected privately by Federalists in New Hampshire. The delegates met in secret session for three weeks. Upon adjournment on January 5, 1815, they made public a report of their decisions. This report served a virtual ultimatum upon the government. In language of the utmost duplicity, the traitors claimed to be patient, long-suffering, anxious to preserve the Union and to proceed along constitutional and legal means. Yet every line of their report was an indirect call for the dismemberment of the Union and the overthrow of its government. After a scurrilous review of the conduct of the government since 1801, the report concluded that the "evils" of the Republican administrations resulted from fundamental "defects in the Constitution" itself. At last, the Federalists openly showed their true colors as enemies of the Constitution. The report ended with four reso-

lutions, followed by a threat of further and immediate action unless the nation accepted at once the dictates of this handful of Federalist delegates from three states.

The first three resolutions called for protection of state militia from Federal drafts, conscriptions, and impressments; for the surrender to the states of Federal taxes for use in "state defense"; and for the immediate formation by the governors of volunteer troops to be held in constant readiness. The conduct of the Federalist Party indicated that the aim of these military instructions was civil insurrection.

The fourth resolution demanded seven amendments to the Constitution. One of these called for representation in Congress and apportionment of taxes according to the number of free persons rather than on the basis of counting three-fifths of the slaves. Another prohibited the admission of a state to the Union without the consent of two-thirds of both houses. A third made unconstitutional any embargo for longer than sixty days or any restriction on commercial intercourse with other nations without a two-thirds vote of Congress. Another required a two-thirds vote for any declaration of war. One prohibited any naturalized citizen from becoming a member of Congress or from holding any office under the United States. Still another forbade any President to succeed himself in office or to be followed by another from the same state.

The aim of the proposed amendments was clearly to give the minority of New England states the opportunity to block forever the democratic majority of the nation; to prevent the entrance into the Union of more democratic states; and to reduce representation from the slave states, which, by one of the ironies of history, were at that moment among the progressive Republican states. Threats, couched in a high, moral tone, with frequent appeals to God, were made to seem more dreadful by being left nameless. Concrete plans were laid for assembling another New England convention in case the dictates of the Hartford conspirators should not be accepted immediately by the Federal Government. The whole proceedings were merely a prelude for armed insurrection as a means of aiding the foreign foe. After the Massachusetts and Connecticut legislatures ratified the

report of the conspirators these two states sent five delegates to serve their ultimatum upon the Republic.

Three days after the Hartford convention ended, the Battle of New Orleans was fought. Rarely has there been such a strange and heterogeneous assemblage of forces as gathered for the defense of that city. Serving under Jackson were regiments of cosmopolitan, dissolute Creole gentlemen, slaveholders; whole regiments of free Negroes who responded enthusiastically to Jackson's appeal; sailors from the *Carolina*; old French soldiers, commanded by one of Napoleon's gunners; rough frontiersmen from Kentucky and Tennessee, wearing their hunting shirts; and bands of outlaw pirates, serving under Jean Lafitte.

The pirates of the Spanish Main had been supported by France during the Napoleonic wars, but most of them had been driven from their strongholds by the British navy. Many of them had then established havens along the bayous and islands south of New Orleans. Some of the most prominent business men of that city were linked with these pirate bands. Large fortunes were made from sales of booty purchased at the vast, illegal auctions held on nearby islands. The commercial firm of the French adventurers, Jean and Pierre Lafitte, was a screen for the sale of the pirates' loot and of smuggled slaves. The brothers Lafitte had become the heads of the local pirates. They had defeated ships of the American navy sent to dislodge them from their hideaways. When the governor had placed a price of five hundred dollars on Jean Lafitte's head, the latter had issued a proclamation offering five thousand dollars for the head of the governor.

The British asked Jean Lafitte and his followers to serve under the British navy in the attack on New Orleans. But undoubtedly considering Britain the greater danger to his traffic, Lafitte sent information concerning the British fleet to a member of the Louisiana legislature, and afterwards offered his services both to the governor and to Andrew Jackson. That realistic frontier warrior refused at first, but finally accepted. Thus it was that bands of outlaw pirates helped defend the independence of the United States.

The British landed in small boats from Lake Borgne and the



canals south of New Orleans. Jackson's hastily constructed but well-built fortifications forced the British to fight between the Mississippi and a swamp. Prior to the decisive battle, there were preliminary clashes. The final conflict on January 8 was the bloodiest of all battles hitherto fought on American soil. It was decided in about twenty minutes. The British were borne down with heavy equipment. As they attacked, the Americans, supported by a gunboat in the river, used the old familiar tactic that had so dazed the Redcoats at Bunker Hill. Taking careful aim, the Americans waited until the British were upon them, then let loose a devastating volley in which every bullet found its man. Two thousand of Wellington's veterans were laid low. Among the slain were General Pakenham, two other generals, seven colonels, and seventy-five lesser officers. Only eight Americans were killed. That battle saved New Orleans from occupation, thus protecting the gateway to the Mississippi Valley. Like a wounded animal, the British forces slowly abandoned all their positions and disembarked from American soil for the last time.

Before that battle was fought, American victories coupled with events in Europe had led England hastily to conclude peace on terms agreeable to the United States. The Duke of Wellington had refused to go to Canada on the grounds that it would be impossible to defeat America without naval supremacy on the lakes. As the danger of renewed conflict in Europe arose and with the news of American victories, Britain retracted her demands for territory and consented to a peace which recognized the status quo before the war. The Treaty of Ghent was signed on Christmas Eve, 1814. It arrived in Washington on February 14, 1815.

The peace treaty made no territorial changes. It did not mention impressment of seamen or freedom of the seas. For that reason, it has been customary for some historians, influenced by the Federalist tradition, to assert that the War of 1812 was a useless war which accomplished nothing. Such historians fail utterly to recognize that the main aim of the United States in 1812 was to defend the status quo that existed before the war. In that aim, the United States was completely victorious; Brit-

ain's aggressive aims were completely defeated. For America to secure British recognition of the status quo that existed in America before the war was an enormous victory, for Britain had never before legally recognized the right of the United States to half its domain. She had continuously disputed the acquisition of the Louisiana Territory. Never again could Britain claim a legal right to the Mississippi Valley.

England had *in fact* never recognized America's possession of the Northwest. The treaty signed at Ghent contained a clause that both England and America take steps to pacify the Indians. This represented an enormous victory for the United States, for the main cause of the fury of the Westerners had been Britain's incessant incitement of the Indians against American settlers. Britain was bound by treaty after 1814 to abandon all these aggressive intrigues.

The actual situation was not altered by the fact that the treaty was couched in language which might "save the face" of the British Empire. The concrete terms of the treaty were all in the interest of the United States. Not one advantage was gained by England, for whom the treaty meant relinquishment of all her aims of conquest in America.

That impressment and freedom of the seas were not mentioned was really unessential. These were not the major issues of the war. America had amply demonstrated her naval power, and her assertion of naval strength brought to an end the previous arrogance of Great Britain. After the War of 1812, the United States was respected on the seas, and her ships were able to sail them freely.

On certain other issues, the treaty was also silent. England sought to secure for herself free navigation of the Mississippi in exchange for fishing rights for America in Canadian waters. This led to a bitter controversy among the American commissioners. John Quincy Adams supported the bargain, favorable to New England fishing and trading interests, while Henry Clay, in the interest of the Westerners, violently opposed a strengthening of British ties with New England at the expense of the Western settlers, who could receive no advantage from the deal. Gallatin played the role of mediator, and reference to

either fisheries or the Mississippi was removed from the treaty. Certain unsettled boundary disputes along the Canadian border were referred to special commissions.


The War of 1812 fully established the United States as an independent power. It preserved the fruits of the Revolution, and confirmed the territorial expansion which followed the peace of 1783. It terminated all serious threats of British aggression until the slaveholder offensive within the nation offered Britain new opportunities.

Some unfinished business was left by the War of 1812—the rounding out of the nation through the annexation of East Florida and the settlement of the Canadian boundary disputes. But the new relation of forces after the Treaty of Ghent made possible the settlement of all these issues without a major war. In a word, the victory of 1814 enabled the United States to pursue its national development in peace and to give its major attention to internal affairs.

If the War of 1812 ended the major threat to national existence on the part of Great Britain, it also terminated the major threat to the Union coming from the Federalist Party. The delegates from the Hartford Convention arrived in Washington with their ultimatum in the midst of the celebrations of Jackson's victory at New Orleans and as news arrived of the conclusion of a victorious peace. Like whipped dogs, the five delegates quietly slunk out of Washington. This was the end of the Hartford conspiracy. Not only did the victory of 1814 completely discredit the Federalists as a political party, but it resulted in the destruction of the economic base for Federalist treason. The War of 1812 wrought profound internal changes in the economic life of America.

## PART FOUR

### National and Sectional Growth, 1815-1824



THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE OF 1820 (see Chapter XV).

## CHAPTER XIV

### THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM AND OTHER NATIONALISTIC TRENDS

THE period following the War of 1812 was one of transition. The old problem of national defense remained though it no longer took precedence over other tasks. The nation expanded with startling rapidity into the newly opened lands of the West, for which both small producers and slaveholders contended. The downfall of the old merchant oligarchy was completed, and the offensive of the slaveholders, which finally led to the Civil War, commenced. Industrial capitalism in the Northeast and even in areas beyond the mountains began to press its new demands for tariffs and Federal aid for internal improvements, but found its course increasingly blocked by the rising cotton kingdom of the South. A distinct working class came into existence. The multiplication of roads, canals, and of steamboat transportation led to internal national development which accompanied expansion into new territory. The mercantile capitalists, defeated in their former treasonable conspiracies and rapidly deprived of a large part of their commerce beyond the seas, attached themselves to the plantations of the South and to the industries of the North. The growth of capitalism beyond the mountains involved vast numbers of small farmers and artisans in a new craze of speculation, through which some became capitalists and slaveholders while others became impoverished. An organized movement for free land arose. Amidst the conflict of economic forces, with the West as the major battlefield, unrest among the slaves of the South increased. The seeds for a new revolutionary movement against slavery began to mature.

National expansion during this period was accompanied by sectional growth which was a hindrance to full national unity and finally led to civil war. The growing slave system of the South, dependent upon European markets, could not become fully unified with an interdependent national economy. The foothold of industrial capitalism in the Northeast, of slavery in the South, and of small-scale agriculture in the West intensified that conflict among North, South, and West, which, while really a class conflict, seemed on the surface to be one of regions.

Immediately following peace, overseas commerce from American ports started on a big scale. Not only were American ships now free from attacks by England, but Madison sent the fleet to clear the seas of the Tripolitan pirates, and this was swiftly accomplished. Between 1814 and 1815, exports rose from \$6,927,000 to \$93,281,000, while imports increased from \$12,965,000 to \$121,750,000.<sup>1</sup> Vast quantities of agricultural produce, especially Southern cotton, now found its way to Europe, while England began to flood America with manufactured goods for the purpose of crushing the infant industries which had multiplied at such a rapid pace during the war.

Some 250,000 spindles were at work in America by 1820, an increase of 213 per cent over 1810, in spite of the fact that production declined by half after the end of the war.<sup>2</sup> Lowell, Massachusetts, was rapidly becoming the Manchester of America. While New England had been the original base for industrial development, manufacturing had spread after the embargo throughout the Middle Atlantic states of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Maryland. Steam engines were becoming more and more popular, and by 1817 were being manufactured not only on the coast, but in Pittsburgh and even in Louisville and Cincinnati.

Inland commerce in domestic goods by wagon trains had vastly increased during the war. The epoch of road and canal building, which had been interrupted by war, reopened. Leading seaboard cities entered into competition for the Western market. Plans for the building of the Erie Canal, made in New York before the outbreak of war, were now renewed. Philadelphia, fearing the loss of her trade to New York, undertook in 1815

the building of a canal along the Schuylkill River and of another to join the Schuylkill and the Susquehanna. Baltimore also laid plans for better connections with the West.

Due to the widespread distribution of small holdings and the accessibility of land, the American standard of living at this period was the highest in the world. Wages were high as compared to Europe. The contrast between American opportunity and European distress led to a tremendous increase in immigration. The total number of immigrants between 1815 and 1830 was half a million.<sup>3</sup> Some of the foreign born entering the country—especially the poor peasants from Ireland—were unable to move into the West and remained in the cities where they became wage workers, many being employed in building roads and canals. However, the majority settled on the land. Thus, immigration did not greatly depress wages.

At this early date, efforts were made by the manufacturing interests to create native American hostility to the foreign born. Editorials began to question the motives of immigrants. It was not because they loved our institutions that they came here, it was said, but because they wanted to enjoy a higher standard of living, to get land and high wages—as if these had no relation to American institutions. It was hinted that they were endangering the rights of Americans.<sup>4</sup>

The population grew from 7,239,881 to 9,638,453 between 1810 and 1820.<sup>5</sup> The percentage of those living in cities remained the same—4.9 per cent.<sup>6</sup> However, such was the rush to the West that between 1816 and 1821 six new states entered the Union—one each year.

As Americans turned eagerly from war to the peaceful pursuit of agriculture, Western migration, trade, and industry, signs of an oncoming economic crisis began to multiply. After Waterloo, England and France took over much of the carrying trade, which, during the Napoleonic wars, had been captured by American shipping interests. This made the latter increasingly dependent upon American industry and agriculture. Simultaneously the rising manufacturers found it impossible to make the turn from war economy to peacetime production in the face of British dumping, and many of the infant industries closed

down, causing distress in the cities and towns. The entire economic life of the country, including agriculture, was threatened, moreover, by extreme disorganization of the currency.

During the war, the bulk of the country's gold and silver had found its way to Federalist New England, since it was there rather than abroad that planters of the South and many farmers found their markets and purchased manufactured goods. In this way, many supporters of the war had helped the Federalist traitors in spite of themselves. The Federalist boycott of war loans had made this wealth inaccessible to the government.

Following the closing of the National Bank in 1811, the number of banks expanded from 88 in 1811 to 246 by 1817. As metal coins were drained into New England, numerous banks, with very small amounts of capital, opened in all parts of the country, and issued notes which circulated in place of coins. The money in circulation increased from forty-five to one hundred million dollars between 1811 and 1817. High inflationary prices, intensifying the demand for credit, inevitably followed. Large numbers of unlicensed or "wild-cat" banks, established by adventurers, issued absolutely worthless or counterfeit notes. Discounts on notes were frequently as high as 50 per cent. In this situation, the banks suspended specie payments, and small coins almost completely disappeared. Paper notes for as low as 2 cents were issued by many banks or individuals. Trade everywhere was conducted by paper script of hundreds of varieties and with different exchange rates in every locality.

As much of this worthless paper script evaporated in the hands of Western settlers who had borrowed money to buy land, distress grew in the West. Between 1815 and 1820, the debt owed the government for purchases from the Public Domain grew from around \$3,000,000 to over \$21,000,000.<sup>7</sup> Many were threatened with the loss of their land or became illegal squatters. The various relief laws, postponing the dates of payment, afforded no permanent solution.

In the face of general economic disorganization and chaos, Congress began to be flooded with memorials demanding various governmental measures to avert calamity. The rising manufacturers came forward for the first time as a real political force

with a powerful demand for protective tariffs. This was supported by many small producers, but was strenuously opposed by the Federalists representing the shipping interests, still looking toward the overseas carrying trade as the source of profits. The demand of the merchants was for trade agreements with foreign powers. Added to the manufacturers' clamor for protective tariffs was the demand that Federal revenue obtained from the sales of Western land be parceled out among the states for road and canal building. Many Western farmers, especially in the Northwest, desiring better outlets for their crops, supported the program for both protective tariffs and internal improvements. Manufacturers, small merchants, and individuals with government notes also began calling for a new National Bank as a means of stabilizing the currency, redeeming the national debt, and forcing the resumption by the banks of specie payments. At the same time, the demand for free land began to be raised by the Western farmers threatened with ruination. Their agitation was soon to be joined by movements among the artisans of the East, who sought to avoid sinking into the wage-earning class by acquiring land.

There had been occasional petitions to Congress for free land since 1797. A broader movement commenced in 1812 with the formation of the True American Society in Western Pennsylvania, Ohio, and afterwards in Illinois. Congressman Morrow of Ohio voiced its demands, pointing to those who were "poor and suffering, while thousands of acres of land, the property of the United States, are lying unoccupied." He maintained that every man was "entitled by nature to a portion of the soil of the country" and furthermore that "no man ought to possess more than 200 acres."<sup>8</sup> During the last year of the War of 1812, many citizens petitioned Congress for free land in the Northwest, arguing its necessity as a military precaution against Britain and the Indians. After the war, the veterans—privates and non-commissioned officers between eighteen and twenty-five years of age—were settled on lands, known as military tracts, lying between the Indian lands and the older communities. Clamor for free land for all increased.

During 1815, efforts were made by Congress to assist foreign

commerce. A law was passed offering to abolish discriminating duties against other countries when such duties against the United States were abolished. Shortly afterwards, a treaty with England abolished such duties in relation to certain goods exchanged directly. Similar treaties continued to be made under Monroe. These efforts, coming right after the merchants' treasonable conduct during the war, exposed the falsity of Federalist assertions that the Republicans were fanatically hostile to commerce.

The national debt contracted during the war amounted to \$120,000,000. Steps were necessary to make possible the redemption of this debt as well as to alleviate general economic distress. In his message to Congress in December, 1815, Madison presented as problems for discussion the establishment of a National Bank, protective tariffs, and the execution of the old plan of Jefferson and Gallatin for Federal aid for internal improvements. He also revived Jefferson's cherished project for a national university in the District of Columbia. Capitalist development was now forcing the proposal by the Republicans of many of Hamilton's economic policies—but unaccompanied by the Hamiltonian attack on democracy.

Just prior to the debates on the tariff in 1816, Congress, in accordance with old Republican policy, reduced the taxes passed during the war, thus lowering the revenue of the government by \$7,000,000. In the debates on the tariff, the only outstanding opponent to the principle of protection was John Randolph. However, the Federalists, led by Daniel Webster, and many Republicans opposed any tariff that would do more than protect existing manufactures. The spokesmen for the rising industrialists, on the other hand, demanded a tariff which would stimulate new industries and thus establish the "industrial independence of America." Both Clay and Calhoun were ardent champions of the new policy. The tariff as adopted applied especially to cotton and woolen goods and to sugar. It established an average duty of 20 per cent on all goods which could not be produced in America. The tariff of 1816 approximately doubled that of 1789.

The tariff proved to be no real barrier to British goods. Old

hands at trade manipulations, British agents found numerous means of evasion. Through false evaluations, scattered shipments, and the use of public auctions, Britain continued her offensive. Scarcely had the tariff of 1816 been passed before a clamor went up for increasing the duties.

The Federalists reversed their former stand on the bank, and opposed it stubbornly. It would help the republic, for whose overthrow they had conspired, to obtain financial stability, and they were anxious to intensify rather than alleviate distress. They were aware of the fact that the holders of government paper, who would now benefit from the bank, were primarily their nationalist rivals of the Middle Atlantic states. Furthermore, they were hostile to the rise of industries which would make the country economically independent of England, and they felt the bank would help accomplish this. Among the opponents of the bank was Daniel Webster, a Federalist, who had opposed the War of 1812 and supported the Hartford Convention. Although there still remained a few Republicans who opposed a National Bank on principle, party relations on this issue were reversed from what they had been in 1791.

The Republican Bank Bill, unlike Hamilton's measure in 1790, provided that shares sell for \$100 rather than the former \$400, and that subscriptions be taken for twenty days in twenty of the leading cities scattered from Portland to New Orleans. The aim was to prevent concentration of stock and to scatter the proceeds from the bank more widely over the country. The Bank Bill passed over Federalist opposition. It was signed on April 10, 1816, by Madison, who had led the fight against the first National Bank.

During July, 1816, when subscriptions to the bank were taken, there were 31,334 shareholders. Half of this number purchased \$4,000,000 worth of stock in Baltimore alone. In Philadelphia, stock amounting to \$9,000,000 was sold, one-third of which was bought by Stephen Girard. In all New England, there were only 3,000 shareholders who purchased stock amounting to slightly over \$4,000,000.<sup>9</sup>

Prior to the establishment of the National Bank, Congress determined to accept nothing but specie in payment for taxes,



duties, and debts. Pressure from Congress, from the new bank, and from small merchants forced the banks to begin the resumption of specie payment in an effort to cause deflation. Nevertheless, the pressure for credit from the Western farmers led to the continued increase of small banks until by 1818 there were 392. There were 59 in Kentucky alone and an equal number in Pennsylvania. The issuance of notes, unbacked by metal, continued until, in 1818, the group of banks chartered in 1814 had in circulation notes amounting to \$4,000,000, with only \$750,000 in specie behind them.<sup>10</sup> The crisis of 1819 later forced this fictitious capital to evaporate, and began to call forth that powerful movement against the National Bank which finally crystallized under the leadership of Andrew Jackson.

Prior to the debates on internal improvements, the election of 1816 took place. There was some demand among Republicans for a Northern President but it soon became clear that only James Monroe had sufficient support. Governor Daniel Tompkins of New York was selected as Monroe's running mate by the Republican caucus. Monroe received 183 electoral votes and the Federalist candidate, Rufus King, 34. The whole electoral vote of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Delaware was cast for King, but not one vote came from another state. Never again did a Federalist run for office in a national election.

Before Monroe took office, Calhoun introduced a bill for Federal aid for road and canal building, making a powerful plea for internal improvements as the means for national development. The bill passed Congress by a narrow margin, with the New England Federalists in solid opposition, and the representatives of the Middle Atlantic and Western states in almost unanimous support. The Southern representatives were divided. On the day before Monroe's inauguration, the bill was vetoed by Madison on the ground that it was unconstitutional.

In 1790, Madison had fought the bank with the same strict constructionist argument which he now used against Federal aid to internal improvements. In 1816, he had adopted loose construction in relation to the bank. He might just as easily have signed the bill for internal improvements on this same basis. Clearly something more than constitutionality motivated his

conduct. Unquestionably he was influenced by the opposition of the slaveholders. An economic bond existed between the Western farmers and Southern planters. Foodstuffs for Southern plantations were purchased from the West. The industrial centers were seeking to reach the West through roads and canals. These would strengthen their bonds with the West and thus help to break the economic alliance between plantation and back country. The effort of the slaveholders to keep the industrial North and the agrarian West divided manifested itself in the consistent blocking of Federal bills for internal improvements.

Monroe took a tour through the North and West shortly after his inauguration, and everywhere, even in New England, was hailed with warmth. Counter-revolution had lost all semblance of a mass base and the nation was united as never before in its history.

Strong men were appointed to Monroe's Cabinet. John Quincy Adams became Secretary of State; John C. Calhoun, Secretary of War; William H. Crawford, Secretary of the Treasury; and William Wirt, Attorney General.

In a message to Congress, Monroe took a position on internal improvements which shielded him from direct attack from either side of the controversy. A program of Federal aid was desirable, he asserted. However, he maintained that without a Constitutional amendment, Congress had no power to grant it. Congress was thus warned that any such act would receive his veto. In the absence of a two-thirds majority, Congress was unable to act. Since it seemed highly unlikely that two-thirds of the states would ratify an amendment, the advocates of Federal aid did not dare run the risk of defeat, which would kill all chances of such legislation in the future. Through taking advantage of this Constitutional argument and the fear of having an amendment defeated, the slaveholders continued throughout their years of growing power to block all Federal programs for internal improvements.

Thenceforward, road and canal building was undertaken through private initiative and with support from state and city governments. The great Erie Canal was launched in 1817 and completed by 1825. This definitely turned the tide of Western

trade toward New York. The home market was further expanded by the rapid growth of steamboat transportation. In 1818, the first steamboat route was established on the Great Lakes, and, by 1825, 125 steamboats were plying the Mississippi and Ohio.<sup>11</sup>

Unemployment and poverty steadily increased in the Northeast during the years 1817-19. In all the leading cities, local charitable groups opened soup kitchens, which were crowded. Organizations were formed by the industrial and financial interests to study the causes of distress. With monotonous uniformity, they attributed it to rum, shiftlessness, and private charity. A temperance movement was launched as the main solution. Recommendations were also made for the establishment of trade schools. In the course of the various reports, the need for popular education and for reform of the debtors' prisons was voiced.

Out of the public discussion, a movement against imprisonment for debt was started. At that time, poor people could be held in prison for years for debts of a few cents. While provision was made for food, clothing, and fuel for regular prisoners, debtors were left to the mercy of private charity. Unspeakable conditions prevailed in the debtors' cells, which were filled to overflowing during the years of the crisis. As a result of popular indignation, some reforms in the state debtor laws began to be made. This issue was raised more insistently and in an organized manner a decade later by the workingmen's parties.

While the problem of unemployment first reared its head in the Northeast, agricultural distress intensified in the West. As the National Bank opened branches in the states, it issued notes of its own which it exchanged for those of the private banks, and exerted pressure on the latter for their redemption. The local banks in turn pressed the people, and the result was widespread bankruptcy. In response to growing rage against the new National Bank, the state legislatures of Maryland, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee placed heavy taxes on its branches with the object of taxing them out of existence. A bitter controversy ensued which led, in 1819, to the famous Supreme Court decision of *McCulloch vs. Maryland*, which maintained that the

states had no power to tax institutions of the Federal Government. By this decision, the authority of the Supreme Court over state governments was further extended.

The *McCulloch vs. Maryland* decision was openly defied in Ohio. When the bank refused to pay taxes, the Ohio legislature removed from it the protection of the state laws, declaring the bank an outlaw. Some effort was made to apply the policy of having a majority of state legislatures rather than the Supreme Court judge the constitutionality of Federal Acts, as had been enunciated by the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions of 1798, but there was no general response from other states.

In the face of the growing demand for free land and as a means of solving its own inability to collect back payments, Congress in 1820 passed a new land law, the most important since the Ordinance of 1785. It abolished the credit system, which had led to such huge indebtedness, and simultaneously reduced the minimum number of acres offered for sale. After 1820, half-quarter sections of eighty acres could be purchased for cash at a minimum of \$1.25 an acre. Thereafter, it was possible, where bidding at auctions did not force up the price, to purchase a small farm for \$100. This law remained in force until a still more liberal act was passed in 1840.

Other measures were necessary to relieve the debt-ridden settlers. New pre-emption acts, granting squatters or settlers in default the right to purchase their lands before they should be sold at public auction, were passed. Between 1803 and 1825, thirteen separate pre-emption acts were enacted. A series of laws permitted debtors who lacked cash to relinquish part of their improved lands as payment on their debts. By these means, all debts for public land were liquidated by 1832. In 1824, when the debt was greatly reduced, debates started in Congress over the distribution among the states of the proceeds from land sales.

These laws represented a distinct though not a complete victory for the agrarian masses. The cry for free land grew louder with every year as farmers and artisans began to realize their strength. The new laws facilitated that vast influx into the West which inevitably led the small farmers, by degrees, into conflict

with the slaveholders and into an alliance with the industrial capitalists. Yet, in 1820, bonds of trade, common interests in Western expansion, common opposition to bankers, speculators, heavy taxes, and high prices for manufactured goods kept the old alliance of farmers and slaveholders from being severed except in certain localities found mainly in the Northwest.

Just as small free grants were not made to any except war veterans, so no large free grants were made by the Federal Government during any of the early decades of its history. The one big exception consisted of two grants to Lafayette for his services during the Revolution—one in 1803, the other in 1825.

While the farmers were taking advantage of the most liberal land law they had yet enjoyed and pressing for free land, the people in Ohio continued their efforts to tax the National Bank in defiance of the *McCulloch vs. Maryland* decision of the Supreme Court. The issue was finally decided against Ohio in 1824 by the Supreme Court decision of *Osborn vs. the Bank of the United States*, which was accepted.

By 1819, all but two of the Supreme Court judges were Republican. However, the new Republican judges came under the influence of John Marshall, who remained Supreme Court Justice for thirty-four years after his appointment. Although the Federalist Party was dead and its program of treason relegated to history, John Marshall continued to enunciate through the Supreme Court the early Federalist program of bourgeois nationalism. Hamilton's vision that a Jeffersonian victory would not spell the death of capitalism was proving true. Not only was there another large funded debt, another National Bank, a protective tariff such as Hamilton had never been able to obtain from his own party, but the Supreme Court, in the hands of Hamilton's greatest successor, was silently amending the Constitution, so as to strengthen the Federal Government on an undemocratic basis at the expense of the states.

By a whole series of decisions on issues which did not directly concern large numbers of people, the Supreme Court under John Marshall quietly established one precedent after another, usurping, without authorization by any legislative or popular action, powers not specified in the Constitution. Thus, the ma-

chinery of government was almost imperceptibly reorganized by a handful of judges under no democratic control. That machinery was not used in Marshall's day in any case which could arouse any considerable section of the population, and thus the people as a whole were not even aware of its existence. However, the passive acquiescence of the people to decisions establishing precedents whose significance they did not understand enabled the judges to perfect the judicial machinery to the point where, in due time, they might usurp rights delegated by the Constitution to Congress or to the states. The democratic forces, in spite of repeated warnings by the aged Thomas Jefferson, perfected no legal machinery of their own with which to counteract the judicial precedents. Thus, at a later date, on issues of major national importance, the people did not understand the origin of the powers of the Supreme Court and did not know how to resist that to which they had unwittingly consented. Such was the keen foresight of John Marshall. The system of checks and balances permitted what amounted to Federalist amendments to the Constitution after twenty years of Republican power. The Jeffersonian program for judgment on the constitutionality of laws by two-thirds of the states was cumbersome, and no plan for a centralized democratic review was proposed.

During these years of intensive national development, American writers began to make noteworthy contributions to American literature outside the realm of politics. The fathers of the truly national literature of America as distinct from that of colonial times, which was in no sense national, were such men as Benjamin Franklin, Samuel Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine, Philip Freneau, James Madison, John Taylor, Alexander Hamilton, and John Adams. The writings of these revolutionary giants, who linked theory with political practice, comprised one of the greatest contributions to the political theory of the world. American literature thus had an origin in which it may take great pride. These men based their political theory on philosophy as did the great Encyclopaedists of France, but, unlike the French philosophers, their theory was enriched by practical experience in leading a revolution and in founding

a national democratic republic. Their writings, composed in the heat of battle—polemics, pamphlets, tracts, essays, and letters—were a distinctly new type of literature in the history of mankind. Some outstanding contributions to general scientific literature were made by such scientists as Benjamin Rush and by such refugees to America as Thomas Cooper and Joseph Priestley. However, non-political and non-scientific writings during the formative period of the American Republic consisted almost altogether of imitations of English books and were based on English themes. Revolutionary, political, and economic problems were so paramount that leading minds had little time for literary creation in the realms of fiction. During the period of peaceful internal development following the War of 1812, when there was no immediate threat to the independence of the country and no serious internal conflict threatened to tear the Union asunder, men of talent began to express themselves in a variety of literary forms.

The first outstanding author to deal with non-political American themes was Washington Irving. His humorous *Knickerbocker's History of New York* appeared in 1809 and his *Sketch Book*, containing the famous *Rip Van Winkle* and *Legend of Sleepy Hollow*, in 1819. The themes of his successful books generally dealt with the colonial past and the quaint or picturesque features of his own state, New York. Although a writer with rare gifts, he was too much of a Federalist to feel completely at home in his own country and age. Thus, he slipped into writing of the picturesque past of Europe, where he spent many years of travel. His *Life of Washington*, full of Federalist distortions, unfortunately influenced many to see the great patriot through Federalist glasses. His politics prevented him from ever voicing that which was distinctively new and unique in the national life of America—its pioneering democratic spirit.

The first novelist to deal more thoroughly with American themes was James Fenimore Cooper. With his stories of the American Revolution, especially the privateering tale, *The Pilot*, and with his Leatherstocking Indian tales, he began to capture world-wide attention during the early 1820's. As a Rousseauian

democrat, Cooper voiced to a certain extent the sentiments of his people and his age. However, the utopianism of his philosophy converted his Indians into Rousseau's "unspoiled primitive man." Although he inspired the whole Chateaubriand school of writers in Europe, he gave to the world an utterly romantic and false picture of the American wilderness. As a utopian democrat, hating the *bourgeois* democracy which was actually arising, he slipped into an idealistic glorification of the old landed gentry of New York, from which he sprang, and ended by writing bitter novels against the rent strikes of the tenants which swept the Hudson River Valley in the 1840's.

The first of the great flock of New England writers was William Cullen Bryant, whose boyhood poems had been appearing since 1807, his famous *Thanatopsis* being published in 1811 when he was seventeen. Although some of the boyhood poems of Bryant were Federalist satires on the Jeffersonians, which reflected the influence of his environment, the democratic currents which affected his youth converted him into one of America's great liberals during the subsequent conflict with the slaveholders of the South.

The democratic movement, growing stronger in New England after the War of 1812, gave rise to Unitarianism, which carried the Jeffersonian fight against Congregationalism into the church and the theological schools. It captured Harvard, and became the religious vehicle for the rising industrial capitalists and middle class. It helped win, in Connecticut, in 1818, a written Constitution which abolished the established church. Bryant and many other young writers, who later contributed to New England's literary fame, were inspired by this new religious current. It was from the bosom of Unitarianism that New England transcendentalism arose. This philosophy, destined to become the revolutionary theory of abolitionism, was profoundly influenced by the philosophy of German idealism as developed by Kant and Fichte, the predecessors of Hegel. Through transcendentalism, idealistic historical dialectic became native to America, supplanting the mechanistic materialism of the eighteenth century.

A book appeared in New York in 1829 which laid the theo-

retical basis for the free land movement. It was written by a simple artisan, Thomas Skidmore, and voiced the program of artisans and wage workers for emancipation from their dependence on capital through the acquisition of free land. Skidmore was active in the first Workingmen's Party of New York and formed a Left wing which split from that party to fight for free land. His book was entitled *The Inalienable Right to Property* and was based on the general theory of Jeffersonian democracy. However, Skidmore developed that theory into a more detailed program than any ever enunciated by Jefferson himself.

Included within the inalienable right to life, Skidmore maintained, there lay necessarily the right to land, upon which life depends. He contrasted the huge inequalities in the ownership of property in the East with the existence of public land to the West. In Europe, he declared, only violent revolution could abolish inequality. But in America he proclaimed another alternative. Free grants of land to every young man attaining twenty-one and to every unmarried woman could, according to his program, not only convert all Americans into free property-holders, but abolish differences in the East by draining from that area all who toiled for others. He proposed what finally became law under Lincoln, that every settler be granted a quarter-section (one hundred and sixty acres) free of charge.

Going beyond the Homestead Act as enacted in 1862, he sought to prevent any possible re-emergence of inequality. Grants, according to his plan, should be made in perpetuity so long as the settler tilled his land. But the right to sell or rent land was to be forever abolished. If the settler wished to move, Skidmore proposed that his land revert to the government and he have the right to another homestead. No one should be permitted by law, he argued, to own more than one hundred and sixty acres, for no man could by his own toil use more. Championing the Biblical quotation that "he who shall not work neither shall he eat," Skidmore urged that a man owning more property than he could use through his own labor be treated as one running amuck in society with a gun, for he used such property as a weapon whereby to live on the labor of others.

Skidmore did not propose the immediate confiscation of big holdings in the East—merely because the West offered an easier solution. But he advocated a law whereby the government should claim holdings exceeding one hundred and sixty acres after the deaths of the present owners. By such means, he proposed to abolish inequality at the end of one generation.

Skidmore also considered the problem of those living in towns. Here, he demanded a free grant of two city lots to every citizen over twenty-one—one for a home, the other for his shop or business. He had plans for manufacturing establishments as well, and proposed that they be collectively owned by their workers.

Here was the most detailed and, therefore, the most utopian program for the abolition of inequalities to arise out of the American Revolution. It was the elaboration in a very specific form of what was implicit in Jeffersonian democracy. In seeking to encompass the problem of rising industrial capitalism, it inevitably enunciated collective ownership as the solution, though Skidmore's program for small co-operative ventures was necessarily subordinate to his general program for small and equal private enterprises for the majority of the people. In the form of Skidmore's writings, there exists an illustration of the first step in the transition from bourgeois-democratic to utopian socialist ideology.

## CHAPTER XV

### THE FIRST MAJOR CONFLICT OVER SLAVERY

THE triumph of democracy and the growth of nationalism after the War of 1812 were expressed by the complete disintegration of the Federalist Party on a national scale following its last national campaign in 1816. Its members moved into

the Republican Party, for there was nowhere else to go. So discredited were the Federalist leaders that not even a new party could be formed. Thus, after 1816, the Republican Party began to embrace all free classes. On the surface, party strife on a national scale ceased. Not until 1832 was a second party—the Whigs—officially formed, although in 1824 organized factions openly and officially ran candidates for the Presidency. For this reason, the period of 1816 to 1824 has generally been called the “Era of Good Feeling” or the “Period of Harmony.” Jefferson’s dream of national unity on a republican basis seemed consummated. However, the unity was surface-deep, and was expressed merely by the fact that the classes contended within the framework of one party. There was unity only because the strength of democracy was such that none of the exploiting classes—merchants, industrialists, or slaveholders—could find a mass base outside of the Republican Party. The class conflict, therefore, took place *within* that party and led to the formation of factions, which, in 1824, tore it asunder. While farmers and artisans sought to hold their party to its Jeffersonian line, each of the exploiting classes sought to wrest control for itself. The superficiality of the so-called “harmony” was revealed by the fact that it was during the years of the greatest formal unity within the Republican Party that there occurred the bitter fight over Missouri, during which for the first time the threat of secession and civil war arose from the slaveholders of the South.

During the years that followed Jackson’s seizure of the Southwest from the Indians, slaveholders from the old Tidewater poured like a spring flood into the Black Belt lands of Georgia and of the territory that entered the Union in 1817 and 1819 as Mississippi and Alabama. Public land in this area sold for as much as \$70 an acre, even for \$120 in one instance. Unrestricted fraud was practiced by speculators, whose shady combinations grew like mushrooms. Small farmers moved into the Black Belt first, cleared the lands, and afterwards sold at a profit. The planters thereafter came in great wagon trains with their slaves and supplies, after selling their old plantations to new planters just before their overworked soil deteriorated. The pioneers then moved to clear new lands for the oncoming waves of

planters. Thus, the pioneers were absorbed in a fever of speculation. Some accumulated capital and bought slaves and plantations themselves. But the majority of those who cleared the Black Belt fell victims to the banks and big speculators and were pushed into the hills to the north of the plantation country, where slavery never entered.

Some idea of the growth of slavery can be obtained from the figures on cotton production and on exports. In 1810, 177,824 bales of cotton were produced; in 1820, 334,728; in 1830, 732,218. Between 1811 and 1815, the average annual production was 80,000,000 lbs., of which slightly over 52 per cent was exported. Between 1816 and 1820, the average annual production was 141,000,000 lbs., of which 67 per cent was exported. From 1821 to 1825, the average annual production rose to 209,000,000 lbs., of which over 72 per cent was exported. The total Negro population increased from 1,377,808 in 1812 to 2,328,642 by 1830.<sup>12</sup> The average price of slaves rose from \$300 in 1793 to \$600 by 1813. It was \$800 in 1830.<sup>13</sup> In 1800 the major export from the United States was tobacco. However, production of tobacco remained constant, while cotton expanded. The highest tobacco production, reached in 1796, was not equaled again until 1840. The production of rice in South Carolina also increased, as did that of hemp in Kentucky and Tennessee and later in Missouri and Arkansas. Not only did slavery push into the Gulf Coast, but increasingly it expanded along the rivers into the Piedmont of the old South, the original home of the non-slaveholding independent farmers, who formed the first mass base of the early Jeffersonian movement.

The plantation economy was not bound by ties of trade to the rising capitalist economy of the Northeast or of the nation as a whole. While planters bought foodstuffs from Western farmers, the bulk of their produce was sold in Europe, especially to England, and it was from England that they bought vast quantities of their supplies. It was to obtain cheap manufactured goods from England that they increasingly opposed protective tariffs. To prevent economic ties between the West and the rising industries of the Northeast, they blocked Federal programs for internal development. Thus, the expansion of slavery was in



contradiction to the development of the national economy. Not being dependent upon the rising national economy, which in fact threatened their drive for control of the Federal Government, the slaveholders were able to assert independence of the nation as a whole. This explains their readiness after the War of 1812 to threaten secession at the slightest tendency to place obstacles in the path of the growth of their system.

When the old Federalist merchants lost their former overseas commerce, they took over the carrying trade of the Southern slaveholders. Northern bankers increasingly found their most fertile sphere of investment in the plantations. Thus, the merchants, who had formerly threatened dismemberment of the Union in their own name, became linked by degrees, after the War of 1812, with the slaveholders, who were becoming the new threat to the Union. Profits were far greater from investments in the fabulously wealthy cotton kingdom, as it expanded, than in industry. Thus, the merchants, no longer as independent of other classes as they were before the War of 1812, became attached to another class not linked with the national economy, and increasingly voiced its aims. It was this economic connection which finally formed the basis for Copperhead efforts to restore peace on slaveholder terms during the Civil War. Thus, Northern merchants and bankers by degrees began to support all slaveholder demands as the means of appeasing the class on which their profits depended. The slaveholders, using the Northern commercial interests as allies, preferred to remain within the Union, in order to use its strength for their aims, but they were in a position, if the Federal Government violated their will, to find credit in England, to rely on British shipping interests, and thus to threaten secession. The Northern merchants, after losing their old foreign trade, stood in mortal fear of Southern secession, but their program for averting it increasingly became that of conceding to the slaveholders their every demand.

In their constant efforts to expand slavery into new territory, the slaveholders always had two motives, one economic and one political. Single-crop agriculture, required by the slave economy, rapidly ruined the soil. Slaves were multiplying and

had to be fed. To employ them profitably, the constant accessibility of new land was required. Over and above this economic motive for the territorial expansion of slavery, was the political need to control enough state governments to block all anti-slavery action through the Federal Government. The population in the North was growing steadily, because of the rising industries and the accessibility of cheap land in regions not monopolized by planters. Not only were most of the new immigrants entering the Northern states, but vast numbers of pioneers from the South were constantly moving into the Northwest. The result of this unequal growth in population was that the slaveholders were never able to obtain a majority in the House of Representatives. Only by securing the admission of new slave states did they have a chance of gaining control of the Senate as the means of checking anti-slavery legislation originating in the House.

Prior to the struggle over the admission of Missouri as a slave state, which commenced in 1818, negotiations were undertaken by the Federal Government for the annexation of Florida and Texas. This effort to increase the area into which slavery could penetrate aroused awareness of the need to impose restrictions on further slaveholder expansion.

Following the War of 1812, Britain not only renewed her trade war with the United States, but continued to employ agents in Spanish-held Florida to organize plots against American sovereignty. In 1815 a British colonel mobilized the Creek warriors who had escaped from Jackson into Florida, and brought them together with the Seminoles under Chief Billy Bowlegs. At the same time, Britain sought to gather under her leadership fugitive slaves who had escaped into Florida. As in the past, she attempted to convert all those with genuine grievances into pawns of her imperial policy.

A thousand or more fugitive slaves, organized under chiefs and captains, had for some time been living in Florida, where they had carved farms and pastures out of the wilderness. All through the war, there were signs of unrest among the slaves, and many insurrectionary plots were discovered. Just as Indian wars were a punishment for America's violation of Indian rights,

so these were punishments for failure to extend democracy to the enslaved Negro people. In 1815, the escaped slaves in Florida seized a fort, well supplied with arms and ammunition, which had been conveniently abandoned by the British. It became known as Negro Fort. Their bondage growing more intense, and inspired by stories of Haiti and of the anti-slavery crusades of such Latin American revolutionists as Bolivar, the slaves were becoming more militant. From their fort, the fugitives conducted raids upon Georgia plantations, helping their brothers to escape and seizing food supplies and cattle. American troops were sent into Florida. They blew up the Negro Fort, causing wholesale slaughter. But British intrigues in Florida continued.

Meanwhile, aggressive plots against Spanish sovereignty were being launched on American soil. In 1817, a group of adventurers, privateers, and pirates, including many individuals recruited in the Southern states with the support of some slaveholders, seized Amelia Island. A similar group entered Texas, and proclaimed a republic at Galveston. These adventures were in defiance of the policy of the United States Government. The so-called Texas Republic, having no real power, collapsed. In 1818, American troops were sent to seize Amelia Island from the adventurers. The same troops were then sent into Florida against the Seminole Indians.

The Seminole War which followed was in reality a continuation of the War of 1812. Andrew Jackson was placed in command in Florida, and he conducted a vigorous campaign against the heterogeneous forces which England had assembled—Indians, fugitive slaves, escaped prisoners, and adventurers. As always in such conflicts, the fugitive slaves and Indians were fighting heroically for their own freedom, but had unwittingly become pawns in the hands of England. In the course of occupying Florida, Jackson captured, court-martialed, and executed two British spies.

The fact that England and the United States were involved in such a conflict on Spanish soil indicated that the nominal power of Spain had in reality ceased to exist. In 1818, negotiations were started with Spain for the annexation of Florida

and the settlement of the boundary between the United States and Mexico. The delineation of the boundaries of Louisiana in the original treaty of purchase was so vague that, according to some interpretations, it included Texas. Many slaveholders, therefore, demanded that Texas be annexed as well. While there was opposition from the anti-slavery forces to the annexation of Texas, there was no such hostility to the incorporation of Florida into the Union. Although expansion into Florida meant the admission of another slave state, more than the issue of slavery was involved. The possession of Florida was clearly necessary to round out the natural boundaries of the nation and to remove from its borders a convenient base for aggression. Thus, the annexation of Florida was definitely a progressive step necessary for national defense and development. The fact that it would inevitably become a slave state, and the additional demand for Texas, intensified the determination of the forces threatened by slaveholder expansion to take a stand against the extension of slavery in Missouri. Slave and free states had entered the Union alternately since the adoption of the Constitution. Thus, a balance between their representatives had been maintained in the Senate. At the outbreak of the War of 1812, there were eighteen states—half free and half slave. In 1816, Indiana entered the Union; in 1817, Mississippi; and 1818, Illinois. In that year, when there were eleven free and ten slave states, both Alabama and Missouri, where slavery had been introduced, applied for admission. To have granted the appeal of both Alabama and Missouri, at the time when negotiations with Spain for the annexation of both Florida and Texas were under way, would have given the slave states a majority of one and a perspective of further increasing that majority. According to legislation hitherto enacted, only three more states could be expected definitely to enter the Union as free states—Michigan and Wisconsin in the old Northwest, and Maine, in the event that its appeal for separation from Massachusetts should be granted. Missouri lay in the Louisiana Territory far to the north of the line along the Ohio River which had been established east of the Mississippi by the Northwest Ordinance as the line of

division between slavery and freedom. No congressional action in relation to slavery had been enacted for the vast Louisiana Territory, equal in size to all the rest of the Union, and the slaveholders claimed that the treaty of purchase, specifying that Louisiana should enjoy all the rights of other territories in the Union, meant that no restrictions on the rights of slaveholders could be imposed there. Acquiescence to the slaveholder claims in 1818 would have yielded to the planters the right to extend their system over more than three-fourths of the Union and to obtain complete control of the Senate with all its treaty-making and appointive powers, as well as its veto power over the House.

For the first time, the nation sensed the full significance of the slaveholder menace arising in the South. The concession to the slaveholders made in 1787, when their system was not expanding, had seemed insignificant in spite of warnings from Jefferson and others. The country had regarded the Northwest Ordinance as final. No major fight arose over slavery when the state of Louisiana was admitted in 1812, because this was an old slave region, and the main problem at the time was the war with England. There had been bitter resentment among small producers and industrial capitalists over slaveholder sabotage of the Canadian campaigns during the War of 1812 and to their resistance to bills for Federal aid for internal improvements. There was opposition to their demand for both Florida and Texas. Yet the slaveholders in the main had supported the war, and their obstruction to national development had formerly seemed slight in comparison with the treason of the Federalists.

There was no strong abolitionist movement with a clear-cut program or decisive influence in 1818, although there had been a continuous emancipationist movement since the formation of the Pennsylvania Anti-Slavery Society under the leadership of Benjamin Franklin in 1775. Between 1794 and 1806, there had been annual conventions of the American Convention of Delegates from Anti-Slavery Societies. From 1806 to 1815, it met every three years, though after 1809 there were no delegates from the deep Southern states. This organization sought humane treatment of slaves, published literature, and petitioned for abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia.

During 1815, the New Jersey Quaker, Benjamin Lundy, who had lived in the South for many years, began to organize abolitionist societies. Quakers such as James G. Birney of Alabama and William Swain of North Carolina were active in voicing anti-slavery sentiments and in seeking reforms in the treatment of slaves through state legislation. Anti-slavery currents appeared in various churches. The Methodist General Conference in 1812 forbade any slaveholder to serve as elder of the church. In 1816, the Presbyterian General Assembly passed a resolution against slavery. When the Baptist Convention refused to take a stand, a number of local churches withdrew. Democracy in the Southern states was still strong enough to allow anti-slavery societies to function freely.

Through the formation in 1816 of the American Colonization Society, the slaveholders sought to divert anti-slavery sentiments into channels beneficial to the maintenance of slavery. They stood in constant dread of the presence of free Negroes in the South. Not only did their presence intensify the desire for freedom among the enslaved Negroes, but they continuously aided their brothers in making escapes or in planning revolts. The aim of the American Colonization Society was to settle the free Negroes in Africa. Its founders included many of the largest slaveholders, such as John Randolph of Roanoke, who made it quite clear from the beginning that the purpose of the society was "to secure the property of every master to, in, and over his slaves." Many individuals with genuine anti-slavery sentiments were led to believe that by supporting this society they would somehow or other weaken the institution of slavery, but no such illusions were cherished by the free Negroes themselves. From the beginning, they regarded the new society with horror, opposing it through mass meetings and resolutions.

In 1818, the year of the Missouri conflict, the convention of Anti-Slavery Societies chose a new name, "The American Convention for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery and Improving the Condition of the African Race." Thereafter, it met every other year until 1829. It ceased to function shortly before the emergence of the militant Abolitionist movement founded by William Lloyd Garrison. However, it was not the small hand-

ful of abolitionists in 1818 who led the opposition to the expansionist aims of the slaveholders. Several decades were to pass before Abolitionists began to play a leading role among the classes hostile to the expansion of slavery.

When Missouri applied for admission as a state, large sections of industrialists and small producers, joined by some of the old Federalists, determined to prohibit the growth of slavery beyond the Mississippi as formerly Jefferson had sought to prevent its crossing the mountains. General Tallmadge of New York made a motion in the House that Missouri be admitted on condition that no more slaves be imported and that the children of the slaves already in Missouri be emancipated upon reaching the age of twenty-five. This motion unleashed all the fury of the rising slaveholder oligarchy. The storm that arose was a dress rehearsal for the debates over the territory conquered from Mexico in 1848. The motion passed the House, which represented the majority opinion in the United States, but was defeated in the Senate. For over a year while the fate of Missouri remained in the balance, the issue was debated throughout the nation.

When seriously threatened for the first time in its history, the lust for land and power, the fierce sharls that emanated from the slaveholder class became truly ominous to those able to read the shadows of coming years. For the first time, open threats of secession appeared in Southern papers. This threat was thenceforward heard with increasing arrogance at every major crisis. The words "disunion" and "civil war" were voiced on the floor of Congress. Seeking to shift the onus of disunion to the anti-slavery forces, Congressman Cobb of Georgia charged that Tallmadge had kindled a fire which only seas of blood could extinguish.

The belligerence of slaveholder politicians threw terror into the hearts of the Northern and Western capitalists and middle classes, who needed the Southern markets, had money invested in the South, and engaged in the shipping of Southern crops. Since the market for cotton and tobacco was primarily in England, the planters could afford a show of independence from the nation with which they were not fully unified. Taking complete

advantage of the dependence of the North and the West upon the Southern markets, the planters brought the nation to its knees time and time again with the threat of secession.

During this controversy over Missouri negotiations with Spain over Florida and Texas began. Spain demanded in return for Florida the whole of the old Louisiana Territory and countered America's charge of aggression from Florida with charges that privateers of the revolutionary Spanish colonies were being fitted in American ports. The government pointed to steps being taken to stop this. However, many privateers, disguised as vessels of other countries, were actually being supplied in America.

Eventually, the United States surrendered the claim to Texas and consented to the annexation of only Florida, with the understanding that claims of \$5,000,000 against Spain by American citizens should be paid by the United States. The treaty was signed on February 22, 1823, and Andrew Jackson was appointed first Territorial Governor of Florida. The ratification of the treaty was delayed two years, because it was discovered that just before the agreement the Spanish Crown had made land grants embracing the whole of the unoccupied lands of Florida to three noblemen. However, revolution broke out in Spain on March 8, 1820, and the short-lived constitutional government of Spain revoked the land grants. The treaty for the annexation of Florida was finally signed in February, 1823. The failure of the Monroe administration to obtain Texas was bitterly denounced by slaveholders, who were already penetrating that area.

Alabama was admitted without contest as a slave state in 1819. This established eleven free and eleven slave states. When Maine petitioned for admission as a state, the basis was formed for a compromise on the Missouri question. The slaveholders refused to admit Maine unless Missouri was admitted without any restrictions on slavery. The anti-slavery forces would not agree to this unless restrictions were placed upon the rest of the old Louisiana Territory. It was finally decided to admit Missouri as a slave state with the provision that never again should another slave state west of the Mississippi be admitted north of

the line of  $36^{\circ} 30'$ , which marked the southern boundary of Missouri. The Missouri Compromise was ratified in March, 1820. Every Southern member of Congress voted to exclude slavery forever from the Territory north of  $36^{\circ} 30'$ .

When the Missouri Constitution was submitted for approval, it contained a clause prohibiting the entrance into the state of free Negroes. There was bitter opposition to this in Congress on the grounds that free Negroes were citizens in some states, and it was eventually approved in August, 1821, with the weakened provision that the entrance of citizens of other states into Missouri should not be prohibited.

The Missouri Compromise was a submission to slaveholder demands. While the planters were prevented from achieving their full program, they were victorious on the immediate issue of Missouri. From this time onward until the election of Lincoln in 1860, the majority of industrial capitalists and middle classes, intimidated by ever renewed threats of Southern secession, continued to yield to the slaveholder offensive. Not until the Dred Scott decision of 1857 threatened to extend slavery throughout the Union did the majority of the anti-slavery forces fully realize the fatal and suicidal nature of their previous compromises and abandon once and for all their old policy of conciliation.

To the politically backward, the slavery controversy seemed permanently settled in 1821. To the observing, the Missouri Compromise merely ended the first skirmish of a conflict to which there could be no peaceful solution. Thomas Jefferson did not fully understand the issue. He identified the new and genuine anti-slavery movement with the demagoguery of the former Federalists, who, for secessionist aims of their own, had often hypocritically denounced slavery. However, he realized the seriousness of the conflict, writing that "This momentous question, like a fire-bell in the night awakened and filled me with terror. I considered it at once as the knell of the Union. It is hushed indeed for the moment. But this is a reprieve only, not a final sentence."<sup>4</sup> To old John Adams, the Missouri Compromise seemed like "the title-page to a great tragic drama." John Quincy Adams, his son, confided to his diary that he saw

no solution to the division which had arisen except civil war. He foresaw the secession of the Southern states, and wondered if it might not, in the long run, be best, since such secession would occasion the sending of troops into the South as the only force which could abolish the system of slavery.<sup>5</sup> The calm which followed the Missouri Compromise was like that which follows the first flash of lightning from a coming storm.

Viewing the territory of the United States in 1821, it seemed that only two more slave states, Arkansas and Florida, could enter the Union. While only two more free states could enter east of the Mississippi, a huge territory for possible free expansion existed to the west, north of  $36^{\circ} 30'$ . It was inevitable, therefore, that, with the threatened loss of a balance of power, the slaveholders should seek either conquest of foreign soil or the nullification of the Missouri Compromise. In fact, they afterwards sought both. Even as Missouri entered the Union, land grants for cotton plantations and cattle ranches were being obtained from Mexico in Texas, after troops, mobilized in Natchez, had failed to establish an independent republic in that province. Wholesale migration began and this finally led to the annexation of Texas and to the Mexican War. Conquest of Mexican soil subsequently tore to shreds the neat system planned in 1820.

The Indian policy of the Monroe administration must be interpreted partially in the light of the Missouri Compromise. As Secretary of War, John C. Calhoun, responsible for Indian affairs, recommended that the Indian tribes east of the Mississippi, who had been driven from most of their lands by the War of 1812, should after treaty negotiations, be moved into the unoccupied lands west of the Mississippi. While this policy was enunciated as a guarantee of peace, the fact that the whole territory east of the Mississippi and north of Missouri and the line  $36^{\circ} 30'$ , was proposed as permanent Indian country indicates that the aim was to block forever the entrance into the Union of free states from that area. That this policy might not be too patent, Calhoun also included Western Arkansas (the present state of Oklahoma) in his proposed Indian land. This proposal that a "permanent Indian frontier" be established was



definitely a scheme for making permanent the division between slave and free states established in 1820. Monroe accepted Calhoun's plan for a permanent Indian frontier, recommended it to Congress shortly before his death, was repudiated, and Congress adopted the proposal in 1825. Following that action, negotiations commenced with the tribes, who, one by one, in the face of overpowering odds, reluctantly agreed. The treaties they signed before starting their Western treks guaranteed them the Western territory throughout the life of the American Republic. It should have been clear to the farsighted that the republic would not keep faith with the Indians. Not only did the old traditional hostility to the Red man and utter disregard for his rights remain among the people, but the clash of contending classes meant inevitably that the bitter struggle developing over slavery would lead to a total disregard for the tribes, who were not a part of the American nation and thus not participants in its internal struggles. At the very moment when the new Indian policy was being adopted, merchants from St. Louis were opening a trade route along the trail that led to Santa Fe right through the heart of the Indian country. The penetration of Texas, which led to the Texan and Mexican wars, made inevitable subsequent efforts to curb slaveholder expansion by the settlement of more free territory. Nothing could hold back the pressure of the developing social forces from the Western land. The time was approaching when slaveholders, like foreign monarchist agents in the past, would seek to pose as the Indians' best friend, in order to lead their justifiable struggles into uprisings against the free population. The "Indian frontier" never became even a temporary frontier except in the plans of the politicians. While slaveholders were penetrating Texas, a few farsighted abolitionists began to intensify their efforts to mobilize a more determined opposition to slavery. In the same year that Moses Austin obtained grants in Mexico, Benjamin Lundy founded his paper, *The Genius of Universal Emancipation*. Lundy afterwards planned to colonize free Negroes and small homesteaders in Texas as a means of counteracting slaveholder expansion, a policy which was later applied in Kansas. It was through Lundy

that William Lloyd Garrison was inspired to found his Anti-Slavery Society in 1833. During this same period, debates occurred in Congress over the enforcement of the law against African slave traffic. Congress passed a provision for colonizing in Africa those Negroes brought illegally from that land. In 1820, the slave traffic was pronounced piracy and made punishable by death. The slaves themselves were never ignorant of the political conflicts over their status. The slaveholder offensive in Missouri showed them that their chains were being more heavily forged, but it also revealed that their allies were growing. Thus, just one year after the admission of Missouri, there were preparations in South Carolina for what promised to be one of the biggest of all the slave insurrections. A year before, there had been extensive activities in the swamps of North Carolina by fugitives who assisted their brothers to escape, and the state militia had been called out. Denmark Vesey, the leader of the plans for revolt in Charleston, had purchased his own freedom in 1800, and was in contact with Negroes in Haiti. He mobilized his followers by preaching from the Bible. The date for revolt was set in July, when most of the planters would be away from Charleston to escape the heat. The day selected was Sunday, as many slaves came to the city on that day. For months beforehand, weapons were secretly collected. According to testimony at the trials, some 9,000 slaves were involved. Five columns of slaves were to attack Charleston from different directions, while others on horseback were to patrol the streets. The places where arms were stored were designated for attack. Plans included seizure of the shipping in the ports. If unable to hold out against the troops, the slaves were prepared to seize ships and sail for Haiti. The plot was betrayed by a traitor, and arrests of one hundred and thirty-one Negroes followed. Of these, thirty-five were hanged. Most of them, like Vesey, went to the scaffold with the utmost heroism, refusing to the last to reveal the names of their comrades. Four white men were arrested and imprisoned for rendering aid to the slaves. Only military force prevented a widespread effort to rescue the arrested leaders from prison. For months afterwards,



sporadic outbreaks occurred and preparations for revolt were detected in many areas of the Carolinas. The number of patrols was increased in Charleston, and restrictions on both slaves and free Negroes were intensified throughout the South. Sentiment against slavery grew simultaneously.

During the years 1821-22, Liberia was purchased by the American Colonization Society. In the decade of 1820-30, over \$100,000 was raised by the society, and 1,162 Negroes were transported to Liberia. The majority died from malaria and other diseases shortly after landing. The weekly births of Negroes in the United States exceeded the total number transported to Africa in the course of fifteen years.

The year of the Missouri Compromise was election year. The presidential election of 1820 was unique in American history. Monroe's candidacy for a second term was unopposed, and he received every electoral vote but one, cast by a former Federalist who declared that he wanted Washington to be the only president to receive a unanimous election. As a symptom of the unification of all classes within the Republican Party, the aged John Adams served as an elector and cast his vote for Monroe. In spite of the electoral unity, the bitter controversy over Missouri had revealed that there was no real unity. It was clear that even the superficial electoral unity could not outlast Monroe's second administration. The conflicting class groupings were merely biding their time, in the face of Monroe's inevitable re-election, for a real contest in 1824. Scarcely had Monroe been elected before the campaigns for the next election began.

All those classes which saved the nation from destruction by the slaveholder rebellion during the Civil War, with the exception of the industrial working class, were in movement politically during Monroe's first administration. All came into conflict with the slaveholders during those years. Each began to raise its own positive program—the slaves under Denmark Vesey, the industrial capitalists in their demand for tariffs and internal improvements, the small producers in their call for free land. These classes did not join forces in a common coalition at this time. During the period of conflict with the Federalist merchants and speculators, manufacturers and small producers

had been in alliance with the slaveholders. With the defeat of the Federalist menace and the rise of slavery as a major threat, the basis for the old Jeffersonian alliance began to crumble and political realignment began to occur. The classes threatened by the cotton kingdom temporarily offered resistance over Missouri in 1818, but, after the compromise, suffered the delusion that the slaveholder threat had been averted. The alliance of vast sections of Western farmers with the slaveholders was not broken. Issues other than slavery came to the forefront of national political life.

The formation of a large and decisive anti-slavery alliance did not take place until after the repeal of the Missouri Compromise in 1854. The building of the new Republican Party at that time was effected by joining the common national program for resistance to slaveholder expansion with the program of the industrial capitalists for protective tariffs and Federal aid and the program of the small producers for free land. The basis for that junction was the impossibility for the realization of either positive program until the slaveholder grip on the Federal Government was broken. All of these programs were voiced by organized movements during Monroe's first administration, yet these movements developed separately until they were united by the Republican Party of Abraham Lincoln in 1856. The slaveholders of 1820 were driving toward complete state power through the Federal Government, but they had not yet captured it. They were driving toward complete control of the old democratic Jeffersonian party, but they were far from obtaining it. They had no mass following with which to launch a new party of their own. The battle for the West was regarded as having been settled, and there still seemed to be enough unsettled land to enable all free, property-holding classes to develop their enterprises without conflict. That was the illusion which was elevated to a political creed by Henry Clay during the years following the Missouri Compromise.

CHAPTER XVI  
HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE AGAINST OLD  
WORLD AGGRESSION

WHILE the various classes continued to raise conflicting programs relating to domestic policy, their common national interests were challenged during Monroe's second administration by another major threat from Europe. In his first Inaugural Address, Monroe had warned of continued danger from European powers and had advocated national preparedness. "Experiencing the fortune of other nations," he declared, "the United States may be again involved in war, and it may, in that event be the object of the adverse party to overthrow our Government, to break our Union, and demolish us as a Nation. Our distance from Europe, and the just, moderate, and pacific policy of our Government, may form some security against these dangers; but they ought to be anticipated and guarded against." The years following Waterloo were years of savage reaction in Europe. The restored monarchs of Prussia, Austria, and France were brought together by the Tsar of Russia to form the Holy Alliance, which revived the antiquated doctrine of the divine rights of kings and enunciated as its aim the preservation of the Christian religion against atheistical attacks. By Christian religion was meant monarchy and by atheism democracy. During and immediately following the Napoleonic wars, one Spanish colony after another in Latin America proclaimed independence and established a republican form of government. The Spanish Crown appealed to the Holy Alliance for aid in recovering its lost colonies, but had to promise rewards to those "instruments of God." To Russia was offered the Pacific Coast, while, according to rumors, France was promised Mexico. The success of this scheme would again have encircled the United States

with monarchist aggressors, anxious to add the first and most persistent of the "atheistic" democracies to their empires. In preparing to execute this scheme, Tsarist Russia in 1816 established two colonies along the Pacific Coast.

In 1820, democratic revolutions occurred in Spain and Naples. The Spanish revolution, which facilitated settlement of the Florida dispute, was joyfully hailed in America; and Henry Clay immediately raised the demand in Congress for recognition of the Latin American republics. Prior to this, the United States, to avoid trouble with Spain, had refrained from such recognition. This was strenuously opposed by the slaveholders, who feared the anti-slavery character of the revolutionary movements of Spanish America.

Declaring that they had "taken the people of Europe into their holy keeping," the sovereigns of the Holy Alliance informed Spain and Naples that "useful or necessary changes in the legislation and administration of states must emanate alone from the free will, the reflecting and enlightened impulse of those whom God has rendered responsible for power." Thereupon, Austrian troops overran and crushed Italy, while the royalist armies of France prepared to crush constitutional government in Spain.

In 1822, the United States recognized the Latin American republics. In that same year, the Russians laid claim to a large part of Oregon, which was already contested by the United States and Great Britain, and ordered all foreign vessels, including American, not to approach the Oregon coast within one hundred Italian miles. During the same year, the Holy Alliance served notice on Spain to change its constitution or else face invasion from France and, if necessary, from Russia, Austria, and Prussia. The opinion rapidly spread in America that all the republics of the New World must enter into alliance for the preservation of their independence from the tyrants of Europe. Russia was informed by Secretary of State Adams that North and South America were closed to European colonization.

Spain refused to yield before "God's anointed," and in April, 1823, the French army marched. The defeat of Spain was foreseen in the United States as the signal for military aggression

against Latin America, which could be only a prelude to an attack upon the United States. The time for action had arrived.

Great Britain wanted the Latin American markets for herself. Following the French invasion of Spain, she proposed a joint declaration by America and herself to the effect that neither power would consent to European intervention in Latin America. Sorely troubled by the prospect of collaboration with Great Britain, Monroe sought advice from the aged Jefferson and from Madison. The outcome was the famous Monroe Doctrine, which the three great democratic leaders collaborated in formulating, as long before they had worked together when the transfer of Louisiana to Napoleon threatened America. It was the opinion of all three that the United States should now rely upon the military strength of Great Britain as the means of defense against monarchist intervention in the Western Hemisphere.

Replying to Monroe's letter for advice, Jefferson declared: "The question presented by the letters you have sent me is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of Independence. That made us a nation; this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. And never could we embark on it under circumstances more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to meddle with cis-atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last is laboring to become the domicile of despotism, our endeavor should surely be to make our hemisphere that of freedom." He continued, "Nor is the occasion to be slighted which this proposition offers, of declaring our protest against the atrocious violation of the rights of nations by the interference of any one in the internal affairs of another, so flagitiously begun by Bonaparte, and now continued by the equally lawless Alliance, calling itself Holy."<sup>3</sup>

Madison, in his reply to Monroe, went a little further than Jefferson, and urged that the United States seek to conclude an agreement with Britain for the purpose of defending constitu-

tional Spain against invasion by the Holy Alliance. Even though this might involve America in a European war, he considered the aim of defeating that despotism in Europe which menaced America worthy the sacrifice. He furthermore urged a joint declaration by England and America in defense of Greek independence.<sup>4</sup>

In conferences of the Cabinet, John Quincy Adams proposed that the United States proclaim its doctrine independently of Great Britain, since it was clear that, in all events, Great Britain would of necessity back the United States in its opposition to the Holy Alliance. By proclaiming its policy independently, Adams argued that America would serve warning against all European powers, including England, against colonization anywhere in the Western Hemisphere. This he considered important, since England was then contesting the claim of the United States to Oregon. Adams' proposal was adopted.

On December 2, 1823, Monroe proclaimed the doctrine that bears his name before Congress. "The American continents," he declared, "by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers."<sup>5</sup>

After an account of the recent events, in the course of which he openly espoused the cause of Greek independence, Monroe asserted: "We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."<sup>6</sup>

Monroe voiced a protest against the violation of Spanish rights, indicating that such principles as those enunciated in Europe by the Holy Alliance were not a matter of indifference to the United States. However, he continued: "Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the Government *de facto* as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to those continents [North and South America], circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our Southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference." 7

Monroe's statement was greeted with joy in England. There was no treasonable opposition to the Monroe Doctrine from within the United States as there had been to all policies of national defense during previous crises. America's firm stand, backed by Great Britain, prevented the Holy Alliance from any inroads in the Western Hemisphere. By a treaty with Russia, signed in April, 1824, the boundary between Oregon and the Russian claim was placed at 54° 40'. Not for many years, however, was the conflict with England over Oregon settled.

It is ironical that subsequently imperialist aggression by the United States against Latin America—first by the slaveholders, afterwards by Wall Street—was justified in the name of the Monroe Doctrine. Originally that doctrine was a pronouncement against imperialism and was proclaimed to the mutual advantage of both the United States and the Latin American republics. Its essence was that of the solidarity of free republics in resistance to anti-republican aggression. It is also ironical that the Monroe Doctrine has been used to justify advocacy of an impossible

isolation of the United States from the rest of the world, for it was issued not only as an act of solidarity with other republics but on the basis of full support from the greatest of all European powers, the ancient foe of America, Great Britain.

The struggle for continental independence had by 1823 expanded into one for hemispheric independence, as Jefferson noted in his letter to Monroe. It was a policy of national defense for the United States, but American national interests coincided with those of all the republics to the south as well as of those countries fighting for independence in Europe. As an act of defense of all the republics of the whole of the New World, the Monroe Doctrine was all the more magnificent when contrasted with the absolutist tyranny which was then sweeping Europe. The Monroe Doctrine marked the highest point achieved by the foreign policy of Jeffersonian democracy. It was the culmination of the long period of national defense following the Revolution. Although plots against American sovereignty were unceasing, not until the American nation was temporarily torn asunder by slaveholder rebellion did the monarchs of Europe again attempt to subdue any portion of the Western Hemisphere by force of arms.

## CHAPTER XVII

### POLITICAL REALIGNMENT IN 1824

WHILE the nation was rounding out its borders and asserting its democratic policy in foreign affairs, its internal unity within the Republican Party came to an end. Every major class obtained something from the Monroe administrations, but no class was satisfied. The industrial capitalists had a protective tariff, but it was not high enough, and their demand for Federal aid for internal improvements was blocked. The merchants secured trade treaties, but they blamed the republic they had been unable to overthrow for the loss of their former trade, and

they were hostile to the government's preoccupation with the problems of industry and slavery. The slaveholders obtained Florida and Missouri, but Texas, they claimed, was sold down the river, and the line  $36^{\circ} 30'$  was placed across their path. Farmers and artisans obtained the most liberal land law since the formation of the government, but they wanted free land and more participation in government, and they were being ruined by the National Bank and the encroachments of slaveholders. Each class was striving to achieve its full program.

Monroe, the last of the revolutionary presidents, was the link between the early Jeffersonian era and the new period of transition that was opening. Due to his close association with Jefferson, he was able to hold the Republican Party together; but there was no one with similar associations to succeed him. Of the great trilogy of Virginia Democrats who led the nation from 1800 to 1824, Monroe was the least consistent in both theory and practice. Vacillation had been typical of his political life during all the years from his anti-Federalist opposition to the Constitution in 1788 up through his temporary association with the Randolph group of slaveholder Republicans. But it was the new character of national and sectional development, the new unity of all classes within the Republican Party, which so thoroughly stamped his administrations of 1816-24 with the character of compromise.

During the Monroe administrations, the old Federalists and Republicans who had led the Revolution of 1776 and established the Republic were supplanted by new politicians—largely professional—who voiced the demands of the new class alignments which were forming. The clear-cut rationalistic theory of the eighteenth century, with its frank economic determinism, gave way to a new sentimental emotionalism in the pronouncements of political leaders. Demagoguery, in the form of heavy oratory and verbose rhetoric, took the place of cynical frankness among the new bourgeois politicians. The bourgeois-democratic theory of '76, while guiding the nation in its revolutionary overthrow of British rule and the establishment of the national republic, had not brought full freedom and equality as proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence, and its formulations were be-

coming dulled by demagoguery. Marxian theory had not arisen to throw light on the new problems which were emerging, and the old theory could not solve them. Thus, the democratic forces largely abandoned theory, and pragmatism in politics reigned supreme. The democratic movement increasingly followed personal leaders. In Andrew Jackson, it found a leader from its own ranks, sharing all its aspirations and passions, but also its weaknesses and unclarity. Without theory, the people became more vulnerable to demagoguery. With the growth of private enterprise—both small and large—the vague ideology of "rugged individualism," which was the force clearing the wilderness and opening the West, became predominant.

Characteristic of this period of transition and realignment of class forces were complete reversals of programs on the part of individual political leaders. In search of platforms which would give them office, politicians shifted with the needs of the classes supporting them and in accordance with the requirements of electioneering.

The various class groupings sought to capture the Presidency in 1824 by a general attack on the old custom of choosing Presidential candidates by Congressional caucuses. As early as 1821, state legislatures and assemblies of citizens began to nominate candidates. The anti-caucus movement was an expression of the old aspirations of the people for a more direct control of politics. These aspirations had forced the adoption of the Connecticut constitution in 1818. In 1820, they abolished property qualifications for voting in Massachusetts. In 1821, under the leadership of Van Buren, property qualifications for white male voters were abolished in New York, and Negroes possessing a freehold of \$250 were permitted to vote. The latter restriction was abolished in 1826. The various class and regional groupings, no one of which dared break officially from the Republican Party, sought to take advantage of the anti-caucus movement as the means through which to capture the leadership of the party and the government.

The South Carolina legislature originally chose William Lounes as Presidential candidate in preference to Calhoun, whereupon Calhoun was asked to run by certain Northern and

Southern congressmen. While Calhoun's support for internal improvements had won him national support, it had isolated him from the slaveholders of his own state. Undoubtedly this influenced his subsequent break with his early nationalism and his final adoption of the full slaveholder program. While for some time he aspired to the Presidency, he finally dropped out of the race and became the running mate of John Quincy Adams, the candidate of the Northern industrialists, who hoped through Calhoun to win Southern support.

In 1822, a popular demand for Andrew Jackson arose in Tennessee, and he was nominated that year by the Tennessee legislature. He was hailed as a "man of the people," one who had not grown fat from public office, and was put forward in opposition to "caucus rule" and the "dynasty of the secretaries." To counteract the electioneering in Washington of the three secretaries, Adams, Crawford and Calhoun, as well as of Clay in Congress, Jackson in 1823 was sent to the Senate by the Tennessee legislature.

The Kentucky legislature nominated Clay in 1822; the Ohio legislature, the following year. Crawford was put forward by the North Carolina and Georgia legislatures. In New England, John Quincy Adams was nominated in 1824 by a meeting of the Democratic-Republican Party in Faneuil Hall, Boston.

The majority of Congressmen reacted to the popular movement by opposing the holding of the Republican caucus. However, a minority assembled and selected William H. Crawford with Albert Gallatin as his running mate. Crawford thus became, in a sense, the official Republican candidate. His program apparently was to continue the Monroe policy, and he received the support of Thomas Jefferson. In spite of the traditional mantle he had inherited, his name was not identified, like that of his predecessors, with the great national and democratic struggles. Moreover, he bore the brunt of the general attack on the caucus, which, though it had in the past chosen Jefferson, Madison and Monroe, was now seen as an obstacle to direct popular control.

While many favorite sons were put forward by various groups, the field was finally narrowed down to four main candidates—

Crawford, Adams, Clay and Jackson. All of them had much in common. All had supported the War of 1812 and national expansion. All were from slave states except Adams, and his running mate, Calhoun, was from the South. No candidate raised specifically any program for slaveholder expansion, and none of them had openly voiced anti-slavery sentiments—in spite of the opinions Adams confided to his diary. All but Adams had received some slaveholder support, and through Calhoun Adams sought and finally obtained some such support. No one of them attacked democracy, and the ideology of each candidate bore indelibly a middle-class stamp. Each candidate was supported by certain capitalists and landlords of his own region who hoped to see their local interests championed. The issues at stake thus did not seem to be crystal clear. Nevertheless, certain class groupings behind the candidates can be definitely delineated, although the new party formations which were emerging were not yet distinct.

The position of John Quincy Adams was perhaps more clear-cut than that of any other candidate. His support came principally from the rising industrial capitalists interested in internal national development. His main base was, therefore, the Northeast.

Henry Clay's support came primarily from the rising capitalists and slaveholders of the West, interested in markets in the industrial Northeast. He championed internal improvements and the development of all sections of the nation with their conflicting interests, which, however, he always maintained did not conflict. This placed him in a contradictory position before those classes who knew that their interests were not in harmony with all other interests, and alienated from him all decisive support from any except certain Western capitalist and slaveholder interests. His mass support was, therefore, the most purely localized of any of the candidates. By seeking too much, he obtained little.

Andrew Jackson was the only really national candidate. "Old Hickory," the hero of the people's War of 1812, who had stood forth like a giant against all the traitors and cowards, was the only nationally beloved figure contending for office in 1824.



He championed no specific program in this election. But he embodied the popular ideal. He was a fairly well-to-do slaveholder, owning several plantations, several hundred slaves, and the finest racing horses in the West. But he was no aristocrat who had inherited his fortune. He was a Western frontiersman who had risen from the ranks. He was one of the people, who lived, fought, and swore like the rest, but who had made good as a national leader in the greatest crisis since the formation of the republic. He was democratic to the core, according to the democratic tenets of the times. There was not the faintest tinge of hypocrisy about him. A man of action, accustomed to the rough life of the frontier, he always said what he thought and went straight to the point. The democratic forces of 1824 were not hostile to rich men on principle. They were seeking riches themselves. They hated only entrenched privilege, and whoever had acquired a modest fortune, even in slaves, "by his own efforts," as the saying went, was a hero. There was a world of difference in those days between a slaveholder of the Tennessee frontier and of either the old Tidewater or the newly opened Black Belt lands.

Jefferson had been the people's leader and friend, a clearer spokesman for their true interests than Jackson, with his lack of theory and his blind spots toward Negroes and Indians, ever did or could become. But Jefferson, the scholar and philosopher, had the tastes and habits of an aristocrat who had gone to the people. Jackson was bone of their bone, flesh of their flesh. He spoke their language, had lived their life. He even shared their passions and prejudices. He was a fighter who, with his own hands, had helped clear the wilderness. For all these reasons, the old hero, even though he had no definite program, became the candidate of all the dispossessed. The democratic forces of the day felt instinctively that he was their champion, and their feeling did not lead them astray. Thus, around Jackson rallied all the "outs" who wanted power—farmers and artisans, little capitalists and little slaveholders, as well as a few large propertyholders who hoped to ride the waves of the general mass movement. Because the poor can never be herded into any one region, the support of Jackson was nationwide, as was true of no other

candidate. "Old Hickory" clubs sprang up throughout the Union.

While William H. Crawford's announced aim was to continue the Monroe policy of compromise and while he enjoyed the support of Jefferson, who considered Jackson too hot-headed, he became, by a process of elimination, the favorite candidate of the slaveholders. No candidate either explicitly voiced the slaveholders' program or opposed it. Yet Adams was too clearly for the industrial capitalists of the Northeast, Clay for Western capitalists, Jackson for the democratic forces, for any except Crawford to be their fitting representative.

As the campaign proceeded, it frightened both Hamilton's old "rich and well born" and the up-and-coming bourgeoisie to see the vast support for Andrew Jackson, a "wild Westerner," a hot-headed military chieftain, a Southern "poor white" by origin, a man who did not know how to play politics as they were played by professionals, who most undiplomatically called a spade a spade without apology. Jackson symbolized the new democracy, and such a symbol was unprecedented.

The Electoral College cast 99 votes for Jackson, 84 for Adams, 41 for Crawford, 37 for Clay. Since Jackson did not receive a majority of the votes, the election was thrown into the House of Representatives, where each state had one vote. Since only the three leading candidates could be considered by the House, Clay was dropped. This meant that the election was determined by Clay's followers. They cast their votes for Adams, and thus a minority candidate was elected over Jackson, who received a far higher popular and electoral vote and who was the only candidate with national rather than sectional support.

The rumor had been circulated before the election that Adams had made a corrupt deal with Clay by offering to make him Secretary of State in return for his votes. When Adams actually appointed Clay to this office, the followers of Jackson regarded the act as confirmation of the rumor. Regardless of the truth or falsity of this particular charge, the fact remained that the manipulations of Congressmen, and not the votes of the people, placed Adams in the Presidency.

A deep bitterness swept the people. They felt insulted, out-

raged. For the first time, one of their own number, the outstanding national hero, had been on the verge of being President, and he had been cheated from his office by politicians.

Sharing in the general rage, Andrew Jackson resigned his seat in the Senate to commence his 1828 campaign under the slogan, "Let the people rule."

John Quincy Adams, unlike his father, during his period of Presidency, was not a reactionary. As President, he followed a generally progressive program, seeking national development and democratic collaboration with the Latin American republics. However, in permitting a political maneuver to place him in the Presidency over the opposition of the overwhelming majority of the people, he violated democracy in practice, even though he never attacked it in theory. Thus, he bore the brunt of the growing demand for popular government.

In 1824, the old Jeffersonian power, continuous since 1801, came to an end, though its achievements remained. The close of Monroe's second administration marked the end of one epoch in the history of the republic. The independence of the nation by that time seemed definitely assured. The Western Hemisphere was free from the stranglehold of Europe. The republican form of government seemed secure from attack. Industrial development had commenced. The nation was peacefully expanding. It had weathered its first national economic crisis. Yet the storm clouds of the approaching slaveholder effort to dominate the nation had already appeared. The slaveholders and their agents were forming slave plantations and cattle ranches in Texas. The temporary unity of the Republican Party had been disrupted. New party lines were forming. Democracy had been violated in the choice of a President in a manner which had not even occurred under the hated Federalist regime. A bitter class conflict was developing. Jacksonian democracy, with its new methods arising from the new day, was mobilizing to revive the party of Jefferson.

Meanwhile, a new class was knocking on the door of history. The year of the disintegration of the old Republican Party saw the emergence of an industrial labor movement of some importance in the cities and towns of the Northeastern states. As

the democratic forces throughout the country prepared for the election campaign of 1828, the infant labor movement threw its political support to Andrew Jackson. Organized labor thereafter became an integral part of the democratic movement as a whole, even though that movement remained predominantly agrarian until long after the Civil War.

The popular forces rallying around "Old Hickory" after 1824 were the same forces which, under the leadership of Abraham Lincoln, finally established a coalition with the Negro people and thus saved the Union from disruption during the bitter years following the slaveholder rebellion of the 1860's. A new day was beginning to dawn in old agrarian America.

## REFERENCE AND EXPLANATORY NOTES

### CHAPTER I

1. Karl Marx, Vol. I, Part VIII, New York, 1939.
2. All the plantations of the Southern colonies and most of the estates outside New England were maintained intact in the hands of the same families for generations by the feudal laws of primogeniture and entail. The first law provided for inheritance only by the eldest son. The second prohibited the alienation of any portion of an estate by its holder for any reason. No fraction of entailed lands could be sold or mortgaged. They could not be attached for debts or failure to pay taxes. These laws kept in power a hereditary aristocracy and obstructed the development of capitalist agriculture.
3. "A nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture." (Joseph Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question*, p. 12.) The material foundation for a nation is necessarily the interdependence in economic life of those inhabiting a common territory. The emergence of such a common economy has always been determined by the development of capitalist exchange with its inevitable establishment of an extensive home market. Economic interdependence among the American colonies could not arise while they were held in isolation from one another and in economic dependence upon Britain.
4. The absolutist monarchs of Spain and France had been strong enough to suppress in their lands all such liberating movements as that of Oliver Cromwell. Hence, the colonial peoples of those powers in America never obtained such freedom as did the subjects of Great Britain. The democratic rights existing in the English colonies made it possible for their inhabitants to establish the first independent national state within the New World.

5. See Herbert M. Morais, "Artisan Democracy and the American Revolution," *Science and Society*, Vol. VI, No. 3, summer, 1942, and "Sons of Liberty in New York" in *Era of the American Revolution*, ed. by R. B. Morris, New York, 1939.
6. See Stalin, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
7. For a brief account of the ideological background of the Declaration of Independence, see Carl Becker, *The Declaration of Independence*, Ch. II.
8. See Claude Halstead Van Tyne, *The Loyalists in the American Revolution*, and Carl Van Doren, *The Secret History of the American Revolution*.
9. See Van Tyne, *The American Revolution*, Ch. IX.
10. See J. F. Jameson, *The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement*, Ch. II.
11. See R. A. East, *Business Enterprise in the American Revolutionary Era*, Ch. X.
12. See Stalin, "Problems of Leninism," *Leninism*, Vol. I, pp. 266-67.

## CHAPTER II

1. For a detailed history of the Continental Congress and its role under the Articles of Confederation, see Edmund C. Burnett, *The Continental Congress*.
2. See letter of Alexander Hamilton to Robert Morris, April 30, 1781, *Works of Hamilton*, J. C. Hamilton, ed., Vol. I, pp. 223-57, for an example of how representatives of the big merchants planned for an oligarchical or monarchical government as the instrument for executing the financial policy later proposed by Hamilton.
3. See Merrill Jensen, *The Articles of Confederation*.
4. "The countryside is the guardian of nationality." (Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question*, p. 110.)
5. See Benjamin Horace Hibbard, *A History of the Public Land Policies*, Chs. I, II, III.
6. When the Republican Party of 1854 was formed by the masses of the old Northwest for the purpose of preventing the further expansion of slavery at a time when it was threatening to engulf the entire

- Union, its founders deliberately selected the name originally chosen by Jefferson for his party. They pointed out that they were seeking to apply the principle enunciated by Jefferson long before 1854 when slavery became such a danger. Thus, they correctly maintained that they were reviving the principles of Thomas Jefferson. In this manner, both major parties in the United States today were originally formed on the basis of Jeffersonian principles.
7. For a good account of the formative years of Madison's life, see Irving Brant, *James Madison*.
  8. See pages 139-41 of present book.
  9. The following table, taken from page 13 of Kirk Porter's *History of Suffrage in the U. S.*, Chicago, 1918, modified only in the case of New Hampshire to make the table conform to conditions in 1789, shows the extent of property qualifications in 1789:

State	Real Estate Required	Alternative
	<i>Real Estate in Terms of Acres</i>	
North Carolina	50 acres	
Virginia	50 acres vacant, or 25 acres cultivated, and a house 12x12, or a town lot and house 12x12	
	<i>Real Estate in Terms of Value</i>	
Rhode Island	Worth 40 pounds, or yields 40 shillings annual income	
New York	Worth 20 pounds, or yields 40 shillings annual income (Must have paid a state tax)	
	<i>Real Estate with an Alternative</i>	
Delaware	50 acres (12 cleared)	Other property worth 40 pounds
Connecticut	Yields 40 shillings annual income	Other property worth 40 pounds
Massachusetts	Yields 3 pounds annual income	Other property worth 60 pounds
South Carolina	50 acres or a town lot	Payment of a tax equal to a tax on 50 acres
Maryland	50 acres	30 pounds in money

## 274 THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN NATION

State	Real Estate Required	Alternative
-------	----------------------	-------------

	No Real Estate Required	
--	-------------------------	--

New Hampshire	Payment of a poll tax
New Jersey	50 pounds proclamation money
Georgia*	Property of ten pounds' value
Pennsylvania	Must have paid public taxes

\* In 1789, Georgia abolished its money requirement, providing that any who had paid a tax within the year might vote.

## CHAPTER III

1. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Chs. XX and XXVI, Chicago.
2. See Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in American History* and *The Significance of Sections in American History*.
3. Marx, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, Chs. XXXVII and XLVII.
4. H. V. Faulkner, *American Economic History*, p. 358.
5. See B. H. Meyer and others, *History of Transportation in the United States before 1860*, Chs. I and II; see also Percy W. Bidwell and John I. Falconer, *History of Agriculture in the Northern United States, 1620-1860*, Ch. X.
6. See J. F. Jameson, *op. cit.*, Ch. III.
7. See John Rogers Commons, *History of Labour in the United States*, Vol. I, Chs. I-IV.
8. See Victor S. Clark, *History of Manufactures in the United States*, Vol. I, Chs. I-X.
9. The Virginia House of Burgesses was established in 1619. For the history of democratic movements in the early colonial South, see William E. Dodd, *The Old South*. For an account of the colonial plantation and the plantation economy during revolutionary and post-revolutionary times, see Lewis C. Gray, *History of Agriculture in the Southern U. S. to 1860*, Vol. I, Chs. XIV, XV, XVI; Vol. II, Chs. XXV, XXVI, XXVII.
10. Herbert Aptheker, *Negro Slave Revolts in the U. S.*, pp. 3-24; and *The Negro in the Abolitionist Movement*, pp. 28-31.
11. On the status of internal commerce at this period, see Emory Richard

## REFERENCE AND EXPLANATORY NOTES 275

Johnson, *History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce of the United States*, Vol. I, Ch. XIII; on foreign commerce, see Vol. I, Chs. VII, VIII, and XI; also Vol. II, Ch. XXII.

## CHAPTER IV

1. Karl Marx in his chapter on "The Genesis of the Industrial Capitalists" in Vol. I of *Capital* lists five major forms of primary accumulation requiring state power. He listed them chronologically as they had appeared in the history of such countries as Spain, Portugal, Holland, France, and England. They were (1) the colonial system, (2) the national debt, (3) the national bank system, (4) taxation, (5) protective tariffs. It should be noted that with the exception of the colonial system, which the bourgeoisie of America had advocated unsuccessfully under the Confederation, in the course of the first two years of the history of the United States after the adoption of the Constitution, Hamilton proposed each of these forms of primary accumulation in the precise order listed by Marx. He had outlined them in that manner as early as 1781 in a letter to Robert Morris. This indicates that Hamilton, in studying the previous history of capitalism, arrived at some of the same general conclusions as Marx, although Hamilton, as the political leader of the rising bourgeoisie, used these conclusions for the sake of forcing the development of capitalism, while Marx used them, over a half century later, to enlighten the working class.
2. *Works of Alexander Hamilton*, ed. by John C. Hamilton, Vol. I, p. 257.
3. "The Anas," *Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, Ford ed., Vol. I, p. 166.
4. See Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, pp. 779-80.
5. *Works of Alexander Hamilton*, Vol. III, p. 208.

## CHAPTER V

1. See Eugene Perry Link, *The Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790-1800*.
2. The Democratic-Republican Party by the time of the Monroe administrations came to be known simply as the Republican Party. The followers of Andrew Jackson after 1824 revived the name Democratic-

Republican Party. Thereafter and until the present, it has been known simply as the Democratic Party. The present Republican Party has no direct organizational link with the Democratic-Republican Party of Jefferson. However, the new Republican Party of 1854 deliberately chose the name Republican, because that was the original name of Jefferson's party, whose principles had been repudiated by the Democratic Party after it was captured by the slaveholders following the defeat of the Jacksonian Democrats in 1840.

3. See Chapter II of present work.
4. Claude G. Bowers, *Jefferson and Hamilton*, p. 151.
5. *Works of Thomas Jefferson*, Washington ed., Vol. VII, pp. 290-91.

#### CHAPTER VI

1. *Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, Monticello ed., Vol. IX, p. 45.
2. *Writings of James Madison*, Vol. I, p. 577.
3. *Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, Monticello ed., Vol. IX, p. 10.

#### CHAPTER VII

1. For an account of this whole period, see Claude G. Bowers, *Jefferson and Hamilton*, Chs. XVI-XXI.
2. See Benjamin Brawley, *Social History of the American Negro*, pp. 61-62.
3. Aptheker, *Negro Slave Revolts in the United States*, pp. 29-30.
4. *Writings of Jefferson*, Ford ed., Vol. III, p. 249.
5. *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 250.
6. *Ibid.*, Monticello ed., Vol. XII, pp. 254-55.
7. *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 267.
8. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 68.
9. *Ibid.*, Vol. X, p. 157.

#### CHAPTER VIII

1. *Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, Ford ed., Vol. VII, p. 460.
2. *Ibid.*, Monticello ed., Vol. XV, p. 274. See also pp. 266-267, 273-76.

3. *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 319.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 319-20.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 320-21.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 321-22.
7. Harold U. Faulkner, *American Economic History*, p. 355.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 358.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 359.
10. Frederic L. Paxson, *History of the American Frontier*, p. 111; Emory Richard Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 209.
11. Lewis C. Gray, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 680-83.
12. Faulkner, *op. cit.*, p. 210.
13. Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
17. Faulkner, *op. cit.*, p. 274.
18. Bowers, *Jefferson in Power*, p. 134.
19. Channing, *The Jeffersonian System*, p. 12.
20. Bowers, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 144.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 154.

#### CHAPTER IX

1. *Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, Ford ed., Vol. VIII, pp. 144-45.
2. See Earl Browder, *The People's Front*, pp. 262-64.
3. Bowers, *Jefferson in Power*, p. 234.
4. McMaster, *History of the People of the United States*, Vol. III, p. 57.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.
6. Bowers, *op. cit.*, p. 274.



7. See G. R. Taylor, "Prices in the Mississippi Valley preceding the War of 1812," *Journal of Economic and Business History*, 1930, Vol. III; also "Agrarian Discontent in the Mississippi Valley preceding the War of 1812," *Journal of Political Economy*, 1931, Vol. XXXIX.
8. Bowers, *op cit.*, p. 397.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 417.

## CHAPTER X

1. *Writings of Jefferson*, Ford ed., Vol. VIII, p. 494.
2. The Russian Populists, known as Narodniks, formed a revolutionary peasant movement, led by intellectuals, which proposed to prevent the industrialization of Russia.
3. *Writings of Jefferson*, Monticello ed., Vol. XV, p. 42.
4. *Writings of Jefferson*, Ford ed., Vol. VIII, p. 492.

## CHAPTER XI

1. Johnson, *History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce of the U. S.*, Vol. II, p. 29.
2. Bowers, *Jefferson in Power*, p. 451.
3. *Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, Monticello ed., Vol. XII, p. 248. The Essex Junto was the most reactionary section of the Federalist Party in Massachusetts.
4. Channing, *A History of the United States*, Vol. IV, p. 407.
5. Pratt, *Expansionists of 1812*, p. 253.
6. Johnson, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 20.

## CHAPTER XII

1. McMaster, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 558.
2. Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 56.
3. McMaster, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 444.
4. *Writings of James Madison*, Vol. VIII, p. 201.
5. Faulkner, *op. cit.*, p. 355.
6. McMaster, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 459-60.

7. Faulkner, *op. cit.*, p. 358.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 355.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 247.

## CHAPTER XIII

1. See L. M. Hacker, "Western Land Hunger and the War of 1812: A Conjecture," in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 1924, Vol. X; also Beard, *Rise of American Civilization*, Ch. IX. An able answer to Hacker's unwarranted assumption that lust for land led to the demand for the annexation of Canada was given by Julius William Pratt in his article, "Western Aims in the War of 1812," in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 1925, Vol. XII. Hacker could not find a shred of evidence in the newspapers or other documents of the day indicating a desire for Canadian land. Only in the ravings of the anti-war slaveholder John Randolph appeared the charge, which Hacker repeats. When it is recalled that four-fifths of the territory of the United States was unsettled, it is absurd to believe that there was a desire for more land. The object of Canadian annexation was to keep the land the frontiersmen already had open for settlement. If there had been a desire for additional land, we may be sure that frontiersmen, who always spoke their mind, would have said so. Even had they desired more land, it would not, under the circumstances, have been an imperialistic ambition.
2. See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 219-20.
3. Johnson, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 20.
4. McMaster, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 555.
5. Channing, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 457.
6. McMaster, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 220.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

## CHAPTER XIV

1. Johnson, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 20 and 32.
2. Faulkner, *op. cit.*, p. 303; see Clark, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Chs XI-XX for detailed picture.

3. Faulkner, *op. cit.*, p. 359.
4. McMaster, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 391.
5. Faulkner, *op. cit.*, p. 355.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 358.
7. Hibbard, *op. cit.*, p. 97.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 78.
9. McMaster, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 313.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 489.
11. Faulkner, *op. cit.*, p. 333; Meyers, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 295-98 and 102-09.

## CHAPTER XV

1. Faulkner, *op. cit.*, p. 247; for detailed picture, see Gray, Vol. II, Ch. XXXVII.
2. Faulkner, *op. cit.*, p. 355.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 249.
4. *Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, Ford ed., Vol. X, p. 157
5. See *John Quincy Adams' Diary*, ed. by Allan Nevins, pp. 228-29, 232, 246.
6. Aptheker, *Negro Slave Revolts in the United States*, pp. 40-43.

## CHAPTER XVI

1. *Writings of James Monroe*, S. M. Hamilton ed., Vol. VI, p. 10.
2. McMaster, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, pp. 40-1.
3. *Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, Ford ed., Vol. X, pp. 277-78.
4. *Writings of James Madison*, J. B. Lippincott ed., Vol. III, pp. 339-40.
5. *Writings of James Monroe*, Vol. VI, p. 328.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 340.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 340-41.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

## DOCUMENTARY

- Commager, Henry Steele. *Documents of American History*. Vols. I-II. New York, 1935.
- Commons, John Rogers. *A Documentary History of American Industrial Society*. Vols. I-IV. Cleveland, 1910-11.
- Hamilton, Madison, and Jay. *The Federalist*. Ford ed. New York, 1898.
- Letters and Other Writings of James Madison*. Vols. I-IV. Philadelphia, 1865.
- Works of Alexander Hamilton*. Vols. I-VII. Ed. by J. C. Hamilton. New York, 1850-51.
- Writings of James Monroe*. Vols. I-VII. New York, 1893-1903.
- Writings of Thomas Jefferson*. Vols. I-XX. Monticello ed. 1905.

## HISTORIES

- Adams, James Truslow. *New England in the Republic, 1776-1850*. Boston, 1926.
- Andrews, Charles McLean. *The Colonial Period of American History*. Vols. I-IV. New Haven, 1934-38.
- Aptheker, Herbert. *Negro Slave Revolts in the United States, 1526-1860*. New York, 1939.
- . *The Negro in the Abolitionist Movement*. New York, 1941.
- . *The Negro in the American Revolution*. New York, 1940.
- Babcock, K. C. *The Rise of American Nationality*. New York, 1906.
- Beard, Charles A. *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States*. New York, 1913.
- . *Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy*. New York, 1915.
- . *The American Party Battle*. New York, 1828.
- Beard, Charles A. and Mary R. *The Rise of American Civilization*. New York, 1930.

- Becker, Carl L. *The Declaration of Independence*. New York, 1922.
- Bemis, Samuel Flagg. *A Diplomatic History of the United States*. New York, 1936.
- Bidwell, Percy W., and John I. Falconer. *History of Agriculture in the Northern United States, 1620-1860*. Washington, D. C., 1925.
- Bogart, Ernest Ludlow. *An Economic History of the United States*. New York, 1937.
- Bowers, Claude G. *Jefferson and Hamilton*. Boston, 1925.
- . *Jefferson in Power*. Boston, 1936.
- Bowers, Claude G., Browder, Earl, and Franklin, Francis. *The Heritage of Jefferson*. New York, 1943.
- Brant, Irving. *James Madison*. New York, 1941.
- Brawley, Benjamin Griffith. *A Social History of the American Negro*. New York, 1921.
- Browder, Earl. "The Revolutionary Background of the Constitution of the United States," *The Peoples Front*. New York, 1939.
- Burnett, Edmund C. *The Continental Congress*. New York, 1941.
- Channing, Edward. *A History of the United States*. Vols. I-V. New York, 1905.
- . *The Jeffersonian System*. New York, 1906.
- Chinard, Gilbert. *Thomas Jefferson, The Apostle of Americanism*. Boston, 1929.
- Clark, Victor S. *History of Manufactures in the United States*. Vol. I. New York, 1929.
- Commons, John Rogers. *History of Labour in the United States*. Vol. I. New York, 1918.
- Corwin, Edward Samuel. *John Marshall and the Supreme Court*. New Haven, 1921.
- Dodd, William E. *The Old South*. New York, 1937.
- . "Thomas Jefferson," *Statesmen of the Old South*. New York, 1911.
- East, Robert Abraham. *Business Enterprise in the American Revolutionary Era*. New York, 1938.
- Farnam, Henry W. *Chapters in the History of Social Legislation in the United States to 1860*. Washington, D. C., 1938.

- Faulkner, Harold V. *American Economic History*. New York, 1931.
- Gray, Lewis C., and E. K. Thompson. *History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860*. Washington, D. C., 1933.
- Hardy, Jack. *The First American Revolution*. New York, 1937.
- Hart, Albert Bushnell. *Slavery and Abolition*. New York, 1906.
- Hibbard, Benjamin Horace. *A History of the Public Land Policies*. New York, 1924.
- Hockett, Homer Carey. *Constitutional History of the United States*. New York, 1939.
- . *Political and Social History of the United States, 1492-1828*. New York, 1920.
- James, Marquis. *Andrew Jackson: The Border Captain*. New York, 1933.
- Jameson, J. F. *The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement*. Princeton, 1940.
- Jensen, Merrill. *The Articles of Confederation*. Wisconsin, 1940.
- Johnson, Emory Richard, and others. *History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce of the United States*. Washington, D. C., 1915.
- Link, Eugene Perry. *Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790-1800*. New York, 1942.
- Loth, David Goldsmith. *Alexander Hamilton: Portrait of a Prodigy*. New York, 1939.
- Mahan, Alfred Teager. *Sea Power in Its Relation to the War of 1812*. Vols. I-II. Boston, 1905.
- McMaster, John Bach. *History of the People of the United States*. Vols. I-V. New York, 1885.
- Meyer, Balthazar Henry, and others. *History of Transportation in the United States before 1860*. Washington, D. C., 1917.
- Morgan, George. *The Life of James Monroe*. Boston, 1921.
- Nettels, Curtis P. *Roots of American Civilization*. New York, 1938.
- Parrington, Vernon L. *Main Currents in American Thought*. New York, 1927.
- Parton, James. *Life and Times of Aaron Burr*. New York, 1858.
- . *Life of Andrew Jackson*. Boston, 1905.
- . *Life of Thomas Jefferson*. Boston, 1884.

## 284 THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN NATION

- Paxson, Frederic L. *History of the American Frontier, 1763-1893*. Boston, 1924.
- Pratt, Julius William. *Expansionists of 1812*. New York, 1925.
- Robbins, Roy M. *Our Landed Heritage*. Princeton, N. J., 1942.
- Roosevelt, Theodore. *The Naval War of 1812*. New York, 1882.
- Sears, Louis Martin. *George Washington*. New York, 1932.
- Stalin, Joseph. *Marxism and the National Question*. New York, 1942.
- Turner, Frederick Jackson. *The Frontier in American History*. New York, 1920.
- . *The Rise of the New West*. New York, 1906.
- . *The Significance of Sections in American History*. New York, 1932.
- Van Doren, Carl. *The Secret History of the American Revolution*. New York, 1941.
- Van Tyne, Claude Halstead. *The Causes of the War of Independence*. Boston, 1929.
- . *The Loyalists in the American Revolution*. Boston, 1902.
- . *The War of Independence*. Boston, 1929.
- Warren, Charles B. *The Making of the Constitution*. Boston, 1928.
- Whitaker, Arthur Preston. *The Mississippi Question, 1795-1803*. New York, 1934.
- . *The Spanish-American Frontier, 1783-1795*. Boston, 1927.
- Woodson, Carter Godwin. *The Negro in Our History*. Washington, D. C., 1922.

## INDEX

- Abolitionist movement, 43, 246
- Adams, John, 82f., 96ff., 176, 264
- Agriculture, 241f.
- Alien and Sedition acts, 101ff., 135
- American Colonization Society, 247, 254
- Armstrong, John, 206
- Army, 104
- Articles of Confederation, 23
- Ballot; *see* Voting
- Banking, 226; *see also* National Bank
- Bill of Rights, 31f.
- Birney, James G., 247
- Bloodworth, Timothy, 75
- Bowers, Claude G., 195
- Bowler, Jack, 111
- Brown, Jacob, 211
- Bryant, William Cullen, 237
- Burr, Aaron, 108f., 149ff., 160ff.
- Callender, James Thomas, 104
- Canada, 186ff., 279
- Calhoun, John C., 263f.
- Calvinism, 75f.
- Capitalism and national development, 45f., 223ff.
- Chase, Samuel, 155
- Church and state, 20
- Civil rights, 102, 116f.
- Clark, George Rogers, 19f.
- Clark, William, 146
- Clay, Henry, 264
- Clinton, DeWitt, 198
- Clinton, George, 155
- Clymer, George, 74
- Colonial policy of Britain, 11ff.
- Congregational Church, 76, 108
- Constitutional Convention, 28
- Continental Congress, 21
- Cooper, James Fenimore, 236f.
- Cotton industry, 40, 44
- Courts and civil rights, 104
- Crawford, William H., 264
- Crockett, David, 210
- Debt; *see* Public Debt
- Declaration of Independence, 17
- Democratic-Republican Party, 79ff., 89ff., 275
- Democratic Societies, 78ff.
- Dodd, William E., 195
- Duane, William, 104
- "Economic determinism," criticized, 47ff.
- Economic development, 12, 34, 129; *see also* Industrial development
- Education, 26, 78, 173
- Embargo act, 175
- Electoral laws; *see* Voting
- Engels, Frederick, 124
- England; *see* Great Britain
- Entail of estates, 37, 271
- Farmers, 35f.
- Federalists, 31ff., 46, 57ff.; and War of 1812, 190ff.; anti-demo-

# 286 THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN NATION

Federalists (*continued*)  
 cratic aims, 79ff.; seditious activities, 176ff.  
 Feudalism, remnants of abolished, 20, 37  
 Fitzsimmons, Thomas, 74  
 Florida, 249; *see also* West Florida  
 Floyd, John, 210  
 Foreign affairs, 50ff., 85ff.; *see also* France, Great Britain, Spain  
 Foreign trade, 44, 130, 244  
 France, U. S. relations with, 51, 99ff.  
 Franklin, Benjamin, 18ff., 28  
 French Revolution, 85f.  
 Freneau, Philip, 77  
 Friends of Peace, Union and Commerce, 198  
 Gallatin, Albert, 93, 101, 136f.  
 "Gazette of the United States," 75  
 Genet, Citizen, 90f.  
 Giles, William, 75  
 Gray, William, 176  
 Great Britain, colonial policy, 11ff.; interference with U. S. commerce, 86f., 158f., 169ff., 243; planned to regain American colonies, 50; U. S. relations with, 91ff.  
 Griswold, Roger, 149  
 Guerrilla warfare, in the revolution, 19  
 Hamilton, Alexander, 28, 60ff., 108f.  
 Harrison, William Henry, 110, 142, 206  
 Hartford convention, 214ff.  
 Hawkins, Benjamin, 209f.

Hillhouse, James, 149  
 Henry, John, 176, 191f.  
 Historical materialism, 47ff.  
 Houston, Sam, 210  
 Indians, conflicts with, 14, 51ff., 171ff., 251ff.  
 Industrial development, 39ff., 70f., 131ff., 177, 223ff.  
 International trade; *see* Foreign trade  
 Ireland, support for American revolution in, 18  
 Irving, Washington, 236  
 Jackson, Andrew, 207ff., 214ff., 263 ff.  
 Jackson, Francis James, 180f.  
 Jackson, James, 75  
 Jay, John, 94ff.  
 Jefferson, Thomas, 65; and constitution, 31f.; and Democratic-Republican Party, 77ff.; and French revolution, 89; attacks on, 138f.; personal characteristics, 121ff.; position on slavery, 112f.  
 King, Rufus, 150, 155, 230  
 Lafitte, Jean and Pierre, 217  
 Land question, 22ff., 38, 72f., 96, 110, 154f., 227f., 233, 238f.  
 Land, speculation in, 38  
 Latin America, 106, 257ff.  
 Lewis and Clark expedition, 146ff., 162  
 Liberia, 254  
 Literature, 235f.  
 Logan, James, 106  
 Louisiana, 144ff., 183

# INDEX

287

Louisiana Purchase, 144ff.  
 Loundes, William, 263f.  
 Lyon, Matthew, 78, 101, 103ff.  
 Lundy, Benjamin, 247, 252  
 Maclay, William, 64, 75  
 Madison, James, 75; administration of, 178ff.; and public debt, 64; at Constitutional Convention, 28; opposed national bank, 69  
 Marion, Francis, 19  
 Marshall, John, 117, 139ff., 234  
 Marxist interpretation of history, 47ff.  
 Massachusetts, and War of 1812, 198  
 Merchants, political demands of, 21f., 24, 53f.  
 Middle classes, 35, 39  
 Miranda, Francisco de, 106f.  
 Missouri, 248ff.  
 Missouri Compromise, 250ff.  
 Monetary problems, 41, 226  
 Monroe Doctrine, 259ff.  
 Monroe, James, 75, 159; administration of, 231ff.  
 Morris, Gouverneur, 91  
 Morris, Robert, 74, 137  
 Napoleon, 146ff.  
 Nation, defined, 271  
 National Bank, 68ff., 84, 136, 226ff.  
 National debt, 61ff., 136, 228  
 "National Gazette," 77, 82  
 Nationalism, steady growth of, 36  
 Naturalization law, 135  
 Navy, 202ff.  
 Negroes, 208; *see also* Slavery

New England states, in War of 1812, 213ff.  
 New Orleans, battle of, 217  
 Non-Intercourse act, 179  
 Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 26f.  
 Ohio, 142f.  
 Paine, Thomas, 83  
 Pickering, John, 155  
 Pickering, Timothy, 149, 175  
 Pinckney, Charles C., 155  
 Pinckney, William, 159  
 Plantation economy, 241f.  
 Population, growth of, 129ff., 225  
 Porter, Peter B., 211  
 Pratt, Julius William, 195  
 Primogeniture, 37, 271  
 Prosser, Gabriel, 111  
 Protective tariff, *see* Tariff question  
 Public debt; *see* National debt  
 Public domain; *see* Land question  
 Public roads, 163f., 231f.  
 Public schools; *see* Education  
 Randolph, John, 156f.  
 Religion, 20, 75f., 108, 237  
 Republican Party, 240, 255  
 Roads, 163f., 231f.  
 Rush, Benjamin, 78  
 Schuyler, Philip, 74  
 Scott, Winfield, 211  
 Sectionalism, 35f., 194, 224  
 Sedition act, 101ff., 135  
 Seminole War, 244  
 Shays' Rebellion, 27  
 Shipping industry, 45  
 Skidmore, Thomas, 238  
 Slater, Samuel, 40f.

## 288 THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN NATION

- Slave insurrections, 253
- Slavery, 26ff., 41ff., 110ff., 167, 173, 241f.
- Smyth, Alexander, 205f.
- Spain, U. S. relations with, 50f., 96, 157f.
- "Spoils system," 132
- Standard of living, 225
- States' rights, 141f., 233
- Strikes, 165
- Supreme Court, 139ff., 232ff.
- Tariff question, 59, 70ff., 163
- Taxation, 67ff., 232f.
- Taylor, John, 84
- Tecumseh, 171ff., 184
- Tennessee, 96
- Tippecanoe, Battle of, 189
- Tories, 15f.
- Tracy, Uriah, 149
- Tripolitan War, 137
- Unemployment, 232f.
- Unitarianism, 237
- Van Rensselaer, Stephen, 205f.
- Vesey, Denmark, 253f.
- Voting, qualifications for, 20, 30, 76f., 263, 273
- Wages, 225
- War of 1812, 185ff., 195ff.
- Washington, George, 57ff.
- Wayne, Anthony, 82, 93
- West, British restrictions on development, 14
- West Florida, 182f.
- Whigs, 14f., 240
- Whiskey Rebellion, 92
- Whiskey tax, 67f., 136
- Wilkinson, James, 152f.
- Williamson, Charles, 150f.
- Working class, 34ff., 165f., 223f.